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Leading
IN THE
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CENTER FOR CHARACTER & LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY

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Cover Image: Murano glass tile walls in blue, red and yellow signify various building functions at the Air Force Academy. Viewed closely, the tiles are all individually unique. When placed in wall-sized matrices, they present an intricate but coherent expanse of color reflecting both the individuality and unity of the Academy's graduates.

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FROM THE EDITOR

A Matter of Necessity

Christopher D. Miller, *Executive Editor, JCLI*

This special issue of the *Journal of Character and Leadership Integration* illuminates issues of direct and pressing importance to military professionals. In a globally-connected, always-on world that brings a sense of omnipresence to ongoing ancient animosities and newly-brewing conflicts, the context in which military professionals perform is both complex and demanding. We address two closely related aspects of the challenge: the evolving geopolitical, informational and technological context in which military professionals must lead and succeed; and the ethical, intellectual, organizational, and educational adjuncts of that evolving context. From a variety of perspectives—that of senior leaders within the Department of Defense, military educators and senior institutional leaders, American and international educators—the articles assembled here provide a wide range of insights on the leadership acumen and character attributes that modern military professionals must possess, and how they can be developed and strengthened.

As this issue goes to press, the Department of Defense (DoD) will be gathering, for the first time, the leadership of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard professionalism centers, along with civilian thought leaders, in a symposium devoted to strengthening military professionalism and culture. This “professionalism summit” is intended to build community while sharing tools, insights and solutions to common challenges. It is an idea whose time has come—because as one of our feature articles points out, the “old” uses of military force are no less necessary or demanding, while “new” uses and definitions of military force are rapidly adding to the moral and intellectual complexity of the tasks military professionals must navigate. Immediately after the DoD summit, the U.S. Air Force Academy will host its 23rd National Character and Leadership Symposium, which this year brings together over 5,000 cadets and faculty with visiting students and exceptional speakers in a two-day event focused on “Professionalism and the Profession of Arms.” The thoughts expressed

Lieutenant General Christopher D. Miller, USAF (Ret) is the editor-in-chief of the *Journal of Character & Leadership Integration*. His active service included leadership as the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for strategic plans and programs, operational command of B-2 and B-1 bomber units, and in Afghanistan; and a wide variety of other positions in homeland defense, policy analysis, international relations, human resources, aviation and academic settings. He was a 1980 distinguished graduate of the Air Force Academy, and earned graduate degrees from the U.S. Naval War College and Oxford University.

in this issue of the JCLI are intended to inform, energize, and sustain the dialog and learning that needs to take place at these two significant events.

In this Issue

We open with an interview focused on DoD's "Force of the Future." In the candid conversation, the Honorable Brad Carson, who is the Secretary of Defense's senior advisor on personnel and readiness issues, surveys topics from leader education and development to workforce flexibility, diversity, and management processes. Secretary Carson outlines an ambitious agenda for making DoD's military and civilian members more effective that will require—just as much as legislative change and process modernization—a change in the mindsets and cultures of leaders at all levels. His broad, no-punches-pulled perspective underscores the necessity of changing DoD's industrial-age processes and the magnitude of the tasks required to do so.

In the first of two feature articles, a former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a two-time university president and retired senior military intelligence leader, and a retired naval officer and innovation entrepreneur collaborate to advance the thesis that it is *management of effects*, not the management of violence, that is at the core of a 21st-century military professional's competence. Proceeding from an analysis of the cyber attack which wrought havoc on the Sony Corporation, Admiral Stavridis, General Rokke and Captain Pierce examine the Cold War civil-military relationship and definition of professionalism advanced by Samuel Huntington, and the concomitant Combined Arms Warfare mindset that characterized the last few decades, and find them lacking to cope with the

more complex, non-nation-state, multi-domain conflicts of today and tomorrow. Their essay is a clarion call for examining the way we currently think about the profession of arms, and the roles that military and civilian leaders play in understanding and organizing the management of potentially lethal competition on the world stage.

In this issue's second feature article, the Secretary of Defense's Senior Advisor for Military Professionalism makes a compelling case for a renewed emphasis on value-based ethics as the essential underpinning for the military profession. Her sense of urgency is not born of a crisis of confidence, but of the fundamental importance of retaining trust. Touching on the complexity of human organizations, the way people and their environments interact, and the duty that leaders have to bring an ethical climate "to life," Rear Admiral Klein and Lt Col Basik cite the importance of leaders upholding and exemplifying high standards, building trust, and developing habits of integrity and a sense of professional identity that will spread throughout the scope of their influence. The essay closes with a powerful reminder that today's military professionals are engaged in noble and honorable work

... The articles assembled here provide a wide range of insights on the leadership acumen and character attributes that modern military professionals must possess, and how they can be developed and strengthened.

that is imminently worth pursuing.

Leading off a series of articles exploring different aspects of military leadership, Professor Gene Kamena and Dr. Aron Potter provide an insightful survey of the critical nature of trust in relationships in the military. In it, they assert the importance of and explore the ways that the emotional construct of trust operates to bound the degree of respect, confidence or commitment that members of

an organization will have for their leaders. Gaining and maintaining trust is tricky, developing it is not a linear process, and achieving high levels requires leaders to understand the roles that both emotion and truth play in achieving trust.

Two Air Force Academy professors and a colleague from Colorado College provide a thoughtful analysis of leadership development at a military academy, focusing on how a deliberate program can foster identity change. Professors Davis, Levy and Parco explore the development of leadership identity and sense of purpose, and the steps that lead to such development. They touch on impediments to development, and examine how women and men interact within and with the studied development process. The authors surveyed a population of cadets with regard to their phase in the officer development process and the values they place on various leadership levers, testing three hypotheses and concluding that higher-level organizational roles require very different skills from mid level roles; change readiness is an important element in any leadership development process; and women did not favor relationship-oriented leadership levers as strongly as expected.

Richard Pircher's contribution on self-leadership and perception represents not only an international scholar's viewpoint, but a valuable perspective on organizational leadership and leader perceptions from outside the military sphere. Dr. Pircher's thoughts on self-organization and his exploration of non-hierarchical approaches to accomplishing an organization's mission are clearly orthogonal to historical and mainstream U.S. military organizational practice, yet his work offers some intriguing insights for diverse sub-organizations and cultures within DoD, particularly those with rapidly evolving or specialized mission demands. Equally importantly, his observations on the ways in which human beings perceive and decide are a valuable offering

to military professionals immersed in endless and often contradictory streams of information.

Captains Chapa and DeWees combined their operational experience and intellectual acuity to offer a thought-provoking look at how young military professionals can develop the ethical framework needed to deal with ambiguous, unpredictable, and consequential circumstances in which they will have to make decisions. Using a case study to illuminate the life-and-death stakes, and the ambiguity of the ethical environment, the authors introduce the concepts of awe—a sense of wonder and attraction to something larger than one's self—and of the frontier of individual knowledge, or the limits of the known—as a way to build the character necessary to “answer well the questions we cannot possibly foresee.”

Our closing essay is by the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy, Lt Gen Michelle Johnson, and underscores the reasons that this discussion of “Leading in the Profession of Arms” is a matter of necessity at this time in history. Drawing from personal experience and observation, she highlights the human complexities of the world in which today's military professionals must develop, operate and succeed. Such things as operating in an environment that demands decisions amid overwhelming information; operating outside comfort zones; bringing together the rapidly evolving scientific and technical aspects of our world with the foundational perspectives of the humanities; educating, equipping and empowering young men and women to take creative chances when necessary to meet opportunity—all of these are demanded by the military strategic and operational environments faced by today's soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. The Academy is well aware of these challenges and is focusing on adaptation of its curriculum, continued development of character, and beginning a wholehearted emphasis on building capability to educate and innovate collaboratively in the new cyber domain, in the form of a new Air Force

Cyber Innovation Center. In these and other ways, Gen Johnson concludes, we must and will empower leaders to take creative chances.

