ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Character Conflation: The Just War Tradition and Just Peacemaking Theory as Part of an Intentional Character Development Approach

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ABSTRACT

Character development efforts comprise an important part of the training regime in all U.S. military forces, but a review of those plans shows areas of potential improvement in defining and refining the character construct. This paper encourages an organizationally unique and narrowly specific character definition as a way to further virtue cultivation, combined with an expanded and more realistic ethical construct for the entire spectrum of missions every U.S. military member now faces. The author proposes a new term called "character conflation" to express this process, defining it as: "The unique process by which an organization intentionally identifies and influences character outcomes toward a specific, desired end state." Because of the extensive use of modern U.S. military forces in non-traditional peacemaking roles, instruction in the Just War Tradition should expand to include theoretical development and training in Just Peacemaking Theory. Military members required to operate on any part of the power spectrum need an ethical construct which supports the entire spectrum, not just the ethics of war.

Introduction

"Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet" (Ricks, 2006). This directive was one of the rules Major General James Mattis gave his Marines while he was the commander of the 1st Marine Division during the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the stability operations which followed. This quote received considerable press attention all around the world following his nomination to be the Secretary of Defense (Conway, n.d.; Wilner, 2016).

Mattis made this comment in a specific environment to a particular audience, but the statement does succinctly, and colorfully, illustrate the oft-competing ethical demands experienced by military members. How can one be polite and professional, yet have a mindset so focused on killing? Are these not conflicting ethical and character demands?

My first operational assignment was as a lieutenant in a Security Police Squadron. Shortly after I joined this unit, I deployed to Cairo West Air Base as an Air Base Ground Defense Flight Commander, supporting Operation Restore Hope. As a primary liaison to the Egyptian security forces, I was in strange role, for which I had no specialized training. I was quickly forced to adjust to the host culture, relying on character developed during my upbringing and formative years at the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA). These interactions aimed at developing "polite and professional" goodwill with the Egyptian forces. I found myself not only responsible for U.S. force security, but also required to develop and maintain a low-level international alliance in order to further larger American strategic goals.

Eight years later, on the morning of 9/11/2001, I unexpectedly found myself in a different environment, far removed from building host-nation goodwill. Early that morning, at home in North Pole, Alaska, I watched the World Trade Center South Tower fall on live television. I immediately put on my flight suit and drove to my operational squadron, the 18th Fighter Squadron at Eielson Air Force Base (AFB). Within hours of the attack, I was briefing as part of an alert formation of F-16s on standby for the unthinkable task of shooting down any other hijacked airliners, a White House order the North American Aerospace Defense Command issued that morning (Kean & Hamilton, n.d.). There were still many commercial flights over the Pacific headed toward the U.S., and the full extent of the 9/11 attack was not yet clear. As a result, two F-15s intercepted Korean Air Flight 85, bound for Anchorage, and forced a divert to Whitehorse, Canada over fears it had been hijacked (Levin, 2002). Many across America, military and civilian alike, had their ethical construct unexpectedly challenged that day. During the mission brief, I asked the Operations Group Commander who would give the order to shoot and how to verify that order. Fortunately, that scenario never transpired, but two months later, I was flying combat missions over Afghanistan. In this situation, the latter part of General Mattis' quote proved pertinent. America was unexpectedly at war, and I was part of it.

In an earlier version of this journal, Chapa and DeWees (2016) proposed officer character development as a combination of virtue cultivation and ethics education, and offered a model which expanded virtue education by adding advanced ethics instruction. Kevin McCaskey, also writing in the JCLI, now known as the JCLD stated, "We have defined the desired end state of our strategic approach to character and leadership education as providing an individual the tools necessary to act as a leader of character"

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(McCaskey, 2017, p. 42). Virtue cultivation and ethics education, founded on specific tools useful to further the organizational mission, were offered as new ways to respond to future demands. To continue their line of reasoning, this article encourages an organizationally unique and narrowly specific character definition as a way to further virtue cultivation, combined with an expanded and more realistic ethical construct for the entire spectrum of missions every military member must now face.

Institutional Character Conflation

"Based on the collective wisdom of the ages, we can definitely state that character not only matters, but that for much of recorded history, it has had a fixed meaning" (Wright & Goodstein, 2007, p. 934). Character education has a complex, multifaceted, and rich history extending back to antiquity (Healea, 2006). It is prominent in Western and Eastern literature from the earliest times. The Biblical experience of the Hebrews showed character was central to their relationship with God. Character is also essential in Eastern philosophy, especially Confucianism, which taught people to exercise careful vigilance over their character (Wright & Goodstein, 2007).