What's Ahead

In our next regular issue, the Journal will seek to explore character development topics in greater depth, as outlined in the Call for Papers on page 91. We will also inaugurate a standing Book Review section, to enhance the Journal's value to those concerned with character and leadership issues but lacking the time to read all that is being produced on the subject. In that light, we welcome both suggestions for books to be reviewed, and contributions of book reviews by thoughtful contributors. A call for book reviews is included beginning with this issue.

As before, we remind the reader that we intend this Journal to serve one purpose: to attract and empower both contributors and readers so that both can share and increase wisdom on issues of character and leadership. We are intent on extending the Journal's reach in both print and electronic versions, and solicit inputs on the way the JCLI is presented and the topics it addresses. Just as many authors in this special edition stress the need for creativity and agility, we recognize that implementing these concepts are essential to JCLI's ability to fulfill its purpose and connect with its readers. We need your engagement, your suggestions, your critiques, and your contributions to achieve that end. Write to us at JCLI@usafa.edu.

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INTERVIEW

Creating the Force of the Future

Brad R. Carson, Acting Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness)

Interviewed by: Christopher D. Miller

The U.S. defense establishment's approach to its people must adapt to meet the challenges of 21st-century national security. Dissatisfied with today's military personnel processes and concepts originally designed for the Cold War, and civil service systems with roots over a hundred years old, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has called for a concerted effort to define and move toward a more modern approach to human capital—toward a "Force of the Future." As DoD's senior appointed official in the Personnel and Readiness sphere, Brad Carson recently shared some thoughts with JCLI on the challenges and benefits of this new approach. The Force of the Future is one in which military leaders could develop greater agility and leadership effectiveness through better use of civilian graduate education and corporate exchange programs, combined with an approach to advancement that is inherently inclusive and values formative experiences over seniority. At the same time, a less restrictive "career pyramid" would allow DoD to bring specialized skills into the force when needed, moving away from today's reliance on long, closed personnel pipelines that rarely match the size or character of changing demands. Achieving these sorts of changes is difficult and will require willingness inside and outside DoD to re-look elements of existing law and policy; but even more, will require a widespread shift in thinking to be fully successful. The words flexibility and innovation, while often over-used, are indispensable attributes for DoD's new approach to people if we hope to retain the finest examples of military and civilian professionals and enable them to effectively provide for the common defense.


The Honorable Brad R. Carson is the senior policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on recruitment, career development, pay and benefits for 1.4 million active duty military personnel, 1.1 million Guard and Reserve personnel, 748,000 Department of Defense civilians, and is responsible for overseeing the overall state of military readiness. He previously served as Under Secretary, Chief Management Officer, and General Counsel for the U.S. Army, a Member of the U.S. Congress from Oklahoma's 2nd District, a White House Fellow, CEO of Cherokee Nation Businesses, and in a variety of other academic and advisory positions. His military service as a Naval Reserve Intelligence officer includes deployment in 2008-09 with U.S. Army explosive ordnance disposal teams in Iraq. He holds Bachelors' and Master's degrees from Baylor and Oxford universities and a J.D. from the University of Oklahoma.

JCLI: *What are the key characteristics that you are looking to develop in future DoD civilian or military leaders?*

Carson: Creativity. Commitment. A sense of purpose. A sense that you can realize all of your professional ambitions working for the Department of Defense, even if that means leaving us for a while and coming back in. That's what I want for us. I want us to be a culture of innovation, of thinking, of having a critical distance on our own activities, one that is embedded in a love for what we do and the institutions and the history that we bring to it, but recognizing that it has to change. So that's what my ambition is. To be able to attract people in. And this is a place that is often hard to find elsewhere, a real sense that you are doing something important, and I think that's what people want.

JCLI: *Given that "Force of the Future" is the strategy for the Department's effort to achieve those kinds of aspirations, can you share a synopsis of its most salient parts?*

Carson: It has a military and civilian side to it. There are about eighty different reforms. I think fundamentally what we want to do is move what is currently a pyramid with pretty steep sides to it, to more of a matrix or a network, or [as Secretary Carter said], a "jungle gym" approach to things. Because we find lots of people, especially the people who want to rise to strategic leadership within the department, want to do things over the course of their career that are more divergent than the current system would permit. I've seen this in the Army closely, where we have key development positions,



Oct. 29, 2015. DoD Photo

we have command positions, we have professional military education you have to meet. And if you spend any time between these positions cooling your heels, waiting for these positions to open up, the time between promotion points is quickly eaten up. And if you want to go, for example, and get a master's degree or Ph.D. from a civilian school, you are likely to be punished by the system, because you will miss something that you should have otherwise done. We see this in a new study from a very distinguished Ranger who is now teaching at West

perspective. You are just not tactically proficient, which is what we privilege now in promotion to the highest levels. In the Army, you may have been a terrific battalion commander or brigade commander. But those are not necessarily the same skills which you need to lead the Army and to give advice to the President on how to deal with Syria or China. The skills are amazing, in your ability to synchronize combined arms, this requires an organizational genius of sorts. But it is a different skillset from understanding how the Army or Air Force needs to be in the world.

I want us to be a culture of innovation, of thinking, of having a critical distance on our own activities, one that is embedded in a love for what we do and the institutions and the history that we bring to it, but recognizing that it has to change.

While we need to have these different experiences, we don't make it very easy for people. And this is especially punishing those folks that we need to recruit

Point, in the summer issue of *Parameters*. If you are one standard deviation above the IQ norm, as a West Point cadet, your chances of promotion to major, lieutenant colonel, being picked up for command, are less, eighteen to thirty percent less than the average. And that's not because of an anti-intellectual bias, it's that these top performers want to do something a little bit different, they don't want to do the ruthless track of company command, battalion XO, go to [Fort] Leavenworth, and come back--they want to do something a bit different from that. And as a result, they do that, and they find themselves on the short end of the promotion stick.

and retain more of, especially women. Only about twenty percent of the military services are women, and they leave at a higher rate than men. At the same time, they are dominant in higher education, especially with master's degrees. So if you need a more cognitively skilled workforce, you need one that is more open to women's participation. And right now we really don't have that. And I think we can do those sorts of things without really sacrificing readiness. To me, keeping really able people in the services, and making this a hospitable environment for them, enhances our readiness and doesn't detract from it. But being in the military, I think there is some suffering that is required, and [if] you go to Ranger School, it is about suffering. But we should not gratuitously impose it on people during the course of their careers, because they will leave.

So my hope is that we can make it a slightly more flexible system, where we can be grooming strategic leaders earlier in their careers, giving them broadening experiences that don't come at the expense of depth. Because now we've traded those things off. So we could see a world where the Chief of Staff of the Air Force might have a Ph.D. in English Literature from a top American civilian school. That to me is a better world, because it gives you a broader

As I look forward into the future, we have lots of reasons to be concerned about the all volunteer force. We've kind of papered over it in the past fifteen years

because we had a strong sense of mission. A strong sense of patriotism and that people wanted to fight, especially after 9/11. But we've also greased it with a lot of money. Year upon year increases in basic pay and BAH, huge bonuses. The Army at the height of the war was spending almost a billion dollars a year in bonuses. We had moral waivers and lowered academic standards. So, we have been enabled to try and jury-rig it together. We're at a point where the Chiefs say, the compensation bill has grown so large, we can no longer even afford to do this, we have to find ways to cut it. The Army is not even meeting their recruiting mission at this point, and the Army is a bellwether on this and on retention. So we can look to the future and see that more money is not going to be available to us, so we have to change the value proposition for service. It may not be as lucrative, but it might be better. That's what we are trying to do now.

JCLI: *There are a great number of embedded challenges in those goals. Are notable changes needed in any of our current national defense or service-specific cultures, and if so, what might those changes look like?*

Carson: We have to have a culture that accepts the notions of more flexibility in personnel. Because many of the cultures can swallow up any reforms that I choose to offer by not promoting people who take advantage of them. The services get to decide who rises up to become the general officers, to become the Chiefs, and if we don't reward the people who do these kind of activities, they won't do them. We see this already in the sabbatical programs, because they are under-subscribed. People think, I guess, "it's available, but I will get punished on the back end?" The promotion board will come up and people will wonder where I have been. And until the services reward that and change the culture, you won't have the kind of differences that I am hoping to see.

At the same time, I am inspired at what Daniel Patrick Moynihan once said about politics and culture, where he said that culture is more important than politics, but sometimes politics can save a culture from itself. So what I can do here is use the bully pulpit of this office. I can change some regulations and rules and duties, and ask Congress for some statutory change, and in some ways, these new rules can push the culture to make the changes that I see are needed, and many people in the services see are needed. The inertia is intense, but that's my hope.

JCLI: *As you've talked about leadership characteristics and managing them in an enterprise the size of the Department of Defense, what do you envision with regard to metrics and incentives applied across DoD?*

Carson: They look like a world in which half of the general officers that are promoted across the services have been to civilian institutions for their master's degree or have a higher degree than that. Where half of the general officers have had training with industry, like a year or two with one of the big high-tech firms, for example. The Air Force is great about that already. Here's an anecdote that illustrates the cultural differences. We have a Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows Program, where we send people out to some of the best businesses in the country. It has produced, over its career, twenty general officers. Fifteen have come from the Air Force. The Army has produced none that went through that program. So I

We have to have a culture that accepts the notions of more flexibility in personnel.

want to see a world kind of like what the Air Force has now. Where we have a lot of general officers, senior leaders, who have been out to Google, to UPS, to Proctor and Gamble, and see how other large organizations operate

and can bring those lessons back to us. At the same time, these officers serve as ambassadors to a civilian world that is increasingly distant from us. So those are some of the metrics. I would like to see more women, more African Americans, more Latinos, especially at the highest ranks, I would like to see their promotion percentages, which we closely monitor here, tick up. I would like to see better “branching decisions” . . . sometimes, the challenges that we face in diversity appear at the very earliest parts of a military career, when people choose to be in a particular branch that doesn’t lead to the apex of the pyramid. So I want to see, in all of these kinds of things, incremental improvement on them, year after year.

JCLI: *A former defense secretary recently wrote that as he was addressing personnel and readiness issues, he was often angered by various factors preventing real change. Regardless to the degree that you share that view, what are the obstacles you see within your own organization? Moving beyond P&R, what challenges are you are trying to overcome?*

Carson: I think there are problems in general with what I would call functional organizations [of human relations and legal personnel], who often come to be seen as compliance officers. And many of these folks, because they have spent so many years in it, have an almost Pharisical devotion to the book, and the rules, and an interpretation of what those rules might mean. And therefore, saying “no” is what the HR community does, what lawyers do, and both often are about checking to make sure that you did it all correctly, as opposed to helping make it what it should be. It seems that especially in the private sector, [human resources people] are more often strategic enablers who are about saying yes and getting to yes. That is much of the frustration that people have had with P&R in the past. The perception

is, “You are the custodians of all those rules, from equal opportunity and diversity, to who gets money and how people are promoted, and you always say no to us.” Well, we do have to say no on occasion. But a good lawyer or a good HR person goes in and will say, “Tell me what you want to do, and I will help make this happen.”

Many of the things that come to me do not have clear yes or no answers, because if they did, they would have been decided two or three echelons below me. There are complicated and controversial issues and people can disagree how to interpret this regulation, this policy, this statute. But instead of saying yes or no, we can offer people risk management alternatives, which I think is really important. So that is what we are trying to do.

JCLI: *In that light, with regard to the statutes that you have to deal with and resulting personnel policies, do you see an absolute need for a revision of landmark legislation like the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act [DOPMA], or the Civil Service Statutes? If so, are there things that are particularly important to change?*

Carson: I do think that we need wholesale revision to those major pieces of legislation, like DOPMA, which was passed in 1980, and the Civil Service Act of 1883, the Pendleton Act, and its progeny that defined the civilian public sector today.

Looking at the military side, careers are too short. We force people out as a colonel at thirty years, at the age of fifty, close to the peak of their powers in terms of doing a cognitively important position. [The impact of age is] more complicated if you are in the infantry, but most of the jobs are not in the infantry. You are doing mental calculations and transformations in your head, and you’re at the peak of your powers when we force you out. And that doesn’t make sense to me. We have a

world today where, because of that statute, the [William F.] Halseys, the [Douglas] MacArthurs, the [George C.] Marshalls, wouldn't have seen the end of World War II. They would have been forced out, even with a Presidential dispensation. That makes no sense to me. We have to have longer careers where people can get these broadening experiences. I am told by Air Force officers, when you are a high potential officer, you are going through jobs every ten or eleven months in the later part of your career to be prepared to be a general officer. That gives you a certain perspective on the different parts of the Air Force, and that is important. If you have longer careers you can stay in those jobs for more time, because that [rapid turnover] hurts the organization. I saw this on the Army Staff. We are rotating through, if you are a three star, maybe every two or three years, if you are a principal on the staff. And so in three years, [your staff has] completely turned over. You don't have time to see long-term reforms through, because you are trying to make reforms in the short term, you don't have the subject matter expertise that the SES [Senior Executive Service] person next to you does who has been there for twenty years, and he outwaits you.

We have to have longer careers because that will allow us to facilitate other reforms. We need to remove the fixed promotion points, so when you are at sixteen years, [in the current system] you are up for lieutenant colonel plus or minus one, whereas [a new system would look to see whether] you have certain competencies instead. So you could perhaps be screened for lieutenant colonel at twenty years, or it could be at twelve years, depending upon when you have got certain things, milestones achieved. I think it's important to do on the military side. Longer careers, longer jobs,

I think that's really important. [So is] making that pyramid a little less steep and giving people places to get on, perhaps halfway up.

On the civilian side, the system is both over structured and under structured. We don't spend as much time with civilians as we do the military with career development. A great thing about the services is that we tell you all about what you need to do to succeed at the next level. But many times the services have published plans, do this, do that, to move on up. And it can be claustrophobic, almost, in how intense they are, but they do give people a sense of "I need to be the "3," the XO," or whatever you need to do. Civilians don't have that. What do you need to do to move up to the next step? You really don't know. We don't really devote nearly the money that we spend on the military side to training. The military has this great tradition, it's about education. We send them off to school all the time. It's continuing education. You don't have that on the civilian side. We need more there. And we need more flexibility. It's frustrating to me that if—for example—a Mark Zuckerberg-type person came in today and said, "I would like to join the U.S. military," we would have to say, "you don't have a college degree, so we can perhaps make you an E-4, but without a college degree, that's all we can do—I'm sorry." If he went and got some fly-by-night college degree, the statute would allow [a Service] in theory to bring him in as an O-3, but we don't do that, we bring everyone in as an O-1 in the line branches. It doesn't

I think it's up to senior leaders to try and create a culture where failing is permitted and even encouraged so that it's a "fast failure," as Silicon Valley would say. That is very hard, on the military side.

make any sense to me. But the same is true on the civilian side. You probably couldn't break in at all. Maybe he could

come in as a GS-5 or GS-7, with minimal responsibilities, and it would be a minimum of a year in grade before he could move up, but he probably couldn't break in to begin with. And this doesn't make sense to me. And so, moving to a more flexible system works. What we've seen that in the past thirty years, enabled by IT, the private sector has had a revolution in HR, in that they use data, they collect data, to make sure you are suitable for the job, they do non-cognitive testing, they use cognitive testing, they do whole person evaluations, they have spent a lot of effort on each person. And we need to go to that on both the military and civilian side, as opposed to this industrial age wholesale approach in which you are all interchangeable. We move you through the job, maybe you work, maybe you do not . . . But we can do better.