Greek philosophers, including Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, had extensive views of individual character and the best way to develop it. Plato identified wisdom, courage, temperance, self-control, and justice as virtues (Wright & Goodstein, 2007). Aristotle was a pupil of Plato but diverged from Plato's internally focused view of character. Aristotle taught the knowledge of virtue is not the same as acting with virtue (Olsthoorn, 2010), and added external factors founded in civil and social responsibility stemming from his experience in the unique societal conditions of the Greek city-state. His writing in *Nicomachean Ethics* remains highly influential on virtue ethics. It opens, "Every act or applied science and every systematic investigation, and similarly every action and choice, seem to aim to some good; the good, therefore, has been well defined

as that at which all things aim" (Mintz, 1996, p. 829). Aristotle did not separate excellence of character and intelligence. Instead, the exercise of intelligence transforms individual dispositions into character virtues (Mintz, 1996). He observed educators struggle to prioritize intellectual or moral virtues, but suggested they do both; increasing intellectual virtues with direct instruction, and moral virtues via good habits (Yanikoski, 2004).

Wright and Huang (2008) point out character is a multidimensional construct consisting of three essential elements. The first is moral discipline, or the ability to constrain personal appetites for the greater good of society. The second element is moral attachment, meaning individual commitment to a larger community. Finally, moral autonomy refers to individual capacity to freely make ethical decisions. This last component is the only one focused internally and means people have the discretion and skills of judgment to act in a moral manner. It suggests the notion of personal responsibility and free will. Combining these elements, Wright and Huang validate the character definition provided in earlier work by Wright and Goodstein: "Those interpenetrate and habitual qualities within individuals, and applicable to organizations, that both constrain and lead them to desire and pursue personal and societal good" (2007, p. 982).

Using this perspective as a framework for character, how does the concept relate to leadership? Almost universally, society acknowledges character is an important or even the most crucial aspect of leadership (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Wright & Goodstein, 2007). But, at the same time, there is little consensus on what makes up character, how to measure it, or how to develop it (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Wright & Huang, 2008). The gravity of this problem is more acute in the military. The potential life-and-death nature of military service and its direct tie to national security means leadership and character take on greater

urgency in the armed forces (Guinness, 1999; Jennings, 2013; Light, 2012; Michelson, 2013).

Character is not the only essential trait of a leader. Hannah and Avolio (2011) argue character is necessary, but not sufficient in itself. Many leadership demands are character-neutral, and leaders must also prove themselves competent in the organizational mission, so "character and competence are the raw building blocks of effective and sustainable leadership" (p. 979). The character component of leadership is clearly important, but harder to define and measure than technical competence. Character has a significant influence on leadership ability, continues to develop across an entire lifespan, and undergirds morality.

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Leaders are by default moral agents who always advance virtues or vices in their environment (Quick & Wright, 2011). But character cannot be fully deduced with current research methodology (Hannah & Avolio, 2011) making it more difficult for organizations to understand, agree upon, and commit resources to its development. Even Aristotle anticipated the difficulty of gaining consensus on how to develop character. He wrote in *The Politics*, "There is no clarity about whether training is to be in things useful for life or in things leading to virtue or in things extraordinary...as what leads to virtue, nothing is agreed about it" (Aristotle & Simpson, 1997, p. 154).

This discussion highlights that there is a nearly universal consensus that character is an essential aspect of leadership, but little agreement regarding what character actually is. This problem means it is important for organizations to clearly define what character represents within their own construct,

and develop their members toward that expected outcome (Light, 2012). Organizational leadership should understand and clearly define the desired end state when it chooses the direction in which to steer character development efforts, a process especially important given the challenges of postmodern ethical diversity (Michelson, 2013).

However, there is a lack of research literature or practical guidance proposing quantifiable character development outcomes, especially those uniquely suited for individual organizations. Because of this, I propose a new term called "character conflation" to express this process. Conflation, in this meaning, is a literary term in which an author combines several different characters into a single person as part of their story development (Hartley, 2014). I define character conflation as, "The unique process by which an organization intentionally identifies and influences character outcomes toward a specific, desired end state." Character conflation is an idea rich with potential for research and theoretical development.