JCLI: *An incredible amount of detail goes into constructing a civilian position description, but particularly in the higher civil service grades, hiring authorities really want someone who is flexible, adaptable, capable, creative--and yet the system draws a black and white box around candidates. How do you reconcile this disconnect?*

Carson: When I was in the private sector, I always hired as they say in the NFL, "the best available athlete." For example, you may not actually be trained up in the latest Microsoft Excel skills, you might need to be good at "X",

We may not understand Snapchat, or YikYak, but this is the world we live in...

but you are terrific. A divergent thinker, a great leader, you might have some interesting experiences, I want you, and I will train you on something that is pretty trivial, like how to use Excel better. But we can't do that on the civilian side. It's like we must specify six skills for a financial

analyst: "you have proficiency with Excel, you've done the job for one year at the next lowest grade, etc." But I want a holistic evaluation of you, to know whether or not you have the right temperament for the job, things that are outside the narrow four corners of the job description. We don't currently have the ability to do that.

JCLI: *You've talked about changing the context for DoD personnel management, but can DoD incentivize managers at all levels to be willing to take reasoned risks? Is there a "system fix," a character development approach or some combination of the two that would allow people to make well-intentioned mistakes, or have less than perfect judgment, and still perceive they have a career or a path for potential advancement?*

Carson: I think it's up to senior leaders to try and create a culture where failing is permitted and even encouraged so that it's a "fast failure," as Silicon Valley would say. That is very hard, on the military side. It's hierarchical, and if you don't have a culture where disagreeing is encouraged, you might have a situation that is very dangerous [to your career]. And so people stay in their lane, to use the cliché, and don't want to challenge senior leaders. To me, the only fix is to have senior leaders who reward, encourage, and promote people who dissent. And I can say "Thank you G-1 for giving me your views on this, I see that you believe passionately, it makes a lot of sense, but I am going

this direction. And I am not going to hold that against you, in fact, I am going to reward you and your profound professional advice." You have to, as a leader, encourage people to disagree with you.

That's the only solution. I don't think there is anything we can do to provide instructions, or put them into a pamphlet or regulation, aside from developing a culture of "this is how we do things around here." And it becomes a culture that is so powerful, it wants to bind senior leaders,

who might want to break from it in some way and punish it. No. The culture around here is that the lowest guy can raise his hand and say that that's bunk. And it's hard to do, both in the civilian and the military side, because of the nature of the rewards system that is there. So its up to your leaders to say that I like the guy who is thinking differently, so make him a general in spite the fact that we disagree on many, many things.

JCLI: *You seem to be advocating a hybrid culture that will span older, hierarchical generations of leaders and younger, more fluid-thinking leaders; that will allow dissension and discussion yet still maintain the ability that hierarchy brings with it. How do we do that?*

Carson: Yes, that's the balance that we have to strike. And it is not an easy one to craft ahead of time. You just have to worry about the execution. But we do recruit, not conscript, and you do have to depend upon the market, and when we look at what millennial preferences are, for example, we can't be blind to them. We may not understand Snapchat, or YikYak, but this is the world we live in, and so long as we are recruiting that cohort into our world, you have to understand where they are coming from, and try to find the best of their practices that don't take away from what we need for mission success. If we don't account for that, we won't be able to fill in the ranks. These are the expectations for many people now, is to have a different sort of approach. If we want to say that it is incompatible with military service, we can do that, but we will find it harder to recruit, and we will find ourselves a greater distance from the broader population. I'm not going to say a priori that you can't do that, but whether it's wise to do it, even if you could is another question.

We saw, in the 1990s, some incredible recruiting and retention issues. There's no

...while I can see a world where you can bring lateral talent into key missions, it's not for every job.

reason to think that that was a one-off period, and we are now coming back to a time of austerity. The surveys of the troops in the Military Times and others talk about widespread disgruntlement; they feel everything is being balanced on their back. The mission sense of being at war is going away, and we are coming back to garrison. There are going to be some real challenges.

JCLI: *Do you see anything in the force of the future that would require us to change traditional military core values or the traditional sense of what a military professional is?*

Carson: I hope not. Because I think those values are really important. They are important for the country, they are important for the success of the military, and they are, on their own terms, beautiful things. That's why I enjoy working for the Department of Defense, because you meet people who have devoted themselves to the country, to the fellow men and women that they have served with. In a way that sometimes almost seems quaint, given the way the broader culture has moved to a more narcissistic, more "me" generation, but these are folks who believe in taking care of their people, and in serving something, and about whom we can say "he or she is a patriot" and it does not seem ironic, like it would if you were out in the broader culture using that word. Some people think that it is an odd word to use, but here, it is very heartfelt, no-one thinks twice about it, and it's a beautiful thing.

You don't want to change that in any way, and I don't think people want to change that, because while I can see a world where you can bring lateral talent into key missions, it's not for every job. In combat aviation, or submarines,

or infantry, it's something you come into and you stay, you grow into, you accrete skills over time. But much of the military work we do today isn't like that. Even in 2015, people think of the infantry when they think of the U.S. Army. That's 56,000 people of the active component out of 500,000 people. They are critically important, they are the people at the tip of the spear, but the average person in the Army is not infantry. They may be enabling them, they might be close to them, but many times they are doing other things, high tech skills, for which there is a lot of training being done on the outside too. So for me, you may look and say that there are jobs that are a long way from the tip of the spear, and for which there are a lot of civilian analogues, and we should buy the training that they are doing and bring them into the force, rather than think we have to train all these folks ourselves. There is a way to mix those people and skills, but I don't in any way to want to diminish the martial values that make the military an amazing thing. If Mark Zuckerberg says "I want to be a Marine, I believe in that warrior ethos, and I want to be a part of it," we should find room for him in the Marine Corps. I think there are many people who want to join us and find our values attractive, but they don't want to be an E-4, or an E-1, [if they come] in without a

I'm really after a gestalt switch. I want us to switch the way we think about people.

college degree. We need to allow more people who share [our values] to find their way in, especially when they bring in needed attributes.

JCLI: *With every change in administrations there is new energy but there is also turbulence. When we reach that point in the electoral cycle, what are the markers that you'd like to see for DoD's personnel world that reflect the progress you're trying to lead?*

Carson: The most important thing for me is to change the way we think. Keynes, I think, said we are all slaves to a long-dead economist. [That just illustrates that] it's ideas that matter, for they frame how you think about things. I have told many people, including some in the building who have been critical of the ideas that I have put forth, that I'm really after a gestalt switch. I want us to switch the way we think about people. We have to move to a talent management system, where we value the individual, where we enable them with [information technology], and we recognize that people have unique talents. All of us do, not just the top one or five percent. Everyone in the force has a talent, and there are offices that are suitable for them. We need to match those two kinds of things up. If I could convince the whole building to have this gestalt switch, that's victory. How that manifests itself for years to come will be different in each of the Services, and circumstances will demand different responses to it. But that to me is victory. Changing the way we talk—the vocabulary of people is really important.

I do hope that we can push some specific reforms through. More advanced civil schooling, more flexibility, changes to DOPMA, and there is an appetite for that. But those are almost secondary to me in convincing everyone that

there is a better way to think about this problem. Let's all put our minds together and accept that there is a better way to think about it. That has been a big challenge. People have been surprised that there may be a better way to think about it--and that's what I am trying to do.

JCLI: *You see that as leadership in action, in helping people make that [mental] switch.*

Carson: Yes. Exactly, and it will last long after I am gone. If we can inculcate a new kind of viewpoint, the people that run the services and those who succeed me will execute upon that and make it better still.

JCLI: *Ten to fifteen years from now, if you were to paint a broad picture of the force that you would see, are there any really significant differences or similarities that you would want to highlight?*

Carson: I think I would like to see the intense bonds that have been brought about by these wars to continue. It will be hard in a garrison posture, but that is the most amazing thing I see among our leaders today. In my time in the Army, I saw colonels at the beginning of the conflict who are now three or four star [generals]. They worked at various echelons. This guy was battalion commander or brigade commander, another was a division commander. That sense of trust, of knowledge, [they share] is something that I would hate to see lost as we move more to a CONUS-based posture. Maintaining that is really important to me. I would like to see more women at the top, I would like to see more diversity at the top. I would like to see a world where our senior leaders have an education, a deep education in fields that may be orthogonal to what we do here. And not necessarily even in technical skills, but a Ph.D. in military history, for example, would do wonders for a senior leader in any of the services. English literature, to understand how people really work, and are, and think . . . These are things that are really important to me. So I would like to see that. We have examples of these, like H.R. McMaster, Jim Stavridis, David Petraeus. But they are almost the exception that proves the rule. They were very rare, they were hand managed, they were sometimes controversial, they rose up the ranks. But careers like theirs should be “Hey, that’s what we expect.” Our Chiefs should have a master’s degree from the Kennedy School or the University of Chicago, or a philosophy degree from somewhere like that. That’s a good way to be, I think.

We have to move away from the centralized management we have today.

And we are going to see, I fear, a deficit for the next few years. The Army has spent a lot of time thinking about advanced schooling, but even they had moved away from it over the last twenty years. And so people like the Chairman [Gen Dempsey] got degrees in English from Duke. But it will be a long time, if we are not careful, before you see a Service Chief or a four star general with that kind of background because we’ve gotten away from it. And you see it in all the services. The marines have almost no tradition of that. The Air Force not as much as the Army does. The Navy somewhat. I hope to see more diversity and more grooming across all the services of potential strategic leaders. Some services do better jobs than others on this front. But we need people in the highest ranks who have a strategic vision about how our military forces can be used.

JCLI: *We haven’t talked much about management infrastructure--actual nuts and bolts, the way that the Department keeps track of, assesses, and mechanizes its personnel processes. How do you see the next generation of personnel management systems evolving?*

Carson: We have to move away from the centralized management we have today. When you go to the various personnel centers, HRC, BUPERS, and you see one person, two persons managing hundreds if not thousands of people. And as a result, you really can’t know your people well enough. The only solution to that is not to radically increase the number of detailers in these installations, but to move to a market based mechanism, which is one of the things that we advocated in the Force of the Future. We should have a world where you are populating information yourself, because you think people care about it, so you are willing to put information out there about your avocational interests, what you studied in your spare time, maybe where you grew up, languages that you picked up along the way from

your wife or your own cultural experiences, maybe you are an immigrant. Then, when you have commanders who are searching for certain qualities, like people who have expertise in Africa, they don't just search officer record briefs or call someone at HRC or BUPERS or the Air Force Personnel Center who happens to know something beyond what's in the brief. Commanders should have a way to find out that when someone studied Swahili as a student, but he never got a certification so it wasn't on the officer record brief, and he's a member of the Royal Africa Society just because he is interested in the subject, and he has spent TDYs and mission trips in his time off to Kenya. That's a person some commanders would love to come join their AFRICOM team, because he is not some random guy assigned by rule, but a person with a passion for the AOR who could really bring and develop some expertise. There will be bounds to that, there will always be jobs that are hard to fill, and those that we will have to compel to fill, but we do use bonuses now to go to some hard to fill positions. But that's what we have to do-- give commanders more discretion in hiring people.

One of my staff members just came from Army Human Resources Command, and despite Herculean work and spreadsheets and tracking systems, she couldn't really know that much about the hundreds of names and lives and family considerations she was supposed to manage. IT should solve that problem for us, and it can. And this is a great example of a win-win. The service members are happier, the service is better, because the system as a whole is better at finding suitability. That's what has to happen I think. That's what's the future is going to be. The centralized management is archaic, and we have to move away from that.

JCLI: *What advice would you give to a young person these days who wants to contribute either as a military or civilian professional to our national security?*

Carson: Study. Read a lot. Develop your intellectual capital. Henry Kissinger once said, you have to develop your intellectual capital before you commit to government, because then you are just drawing on it. You don't have the chance to build it back up much because you are so busy. And there's a certain truth to that. I find the people who are really valuable are those who seek excellence in the work they do, and have spent a lot of time to master things that are tedious. The PPBE [Planning, Programming, Budgeting & Execution] process here. The acquisition process. If you want to know how to affect the Pentagon, you need to know how that system works.

Study. Read a lot. Develop your intellectual capital. The really important work is not very glamorous, but you need to master it, or else you will find yourself being carried along by the world around you.

They are very narrow disciplines, but they are critical. For me, it's understanding how the bureaucracy works, where the people are, who makes the decisions, where the money is, how DOPMA really works. It's easy to get caught up in Sunday talk show banter about how the world should look. The Secretary of Defense needs to care about that, but one can make a lasting impact too by knowing how the bureaucracy works. To master the bureaucracy is to effect change around here. Otherwise, there is going to be some wizard in the A-8 or the G-8 or N-8 who will be telling you how the world works, and they will be defining your "box." You need to be able to interrogate them and say "No man, I know how this works too, and it doesn't work like that. I want you to do it like this!"

That's my advice to people: the really important work is not very glamorous, but you need to master it, or else you will find yourself being carried along by the world around you. And unable to grip it in any event.

JCLI: *Thank you, Secretary Carson.*



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FEATURE

Crafting & Managing Effects: The Evolution of the Profession of Arms

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Recent operations conducted against U.S. businesses and its citizens have once again exposed a critical vulnerability in how the United States government thinks about and defends itself against non-kinetic instruments of power. This is particularly true in the new man-made domain of cyber. In December 2014, a high-profile breach of Sony Pictures was linked to a state sponsored cyber-attack by North Korea. Apparently, North Korea was motivated by opposition to the film, *The Interview*, a comedy about the assassination of North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un" (Clark & Giles, "Hackers Hit Sony, Microsoft Services," 2014). The Obama administration retaliated for Pyongyang's alleged cyber attacks on Sony Pictures Entertainment by imposing sanctions against the country's lucrative arms industry (Lee & Solomon, "North Korean Arms Dealers Targeted," 2015). It is too soon to tell whether this response was appropriate and effective. However, the apparent difficulties we faced in determining how best to respond indicate that the assumptions underlying the definitions and responsibilities of our military profession, most of which emerged following World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, are badly in need of updating to accommodate new forms of warfare.

The end of World War II and the emergence of the Cold War resulted in a surge of brilliant academic scholarship concerning the Profession of Arms. In 1957, for example, Harvard political science professor Samuel Huntington published his seminal book, *The Soldier and the State*. This was a monumental effort explaining why and how the modern military officer corps represented a profession in the same sense as those of law, clergy, and medicine (Huntington, 1957, p. 7). Two key themes

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emerged from Huntington's work. First, the optimal means for civilian control of the military was to professionalize it. Second, Huntington argued that the central skill of military competence, unique to its profession, was best summed up by Harold Lasswell's phrase: "the management of violence" (Huntington, 1957, p. 11). In short, for Huntington as well as other nationally recognized scholars of his time, the unique professional expertise of military officers was focused on the achievement of successful armed combat (Huntington, 1957, p. 11).

We believe the first part of Huntington's theory still holds. In a democratic society the military is a profession requiring civilian control. We will argue, however, that the Huntington assertion of "management of violence" as the unique expertise of the Profession of Arms needs to be updated from his 1957 model. We will assert that members of today's Profession of Arms are "the managers of effects" while the primary responsibility for defining the desired effects, particularly in the strategic arena, lies with civilian leadership at the national level. This assertion builds upon Professor Joseph Nye's concept of soft power

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introduced in 1990 that argued "winning the hearts and minds has always been important, but it is even more so in a global information age" (Nye, 2004, p.1). Since 1990, soft power has migrated in importance as the information age technologies become more and more advanced. And more importantly, the information revolution is changing the nature of power and increasing its diffusion, both vertically and horizontally, marking the decline of the sovereign state and rise of a new feudal type world (Nye, 2004, p. 113-114). Finally, we also will maintain that these hard and soft

effects can be generated not only in the natural domains of air, land, sea, and space, but also in the new and increasingly significant man-made domain of cyber.