Military Character Conflation

The reader who is familiar with USAFA or other U.S. service academies may see nothing new here. The academies and other Department of Defense departments understand they must provide values guidance that reflects service-specific requirements. But a closer look at departmental guidance and implementation shows room for clarity. Certainly, USAFA takes seriously their responsibility for character conflation, which is one reason for this journal. The USAFA vision is to be "The Air Force's premier institution for developing leaders of character" (United States Air Force Academy Strategic Plan, 2015). At USAFA, character development programs are of such import that the organization responsible for overseeing them is named the Center for Character

and Leadership Development (CCLD). CCLD, in fact, publishes this journal. USAFA defines character as: "One's moral compass, the sum of those qualities of moral excellence which compel a person to do the right thing despite pressure or temptations to the contrary." (United States Air Force Academy Center for Character and Leadership Development, n.d.). This definition is clear, coherent, and provides specific and useful guidance for the USAFA program, but is more narrowly focused than the earlier academic definition emphasizing habitual qualities and societal good (Wright & Goodstein, 2007; Wright & Huang, 2008). The USAFA definition seems to entirely omit the second element of character – moral attachment to a larger community (Wright & Huang, 2008).

However, USAFA further identifies three aspects of a charactered leader as one who "Lives honorably consistently practicing the virtues embodied in the Air Force Core Values, lifts others to their best possible selves, and elevates performance toward a common and noble purpose" (United States Air Force Academy Center for Character and Leadership Development, 2011, p. 9). CCLD points out these qualities align with a growing body of research that views character as three-dimensional, comprised of moral/ethical character, relational character, and performance character (United States Air Force Academy Center for Character and Leadership Development, 2011, p 10). These components mirror the previously mentioned elements of moral disciple, attachment, and autonomy; so expanded USAFA character instruction integrates the idea of attachment to a larger community highlighted by Wright & Huang (2008).

Moving beyond the service academies, however, a view of leadership character exists but is less clear. The Air Force (AF) has a slightly different view on character than does USAFA, and a specific AF-wide character concept remains elusive. *The Airman Handbook* (2015) provides comprehensive guidance to all members of the service and also addresses the issue of character. In the section titled "Military Ethics," it clearly states the expectation for AF members to be "men and women of character" (p. 228). Later in this same document, the importance of leadership character is also emphasized, but is trait-focused rather than describing an internal, guiding mechanism: "The character traits of effective leaders include charisma, compassion, and courage. Effective leadership is a combination of competence and character" (p. 247). The handbook goes on to address integrity, and assign it a definition very close to the USAFA character definition: "Integrity is the moral compass, the inner voice of self-control, and the basis for the trust imperative in today's Air Force. Integrity is the single most important part of character" (p. 252). But, integrity is only one of the three AF core values: "Integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do" (p. 240).

The Army also defines character, albeit with a more expansive description than USAFA or the AF: "Character is one's true nature including identity, sense of purpose, values, virtues, morals, and conscience" ("Field Manual 6-22 Leader Development," 2015, p. 5-1). This definition expanded from the last iteration of FM 6-22 which simply stated, "Character, a person's moral and ethical qualities" ("Field Manual 6-22 Leader Development," 2006, p. 4-1).

U.S. Army Colonel Brian Michelson (2013) evaluated the Army's character development approach and discovered shortcomings, describing it as "laissez-faire." Michelson argues the Army acknowledges character is vital to leadership but offers confused and self-contradictory advice on how to develop it. Michelson concludes the Army has no method to evaluate character, but assumes three things: First, soldiers inherently know what is right and wrong, and desire to live ethically. Second, consistent ethical conduct develops strong character. Third, leaders develop character commensurate with increasing responsibility by individual effort and self-study.

However, Michelson finds both qualitative and quantitative analyses of Army discipline demonstrate soldiers at all ranks sometimes do not choose to live ethically. For example, in 2011, six percent of the active duty population committed over 78,000 offenses. As to the second character assumption, it is based on fatally circular logic. The Army assumes soldiers will become good by "doing good," but also assumes actions must be in agreement with individual values and beliefs, or character. Michelson cites examples of character failure in senior Army leaders as proof that becoming good by "doing good," is ineffective, calling this dilemma the "Peter Principle of Character." Pragmatic rule following at lower ranks can mask character flaws, but higher ranks and levels of responsibility bring increased visibility and fewer restraints on individual actions. Finally, the third Army assumption about character is quiet on what leaders should study to advance their character. "Is studying the philosophical or religious teachings of Buddha, Mohammed, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Plato, Immanuel Kant, Jesus Christ, Nietzsche or Confucius of equal benefit and value" (2013, p. 36)?