Huntington's World (Military Civil Relationships)

The Profession of Arms as we know it today owes much to Huntington's ground-breaking framework for civil-military relations and national security. Huntington's seminal work was rooted in a bi-polar world where most of the destructive military power was possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. A key tenet of Huntington's work was a complex relationship between civilian and military authorities, with the military subordinated to civilian control. He offered several prescriptions for achieving and maintaining the stability and the utility of this relationship. The output of Huntington's theory included an intellectual framework for analyzing the extent to which the system of civil-military relations in a society tended to enhance or detract from the military security of that society (Huntington, 1957, p. viii).

Huntington's focus was on the nation-state with its responsibility to thwart threats arising from other independent states (Huntington, 1957, p. 1). For him, achieving a stable and productive relationship between civilian and

military authorities was essential for maximum security of the state. A key assumption of Huntington's model was that violence almost always originated with a nation-state and was directed toward another nation-state. In this environment, the threat or actual use of force embodied in national armies, navies, and air forces was the best way to keep the peace. Thus, Huntington asserted that the unique expertise of the military profession was to manage violence.

Huntington's model proved useful for a half century, during which security depended largely on national

capacities for managing violence in the natural domains of air, sea, land, and space. His model, however, falls short with the emergence of non-kinetic instruments of foreign policy to include those within the man-made cyber domain. Particularly within the cyber domain, nation-states and their militaries are no longer the sole managers for instruments of force. A new assortment of non-kinetic actors in the cyber as well as natural domains using soft power can achieve hard power kinetic effects.

Both national and non-state actors operating in the cyber domain have targeted Iranian Oil Ministers' computers, foreign financial institutions as well as foreign energy sectors and even senior political and military leaders, causing significant damage (Porche, Sollinger, & McKay, 2012, p. 35). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen, stated in 2011 that cyber was "...the single biggest existential threat that's out there" because "cyber actually more than theoretically, can attack our infrastructure and our financial systems" (Healey, "No, Cyberware Isn't Dangerous as Nuclear War," 2013). Cell phones, for example, are an essential tool for economic prosperity as well as for financing and planning terrorist operations. Significantly, such cell phones costing \$400 today match the computing power of the fastest \$5 million supercomputer in 1975 (Manyika, Chui, Burghin, Dobbs, Bisson & Marrs, 2013).

New Answers to Three Questions

Our call to update Huntington's definitions and prescriptions for the Profession of Arms is driven by the emergence of new answers to three fundamental questions which have been traditionally used to define a global security situation: 1. *Who are the major actors?* 2. *What can they do to one another?* 3. *What do they wish to do to one another?* Scholars of international politics and national security, beginning with Professor Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University, have taught us that when the answers to these questions change in significant ways, the global

security environment is fundamentally altered (Hoffman, 1965, p. 92-93).

Historical examples include the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the French Revolution (1789), the Congress of Vienna (1815), the unification of Germany (1870) and the end of World War II (1945).

And so it is that the intellectual platform and inspiration for "new thinking" about the Profession of Arms by early Cold War scholars was the emergence of new actors (United States and the Soviet Union), new capabilities (nuclear weapons) and new intentions (propelled by ideological split between democratic and communist ideologies). Quite properly, their analyses and policy prescriptions were based on "new realities" of the postwar period and ultimately came to reflect the desired effect of "containment," which was conceived and developed by civilian leadership at the national level.

New Realities of the 21st Century

Now we must come to grips with the "new realities" of the 21st Century, realities which began to emerge with the fall of Communism and the Soviet Empire in the 1990's. With such additional dynamics as the incredible advances in technology and communications as well as the end of the Cold War, it's apparent that the global security system has once again experienced new answers to Professor Hoffmann's three fundamental questions. As in 1789, 1815, 1870, and 1945, the global world of national security has been turned on its head.

Who are the New Actors?

Some actors on the international scene have disappeared while others, to include a wide variety of non-nation state entities, have emerged. Many of the traditional major actors emerged with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty ending the Thirty Years' War (Lind, "Understanding Fourth General War," 2004). This agreement set the stage

for the previous war-fighting entities such as families, tribes, religions, cities, and even commercial organizations to consolidate and fight under the monopoly of the nation-state militaries (Lind, 2004). Until recently, such state versus state warfare remained the standard model. However, we are now witnessing a partial resurgence of the pre-Westphalia model as non-state actors such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Jemaah Islamiyah and others to include drug-cartels and crime syndicates have emerged as very real participants in the international security environment.

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What can they do to Each Other?

As demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks, these non-state actors are capable of global terrorism with various means of attacking nation-states from suicide operations to decapitation of individual citizens. Ironically, these new actors are in some important ways “returning to the way war worked before the rise of the state” (Lind, 2004, p. 12-16). Many of the non-state actors also are adept at using modern, non-kinetic instruments such as social media and other tools emerging from the cyber domain to achieve their desired effects. Using these cyber tools, they have, in effect, revitalized and bolstered Sun Tzu's notion of getting into your opponents head. They have expanded the battlefield beyond the traditional domains of air, land, sea, and space to accommodate more effectively than ever before the battles of wits.

What Do They Wish to do to Each Other?

Nation-state actors still appear to be focused primarily on traditional goals of maintaining and expanding their power and influence, but generally follow internationally accepted Geneva Conventions for conducting war. This is not the case, however, with the new non-state actors, who too

frequently have clearly eschewed conventions accepted by the more traditional nation-state actors since Westphalia. For them, the battlefield has taken on a wider range of options with less regard for such notions as “just war theory.”

Indeed, recent attacks involving malware tools for hacking into corporate entities such as banks and large merchandise sales entities (Target, Home Depot, Sony, etc.) as well as internet accounts of private individuals demonstrate a departure from traditional emphases by combatants on enemy military targets.

The Need for a Wider Lens

Cognitive psychologists tell us that when faced with complex problem sets, we are “wired” to simplify our task by using “frameworks, lenses, or concepts” to reduce the problem scope to a more manageable, “bite-size” challenge. Most certainly, this pertains to the analysis of predicaments that nations face on a continuing basis in the arena of national security. Such analysis is at the heart of John Boyd's “orientation phase,” the most critical component of his famous “Observe, Orient, Decide and Act” cycle (OODA Loop) (Coram, 2002, p. 327-344). It is the stage in the cognitive process by which the participants attempt to define the “reality” of their problem set. Quite understandably, the simplifying lens traditionally used by leaders in the national security arena has focused on the military weapons of the time. Indeed, this tradition has been employed since at least the Chinese Spring and Autumn Period of the eighth through the fourth century BC. Today, it exists in the form of the Combined Arms Warfare (CAW) concept with its focus being ships, planes, tanks, and missiles.

Cognitive psychologists also tell us that such simplifying lenses inevitably turn out to be inadequate for comprehending realities faced in complex problem sets. In an earlier article, we have argued that the CAW concept encounters this difficulty when used as a lens (Rokke, Drohan & Pierce, “Combined Effects Power,” 2014). In our current security arena, for example, it fails to accommodate the emerging cyber domain as well as non-kinetic instruments of power resident in the traditional air, land, sea and space domains. Because the CAW concept limits “vision” to the traditional instruments of military force, new forms of power, to include those emerging from the cyber domain, are anomalies and excluded from our concept of “reality.” Understanding the power of these anomalies requires a new way of thinking and thus a new and wider lens beyond the traditional CAW lens with its focus on the natural domain weapons systems. The new lens we have offered might properly be called Combined Effects Power (CEP). The CEP construct is a way to maximize and harmonize the effects of kinetic and non-kinetic power. The key issue it tackles is what effects we want to achieve using both hard and soft power (Rokke et al., 2014).

In a very thoughtful piece entitled, “Winning Battles, Losing Wars,” Lt General (retired) James Dubik suggests that this dilemma has characterized virtually all post-9/11 wars and attributes it in large part to the “civil-military nexus that underpins how America wages war” (Dubik, 2014, p. 16-17). We agree with this assertion and believe

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that the problem emerges with the very first challenge in international conflicts: the selection of proper war aims. Too often, our war aims (desired effects) are neither crisp

and coherent nor realistic in terms of their demands on the American people for blood and treasure. One need only review the predicaments we face or have recently faced in Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and, now, North Korea, to understand how battles can be won while their wars are lost.

War aims go wrong when they are based on faulty assessments of reality. Assessments of reality are wrong when the concepts or “lenses” we use to help us understand our security predicaments are unable to accommodate complex challenges. In short, we cannot adequately address the complicated, non-linear aspects of international conflict in today’s world if we rely on the linear CAW approaches designed for the more simple hard power era of the Cold War. Sam Huntington’s 1957 framework was brilliant in its hard power design and has served us well. The time has come, however, to flesh it out with “new realities” including soft power, that square more accurately with the 21st Century. We must come to grips with the facts that the post-cold war era has yielded fundamentally new answers to Professor Hoffmann’s three questions: Who are the major actors? What can they do to one another? and What do they wish to do to one another?

Need for a New Way of Thinking

We believe that the first step in this process is to change the initial question that is used too often for addressing emerging challenges in the national security arena. In place of the traditional focus on how we might best combine our military instruments to successfully fight wars of destruction, we must first have an answer to a “foundational” challenge: “What is the effect that we wish to achieve?” In most situations, particularly at the strategic level, this is a question for our senior civilian policymakers. They must be the primary determiners of desired effects. Equally important, they must understand that without a coherent definition

of desired effects, the military as well as other entities with foreign policy tools are not in a position to craft effective responses beyond the CAW model. This is true regardless of how accurate their assessments of the security challenge might be.

In sum, we believe Huntington's concept of civilian control, with its emphasis on the professional development of our military, remains vital to a democratic society. Also required is a capability and willingness of our national-level civilian leadership to assume a primary role in determining and articulating desired effects. For its part, the military profession must be capable of managing the full spectrum of capabilities within its purview, both kinetic and non-kinetic, to accomplish the desired effects. This may well require some expansion of the traditional professional development process for military personnel. They will need the expertise for an improved capacity to manage a broad spectrum of tools for achieving desired effects as well as the less complex challenge of Huntington's 1957 notions about managing violence.

And so it is that a new first question, "What is the desired effect at the strategic level?" can open the door to a more holistic assessment of and response to the security predicaments in which we find ourselves. As such, it broadens our perspective to go beyond a traditional focus on military instruments to include a more balanced appreciation for non-kinetic alternatives in the natural domains of land, sea, air and space and, equally important, the emerging cyber domain. Once our national security leadership has developed desired effects, they become touchstones which can enable military professionals to go about the task of arraying, selecting, and implementing appropriate strategies and instruments of power. Needless to say, desired effects exist at the operational and tactical as well as the strategic levels. Civilian leadership is likely to call for greater military involvement in the development of desired effects at these less strategic levels.

Need for Updating Huntington's Framework: Sony Example

As we crafted this piece, our national response to the challenge of the cyber strike against Sony Corporation could only be described as perplexed, if not confused. Whether it was an attack on a vital American interest or, less seriously, an act of vandalism was unclear. The strike was apparently the product of a national decision by North Korea, but the target was a non-state actor (Sony) and the location of the strike force could well have been a third country. The attack, while not violent in a traditional way, was certainly serious in its costly impact of some \$300 million in damages as well as its negative impact on an American First Amendment core value. In short, it represented major new answers to at least two of the fundamental questions asked by Professor Stanley Hoffman: What can the actors do to one another? and What do the actors wish to do to one another? From a traditional perspective, North Korea was not a new participant in our nation's historical arena of conflict, but it was clearly acting in a new cyber domain

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which made its fundamental character very different from what we faced when it invaded South Korea in 1950. As such there may or may not have been a new answer to Hoffman's third question.

Whatever the case, the 1957 vintage Huntington model was proved to be an inadequate framework for dealing with the North Korean strike against Sony. Indeed, its narrow focus on traditional instruments of force seemed to suggest only two alternatives, both of which were unacceptable.

Few, including the President of the United States, were willing to respond with kinetic instruments of power. At the same time, Americans wanted to make clear to the North Koreans and the world that the strike against Sony would not go unpunished. Perhaps this notion of punishment was the “desired effect.” If so, the instruments of power to create such punishment fell largely outside the traditional tools relevant to Huntington’s definition of the “unique military expertise” as the “management of violence.”

Conclusion

In conclusion, national security conflicts are increasingly a battle of wits and we must update the way we use them to match the increasingly complicated world in which we live. The challenge goes well beyond “what” we think; it’s also “how” we think about problem sets that rest on new realities and principles that render traditional linear approaches

...We cannot adequately address the complicated, non-linear aspects of international conflict in today’s world if we rely on the linear CAW approaches designed for the more straightforward hard power era of the Cold War.

insufficient if not irrelevant. Against this background, Huntington’s classic framework has proved inadequate for accommodating the cognitive and operational pathways required for meeting today’s challenges of the orientation and subsequent phases of John Boyd’s classic Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop. The Sony crisis

can, however, provide an important learning experience for dealing with even more serious situations of a similar nature in the future.

General Dubik’s assertion that our modern dichotomy of winning battles and losing wars can be attributed at least in part to the “civil-military nexus that underpins how America wages war” has substantial merit. Waging war involves selecting proper war aims; we see this as the crafting of desired effects and consider it to be primarily the responsibility of senior civilian policy leaders as an initial step in their decision matrix. Such desired effects rise above the selection of kinetic and non-kinetic instruments for their achievement. As such, they provide a critical context for the selection of relevant instruments and their operational deployment. This, we believe, is a managerial and leadership responsibility of the military profession.

In summary, we are calling for a new way of thinking

on the part of our senior national security leaders, both military and civilian, to accommodate new answers to Professor Hoffman’s three salient questions. This new way of thinking requires us to adapt our simplifying lens to the more complicated world of

the 21st Century. It also requires us to ask a new question at the outset: What effects do we want to achieve using both hard and soft power? Fortunately, as cognitive psychologists tell us, we are “wired” to do this.

♦♦♦

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FEATURE

The (New) Horizon for Value-based Ethics: Insights and Opportunities for Our Profession

Margaret Klein, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Kevin Basik, Headquarters U.S. Air Force

“Officers of all grades perceive a significant difference between the ideal values and the actual or operative values of the Officer Corps. This perception is strong, clear, pervasive, and statistically and qualitatively independent of grade, branch, educational level, or source of commission.” (Ulmer, 1970, iii)

This description of the Army officer climate appeared in a 1970 study on military professionalism conducted by then-LTC Walt Ulmer¹. His report highlighted a clear “disharmony between traditional, accepted ideals and the prevailing institutional pressures” that undermined the professionalism of the officer corps (Ulmer, p. iii).

In addition, he described a culture in need of deliberate focus on multiple factors—individual, interpersonal, cultural and enterprise-wide— which were negatively impacting the ethical and professional state of the Service. He cited an environment

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that “rewards relatively insignificant, short-term indicators of success, and disregards or discourages the growth of the long term qualities of moral and ethical strength” (Ulmer, p. v). LTC Ulmer acknowledged that the situation was “probably not self-correcting,” and therefore required an integrated and multi-dimensional approach to align professional values and behaviors at all levels (Ulmer, p. vi). In the end, a number of recommendations and initiatives were proposed to correct the issues and re-establish a culture of professionalism among its leadership corps. Some of these initiatives undeniably moved the ball forward, elevating the performance and ethos of Service members at all levels.

But 45 years later, evidence in the form of survey data and specific cases requires us to acknowledge that there is still work to be done. Even in today’s exceptionally professional military context, we are reminded of leaders at all levels who cross ethical lines they know better than to cross. Institutionally, reports highlight the unreasonable firehose of requirements levied on service members, reinforcing a culture of unethical “work-arounds” and pencil whipping (Wong & Gerras, 2015). In other instances, culture and climate surveys describe instances where toxic leadership climates fester, undermining trust, respect, engagement and adherence to our core values. (Steele, 2011). In still other instances, accountability to standards is perceived as inconsistent and soft², and those in positions of trust and power exploit that differential to their advantage. Additional evidence indicates an unfavorable percentage of people fear retaliation for coming forward and identifying misbehaviors³. Yes, we have challenges that demand our attention. Although these data points are not representative of the whole Profession, we must recognize that today’s issues are also “not self-correcting” and must be addressed directly.