Michelson concludes the Army's laissez-faire approach to character development is not sufficient to meet the challenges posed by the current operational environment. He acknowledges the issues associated with character development are complicated and emotionally charged, but best addressed by something other than inconsistent and self-contradictory doctrine. Michelson argues the Army does not know with confidence if character development will meet institutional goals (Michelson, 2013). His evaluation is a negative report concerning the state of character development, but the publication of the critique itself highlights the Army does consider leadership character a priority and realizes it underpins institutional values.

The Army and Air Force are not the only DoD components struggling with the character concept. Light (2012) studied U.S. Navy commanding officers (COs) relieved for cause from 1999 to 2010. He found the dismissal rate for professional reasons increased only slightly, whereas removal rates based on personal and ethical failures climbed significantly. Interviews with the COs removed for misconduct indicated they knew their actions were unacceptable but believed they would not get caught, would not be held accountable, the behavior was worth the risk, or they just chose to ignore the potential consequences.

Light argued these problems should be understood as character failures and necessitate a more in-depth look at the concept. The study suggested ways to develop the officer moral compass and establish a higher ethical standard for behavior. The first step is to acknowledge the problem and create a sense of urgency. The next is to set a standard in writing for the exemplary behavior expected of Naval officers and improve metrics which record officer performance, forming the basis of promotion and command selection. Finally, enhanced moral training, primarily focused on junior officers, should allow them to make and learn from mistakes while growing their character (2012).

The U.S. military values leadership character, otherwise, they would not publish guidance and critical research. But, each service could greatly benefit by moving forward with character conflation efforts. Character conflation should focus narrowly, clearly, and specifically on what the organization values most in its leaders. Do so, and the military may see their efforts yield the increasingly "polite and professional" members envisioned by General Mattis (Conway, n.d.).

Combat Character Conflation

What about that second part of the Mattis quote, "have a plan to kill everybody you meet" (Ricks, 2006)? This evocative statement illustrates the fundamental responsibility of the military to fight and win wars. It also hints at the nexus of character development and ethical combat. Darrell Cole (2002) says, "The importance of character is enormous for military ethics and the just war. Who will be able to formulate good

laws of war if not the wise? Who will be able to follow those laws if not the courageous and self-controlled" (p. 54)? Some argue war takes place outside of the realm of moral reason. They see war as a sphere of interest and necessity where moral argument is a fatal distraction from the deadly and severe business at hand. However, the grand tradition of Western moral philosophy requires all human activities to take place within the purview of moral judgment (Weigel, 2005). How does this broad concept underlie focused character conflation efforts?

A cannon of literature exists on the ethical justification to engage in war and right conduct within war, but less about how human character excogitates the ethics of justified killing. This narrow but important subject is an area ripe for a character conflation. Nobody enters the military with a fully developed ethical construct regarding killing, but the military asks almost everyone who wears a uniform to be ready to do just that if required. How does a new military member think about war? American civil society provides few useful directional cues, so this must be a primary component of military character conflation efforts. Military character training must deliberately and seriously address elements directly applicable to war and how humans deal with the internal ethical struggle when asked to "have a plan to kill" (Ricks, 2006).

Beard (2014) points out that Military Ethics Education (MEE) programs struggle with the multi-faceted demands on character in war. For some, ethics education is synonymous with character development regardless of the situation. Others see military ethics as distinct from general morality and more applicable to expectations of a given military specialty and the expected requirements within it. Although most MEE programs claim to be virtue-based, many of them focus on deontological outcomes and only use the language of virtue ethics. These programs give military professionals little opportunity to develop real virtues necessary in war. Professionalism without moral context creates problems for military members who cannot always rely on common virtue to govern actions that seemingly defy morality, such as intentional killing. Because of this, some argue it is important to educate military members to view their combat responsibilities as a separate ethical realm from the morality governing everyday life.

The U.S. service academies do not agree with this approach, but instead, see character as central to officer development in both combat and peacetime. "Dr. Shannon French, who previously taught military ethics at the United States Naval Academy, used to teach a course named, "The Code of the Warrior." At

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the beginning of the course each semester, she would ask the midshipmen to reflect on the meaning of the word "warrior." She provided five words and asked which best reflects a synonym for the concept. The words were "murderer," "killer," "fighter," "victor," and "conqueror." She found most midshipmen rejected all five because they believed a true warrior needed to be morally superior to any of the concepts these words represented. She pointed out that Thomas Hobbes thought the reason societies formed in the first place was because of a desire to escape murderous appetites and gain security. But the fact humans hate murder means there is an inherent tension within those asked

to fight for their nation. She states, "They must learn to take only certain lives, in certain ways, at certain times, and for certain reasons. Otherwise, they become indistinguishable from murderers and will find themselves condemned by the very societies they were created to serve" (French, 2014, p. 3-5).

As a result, Beard (2014) observes military character training programs tend to feature discussions about war based on two distinct but interrelated principles. The first is what can and cannot be done in war as a matter of law, commonly called just war. But a myopic focus on just war leads to a rule-centric ethic which does not adequately prepare the military member for their multirole commitments. There is more to modern-day military service than only justified killing. Beard notes that service members today face complex moral and psychological challenges since they are expected to fulfill many roles such as warrior, peacekeeper, diplomat, professional, friend, and family member. The second common principle in military training programs, which generally receives less attention, is a focus on the moral lives and character of those participating in war (Beard, 2014). This area, the realm of psychodynamics, requires a focused effort of character conflation. The multitude of military roles, which are often conflicting, are fertile ground for character conflation efforts. Indeed, complex human nature and the force of leader character forms the foundation for national power, even at the highest levels of grand strategy.

The American political scientist Joseph Nye famously developed the concept of "smart power" in international relationships, suggesting it is a mix of the hard power of coercion with the soft power of persuasion. For Nye, power is the capacity to affect desired outcomes on the international stage and is relative to the view of the victim. Effective international power lies in the ability to get others to act contrary to their initial desires. The spectrum of power is a range of options from the hard side of power, usually associated with military action, to the soft side of persuasion and attraction. The challenge for leaders is to find the right, or "smart" mix of power (Nye, 2011). This strategic continuum demands character conflation efforts that teach military members how to think and operate at every point of the power spectrum. For those new to the military, the first responsibility is to provide a character construct for the hard end.

Just War Tradition

Just War Tradition (JWT)[1] provides the bulwark for hard power in most Western nations. Cicero made an early argument for just war in his work *On Duties (de Officii)*. He viewed war as part of the natural law of self-preservation. Self-defense to secure peace was the only justifiable reason for war. For Cicero, peace was grounded in justice, which he considered the supreme moral virtue of community life. He viewed justice from a negative perspective, to do no harm, as well as a positive viewpoint, kindness or generosity to advance the collective good. He criticized the Roman Empire for failing to exhaust discussion as a means to peace (Simpson, 2007).

JWT formally materialized under Ambrose and Augustine in the context of the Christian Roman Empire undergoing what would prove to be a devastating barbarian invasion (Stassen & Gushee, 2003). Bishop Ambrose served as the ideological bridge between Cicero and Augustine. Ambrose read Cicero extensively and lauded his moral insight, if not his theology. Ambrose recommended Cicero to Augustine and passed on two major ideas, the paramount importance of justice if peace was to prevail, and the idea that the pursuit of peace based on justice was the only justification for waging war (Simpson, 2007). As Augustine faced the geopolitical dilemma of invading Vandals, he considered how to balance Christian

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1 JWT can refer to Just War Theory or Just War Tradition, terms normally used interchangeably. I use "tradition" because JWT is not doctrine but has increased in many Western nations to a degree of ideological maturity and practical authority that renders it much more than a theory.

teachings with the need for violence in its defense. His solution was a justification for war under certain circumstances with self-imposed limits on harm. This idea is considered the beginning of the JWT and later made a significant contribution to consensual Western thought regarding self-restraint in war (Johnson, 1984).

Readers of JCLI will likely be familiar with the two JWT pillars, *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. Augustine said of jus ad bellum, or the justice to go to war, "Just wars are defined as those which avenge injuries, if some nation or state against whom one is waging war has neglected to punish a wrong committed by its citizens, or to return something that was wrongfully taken" (Mattox, 2008, p. 36). Along with *jus ad bellum*, JWT developed on another pillar, *jus in bello*, or ethical conduct within a war. The vital distinction is justification for entering war does not extend to allow unrestricted conduct while engaged in combat. The ends in war do not justify the means; *ad bellum* criteria[2] justify entry into war while *in bello* considerations [3]limit combatants.

The choice to wage war is at the discretion of U.S. political leadership, not the individual military member. Military leaders have little input into a decision for war unless they achieve high rank and serve in an advisory position to national civilian leadership. For this reason, military senior developmental education programs are usually the first to cover the strategic issues of JWT. On the other hand, just conduct within war applies to all members of the military. In bello considerations must be a significant character conflation focus area because, "The claim of national purpose is often, in war, made to excuse acts of military force that reach beyond the

limits of what is moral" (Johnson, 1984, p. 169). This temptation means individual character must guide *in bello* actions under fire, an extremely challenging demand on combatants operating under JWT ideology.

JWT provides deontological (from Greek deon), or duty guidance to combatants but struggles to address the aretaic concepts of individual virtue (arête) within war. The distinction between deon and arête is an essential aspect of character development efforts (Beard, 2014). Most U.S. military units understand this so encourage comradery built on a "warrior's code" oriented toward the culture and tradition of the military, but reflecting service and unit-specific priorities. The intent is for the individual to internalize a code that will help form identity and character, rather than a mere understanding of the legal requirements of military duties (French, 2014). The core values of different DoD departments are one example of the virtue ethics approach to character conflation.

Kasher considers a counter-argument to character-centric military training. He points out some eschew character development and focus instead on teaching appropriate, values-based behavior. These naysayers see typical military virtues as those anyone in or outside of the military would condone, and therefore, do not reflect the unique nature of military service. Furthermore, many in postmodern society view morality as relative, so talk of definitive virtues falls on deaf ears. They argue that military members should instead understand what it means to be part of the military in a free and democratic nation, and how their behavior supports the values and norms liberal democracies cherish, such as freedom. This lead away from a virtue-based approach toward a behavior-centric, values-based orientation (2014).

Under this view, dwelling myopically on individual character failures diverts attention from institutional leadership or process breakdowns. Failing to look at

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2   Ad bellum criteria vary slightly from source to source but generally include: (1) just cause, (2) competent authority, (3) right intention, (4) last resort, (5), relative justice, (6) proportionality and (7) a reasonable hope for success.

3   In bello considerations commonly include: (1) discrimination (if a person is a combatant or not) and (2) proportionality, or are planned actions morally justifiable.

the situation holistically misses potentially flawed structures or systems. Another criticism of virtue-based training is that military members have difficulty deciding what to do when virtues conflict as they often do in combat. In a final critique, virtues oriented specifically and narrowly toward combat may not provide adequate guidance for a force employed in other ways more common in the modern era such as peacekeeping, police actions, or coalition building (Robinson, 2014). These criticisms have merit and need attention as part of DoD character conflation efforts. Just Peacemaking Theory is one way to address these concerns.

Just Peacemaking Theory

Most members of the U.S. armed forces are familiar with JWT, commonly taught in many curriculums across the military. But lacking in current military training programs is instruction on a soft power companion of JWT, known as Just Peacemaking Theory (JPT). JPT originated in the work of the recently deceased Dr. Glen Stassen at Fuller Seminary. It is an approach to international conflict which argues first for preemptive initiatives to reduce international and civil tensions while moving nations toward justice, reconciliation, and peace. JPT adds a third paradigm to the pacifism and JWT schools of thinking about international crisis (Stassen, 2008). U.S. service members in the modern, all-volunteer force are not pacifists, narrowing their ethical frameworks to consider only JWT and JPT.

JPT is best viewed conjointly with JWT. JPT does not replace JWT but is complementary because it advocates advanced diplomatic alternatives, but acknowledges the need for military action after all other options fail. JPT first came about during the 1980s when major religious groups started taking issue with the nuclear arms race. A consensus view emerged that the debate between pacifism and JWT was inadequate because it focused the discussion solely on if it was right or wrong to fight a war. Because modern war is so destructive, JPT arose as a third option to consider elements of national power and is currently under theoretical development (Stassen & Gushee, 2003).

The JPT approach emphasizes peaceful resolution for international tension points rather than a rush to violence, proactively considering pathways to peace in attempts to avoid war. It is not pacifism since adherents are willing to wage war if required. Instead, it is an activist, politically engaged, and realistic approach to international conflict that bridges the gap between pacifism and just war (Watson, 1996). It solves a significant problem with current views of war because those who view some conflicts as right still need an ethic that guides initiatives for peace. On the other hand, those who argue war is never the answer need to have a realistic solution when peaceful measures are not working (Stassen, 2008). A major JPT strength is to bring the pacifistic commitment to nonviolent initiatives and the JWT call for a just outcome into coherent alignment (Cahill, 2003).

Most of those acquainted with the military will see JPT as familiar, but primarily within the purview of the Department of State (DoS), and other agencies like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The DoS mission is: "To shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just and democratic world and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere," a mission statement they share with USAID ("United States Department of State agency financial report," 2016). However, joint DoD planning guidance acknowledges solutions to complex international issues can rarely be found in one agency and frequently require a whole of government effort and interagency cooperation. At times, the DoD will be in a supporting role in these endeavors ("Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation," 2016). DoD personnel at all levels are responsible for conducting or supporting soft-power diplomacy and spend a lot of

time doing so. JPT is proactive, an ethical framework for actively building community, not just prohibiting or allowing certain behavior in war (Cahill, 2003). It offers one ethical construct to train service members for soft power employment since so much operational effort happens in this domain.

JPT has ten specific recommendations, divided into three broad categories (Stassen & Gushee, 2003). The first category is peacemaking initiatives,[4] the second is justice,[5] and the last is love and community.[6] JPT encourages geopolitical powers, especially the great ones, to cooperate and build international institutions which help mediate ongoing conflict and prevent future ones (Morkevicius, 2012). But JPT also makes requirements of individuals who seek peaceful justice by compelling them to engage international tension points proactively. JWT provides standard criteria and a lexicon for evaluating the legitimacy of war but does not adequately address how to avoid conflict or build relationships. JPT, on the other hand, provides concrete suggestions an individual or government can take to improve international relationships (Morkevicius, 2012). Injustice is a significant cause of war, so JPT attempts to move the world toward justice in a peaceful manner by advancing democracy, human rights, and religious liberty, as well as encouraging just and sustainable economic development (Stassen, 2008).

It is this point which makes JPT important to service members. Whereas JWT is mainly agnostic to the individual, other than to follow its deontological guidance, JPT makes demands of people to act in ways which build community and further national interests. It is entirely compatible with and complementary to a program of virtue development. JPT provides an ethical framework for character development programs, and flexibility for the individual service member to consider the entire range of smart power missions they are likely to face. For example, USAFA cadets routinely support service projects in their local community (Welch,

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2017), West Point cadets participate in the Soldiers for Citizens community service program (Cole, 2015), and Naval Academy midshipmen collect food as part of the Harvest for the Hungry program (Anonymous, 2017). Are these worthy philanthropic programs merely ways to give back to the local community, or are they also building character and a useful ethical framework for future officers?

These are just a few of the countless programs across all DoD components which encourage preemptive, involved, individual action to further justice and build relationships within the local community. All military members understand supporting their local community is an essential expectation of military service. Do they

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4   JPT recommendations are to: (1) support nonviolent direct action, (2) take independent initiatives to reduce threat, (3) use cooperative conflict resolution, (4) acknowledge responsibility for conflict and injustice and seek repentance and forgiveness.

5   In this category, recommended actions include: (1) advance democracy, human rights, and interdependence and (2) foster just and sustainable economic development.

6   The last recommendations are: (1) work with emerging cooperative forces in the international system, (2) strengthen the United Nations and international efforts to cooperation and human rights, (3) reduce offensive weapons and weapons trade, and (4) encourage grassroots peacemaking groups and voluntary associations.

understand it also forms the foundational building blocks of JPT, and as such, can be one component of an effective organizational character development strategy? Efforts to foster a sense of community and personal responsibility are at the core of JPT, so these are complementary goals. But how is a soldier who spends her evenings coaching youth sports contributing to U.S. national security interests? As she spends time coaching and mentoring, this soldier, like the cadets and midshipmen serving their local communities, is practicing the skills necessary for later operational missions. Are her leaders giving her this sight picture or just encouraging her volunteerism merely as a way to contribute to the local community and further her career? Every encouraged or required activity for all service members must have a long-term objective of building and furthering national security. In a JPT framework, this soldier understands how her seemingly unrelated efforts to coach youth sports aim directly at increasing justice and thereby support national security strategy.

To be clear, JPT is in its infancy as a theoretical construct and has notable shortcomings. For example, Cahill (2003) rightly points out JPT does not provide an ethical endorsement of coercion, an unrealistic oversight in international conflict management. Although a full discussion of JPT is outside the scope of this paper, it has a significant advantage in that it provides an ethical construct to DoD in support of DoS, USAID, and other goodwill missions.

One recent example is DoD support for Operation Tomodachi after the Japanese tsunami disaster in March 2011 (Wilson, 2012). Missions like Tomodachi are positively focused, extending a helping hand to international actors, but also furthering U.S. national interests. Preparing for and conducting soft power missions has the potential to advance the personal sense of awe which drives the learning touted in an earlier JCLI issue (Chapa & DeWees, 2016). JPT can provide the DoD with an ethical construct and character conflation guidance when training for this mission.

Conclusion

The U.S. military plays a significant role across the entire power spectrum of national security. I experienced this throughout my entire career even though my primary skill was decidedly aimed at the hard end. JWT gave me adequate deontological guidance for combat, but I had no ethical framework for soft power missions so I learned on the job. The inadequacy of a full-spectrum ethical framework, combined with the paramount nature of leadership character as it intersects with postmodern challenges, lead to several important points. These areas are worth consideration for leaders thinking about character conflation. Although my recommendations revolve around military examples because of the JCLD audience, these issues are equally pertinent to civilian organizations and business leaders.

First, organization leadership must decide what constitutes character and clearly define that expectation for their members. As I have argued, character is almost universally acknowledged as a critical aspect of leader efficacy, if not the most significant dimension. A quick review of the news on any given day makes it empirically obvious that leader character remains central. Without fail, the character of political leaders features prominently, especially in the U.S. political process. Although there is a universal consensus that character is supreme, as Aristotle pointed out, there is almost no consensus on how to develop it or what it means. This point becomes obvious even in the cursory review of DoD guidance covered in this paper. Leaders must decide what character is, what it means to their organizations, clearly define it, and actively foster it in all members and at all levels.

Next, organizations must develop an ethical framework adequate for the entire mission set. A workable ethical construct is an essential part of

character conflation. Character conflation without comprehensive ethical guidance is useful to some degree but is not enough. Current deontological guidance provided via the JWT is inadequate since DoD members are engaged daily all around the globe on missions not adequately addressed by this framework. JPT, combined with JWT, is one idea for the DoD to provide a comprehensive ethical framework for military members likely to engage interagency and international partners. JPT adds ethical guidance for these cooperative efforts and helps the member understand how individual initiatives to build community play an important part in national strategic policy.

Finally, altruistic actions by DoD members are worthy and important, but they must aim at strategic goals and individual character conflation when they are encouraged by military leaders. These endeavors are common all over the DoD; indeed, there has been a long-running debate in the AF about including volunteer activities in Enlisted Performance Reports or not. Although I do not intend to solve this debate, I will point out that mere encouragement of altruistic actions falls clearly within the JPT domain and can be a useful component of character conflation and ethical guidance which extends across all elements of the power spectrum. If these activities are not useful to national security, they should not be encouraged. On the other hand, if they are important, DoD leaders owe it to their members and the nation to explain why they are worthy pursuits. Community service actions are beneficial when they orient the individual toward smart power as enacted by U.S. foreign policy. These can be part of the foundation of character and the ethical framework that seeks the justice advocated by Cicero and lauded as an individual virtue by Plato (Wright & Goodstein, 2007). Justice on an international scale comes from enacted virtuous justice of people and is the aim of both JWT and JPT (Cahill, 2003; Morkevicius, 2012). Justice is a prerequisite for peace and provides the nexus

of JWT/JPT ethics and character conflation because moving toward justice furthers the common good.

Wright and Huang highlight this point in their definition of character which emphasizes the individual pursuit of societal good (2008). Societal good is found in numerous ways, sometimes coming on the heels of the painful course of war, at other times coming through the difficult work of peacemaking. Either way, military members must be ready to further justice, a calling reflected in their unique service codes and core values, and common constitutional oaths. For these professionals, character conflation helps to develop moral discipline, attachment, and autonomy (Wright & Huang, 2008). This paper defines that progression as, "The unique process by which an organization intentionally identifies and influences character outcomes toward a specific, desired end state." This process must remain a central theme in DoD training, even as the mission requirements and character of those entering the military continue to diversify. A purely deontological approach cannot work for the U.S. military, varied mission requirements are outside a behavior-centered approach, and conflicting values common in postmodern society require a conflation process.

Pledged to defend the Constitution of the United States, service members must be able to think and act broadly in ways that further peace of order, the peace of *tranquillitas ordinis*. Justice brings about this peace and is where national and international interests intersect (Weigel, 2005). This noble calling highlights the critical nature of a military character construct and ethical framework to be polite and professional, but deadly when called upon to defend justice.

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