It was in the context of such indicators—largely represented by a series of General Officer violations and two cheating scandals in early 2014—that the Secretary of Defense created the position of Senior Advisor for Military

Professionalism. Specifically, the position’s charge was to “ensure the effective integration and implementation of ongoing efforts to further improve professionalism, moral and ethical decision-making, and the traditional values of military service” (Terms of Reference). To this end, a cross-Service team was formed to highlight best practices from the military, industry and academia to confront the issues threatening our Profession. That team’s role has largely been to facilitate a critical self-evaluation of the professionalism of our force, identifying integration opportunities, and consolidating and disseminating insights wherever possible to promote institutionalized solutions.

Such critical self-evaluation is not at all unprecedented in our profession. Historically, when we emerge from a period of sustained conflict, there is a natural tendency to re-focus on those fundamental values and practices which align us to our Profession (Snider, 2014). So often, such sustained conflict can create a “drift” in focus toward the urgency of the mission, at times sacrificing the consistent adherence to standards. Today, we have an opportunity to re-examine the alignment or misalignment of our people, institutional processes, and our stated ideals.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey reminded us in a white paper entitled, “America’s Military: A Profession of Arms”:

“As learning institutions, it is imperative that we reflect on our experiences during the past 10 years to assess the impact and understand both our strengths and weaknesses. This is necessary to see ourselves so we can determine how we should adapt and institutionalize the lessons of the last decade. This will enable us to promote the knowledge, skills, attributes, and behaviors that define us as a profession, and develop our future leaders” (Dempsey, 2010, p. 3).

The general conclusion which has emerged during this examination of the state of our Profession: *we are not*

in crisis. The United States of America has the greatest, most professional and capable military force the world has ever seen. The majority of those serving this country do so with selfless dignity, integrity and passion; and often in environments of danger and with limited oversight and resources. Because of this undeniable fundamental starting point, our office has framed its mission not as “fixing” or “creating” professionalism in the DoD, but rather seeking ways to “strengthen” and “recommit” to our already proud professional identity. There is reassurance in knowing the military remains one of the most admired professions in our society, largely because of the consistent demonstration of

action, but to wait for crisis is unacceptably reactive--one does not need to get sick to get better. The factors that either undermine or strengthen our ability to uphold the professional standards must be addressed with a sense of urgency. No doubt, there are unhealthy personal and institutional elements within our profession that warrant a direct, corrective response. Similarly, we cannot ignore the remarkable number of “bright spots” (Heath & Heath, 2010) where, despite environmental pressures and constraints, amazingly productive outcomes are being achieved with honor and professionalism. Our survival as a profession worthy of trust and influence demands we

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(1) be aware of both positive and negative elements and, (2) we respond accordingly in a manner that ultimately strengthens our profession. In some cases, the approach may be evolutionary, and in other

the competence and character the nation expects. However, reassurance is not the target. Despite all of the bright spots, *we can and must do better.*

Reputation and admiration do not absolve us from the need to renew our focus on values-based ethics at all levels. Our profession is existentially threatened with each incident of misbehavior. Every occasion where we are out of alignment with our values undermines the sacred trust with our Service members, as well as between the military and the American people. Regardless of the trigger for this internal examination, there is little doubt the force of the future, albeit operating in an unprecedentedly complex, ambiguous and dynamic environment, will still demand of its members those things expected of all professionals demonstrated expertise in an area vital to society, adherence to the defined ethical standards (self-policing ethic) with a high degree of autonomy, and an identity as a stewards of their profession (Cook & Snider, 2014).

cases, revolutionary. But the solutions must be offered in such a way as to maximize the probability that they endure as an organic, integrated part of our professional culture. This must be about a stronger professional mindset, as opposed to a series of mandated, reactive programs.

So, with that as the background, this DoD-cross service team has committed to approach this effort with a lens that looks beyond the traditional compliance-based view of ethics to one that seeks to foster commitment to the identity of a professional. Indeed, there is a place for rules and regulations, which provide clear boundaries for defining what we can and can’t do within our professional roles. But “not violating the letter of the law” is a threshold that falls well short of what the American people expect from the Profession of Arms. We want the ultimate calculus to balance “can we?” with “should we?”, because with that lens, we’re more likely to tap into the identity that will drive honorable thoughts and actions.

Scandals are a useful impetus for critical reflection and

Ultimately, this effort requires the members of the

Profession of Arms to ask uncomfortable questions, often challenging existing processes and operating assumptions. The Profession of Arms must emerge stronger than ever, and that requires the discomfort of moving from the status quo. To succeed, our office must create awareness, promote insights, build bridges, and move the Department toward solutions in a collaborative environment.

Given all of this, our exploration has identified a collection of key insights and opportunities for our Profession.

Key Insights

We struggle because humans in organizations are complex.

In the end, issues of culture, leadership, professional behavior, ethical decision-making, trust, accountability, respect and countless other constructs related to Professionalism are all deeply human phenomena. And where humans interact in groups and organizations, certain dynamics will emerge. This comment in no way condones actions inconsistent with our core values, but recognizes that our mission is accomplished through people who are multidimensional, emotionally-influenced, diverse and (as behavioral economist Dan Ariely reminds us) predictably irrational. (Ariely, 2010) Added to that, the complexity and scale of our operations require we organize in in a hierarchy for efficiency and oversight, often in an environment of high risk and resource constraint. This interaction of the military professional (individual) in the profession/organization (context) sets the stage for potentially dysfunctional human behaviors and organizational dynamics. Our goal is to proactively understand and shape these dynamics in a way that ensures mission success in line with our values.

In an oddly encouraging sense, the issues we struggle with are similarly challenging in the non-military context.

For example, the 2013 KPMG Global Organizational Integrity Survey found that almost 75 percent of employees reported observing misconduct within their organizations in the previous 12 months, and over half of the employees surveyed reported that what they observed could potentially cause a significant loss of public trust if discovered. Across industries, there is evidence of ineffective or even toxic leadership resulting in dysfunctional and corrosive cultures. The Ethics Resource Council's 2014 National Business Ethics Survey showed that of misconduct observed in the workplace, a shocking 60 percent was conducted by someone in a leadership position. Trust in leadership is at historic lows (see 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer), affecting employee attitudes and behaviors. A recent Gallup poll shows that less than one-third of employees are engaged in their jobs, while 53 percent are not engaged, and a dangerous 16 percent are actively disengaged⁴ (Gallup, 2014). Given this environment, we were not surprised to hear the topics of trust, integrity, accountability, adherence to standards, respect and commitment consistently highlighted as challenges at all of the corporate ethics roundtables, conferences and discussions in which we've participated.

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So, the somewhat reassuring news is that we in the Department of Defense are not unique when it comes to these persistent challenges. Additionally, there is promise in that we can learn from those in the corporate, non-profit and academic arena precisely because we are all working with humans in organizations. There are "bright spots" and best practices we can definitely adapt and adopt. But, we must never lose sight of the fact that the context of the Profession of Arms is unique in that our ethical missteps can have much more profound consequences than other professions.

We must be relentlessly committed to strengthening our professional ethic, for the individual and the organization, no matter how strong it currently is. Good enough is never good enough.

Success in the human dimension is about People and Environments.

The greatest weapon system and asymmetric advantage we have is our people, and it is through this resource that we achieve our success. Herein lays the importance of recognizing and focusing on the *human dimension*. As was famously stated by former Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams about his beloved Service, “People are not *in* the Army, they *are* the Army.” Because of this, leaders have a fundamental burden to bring out the maximum potential in their people in order to execute the task of this Profession. Simon Sinek, in a conversation at the Pentagon, reminded a group of senior leaders, “Commanders are not responsible for the mission. They are responsible for the *people* responsible for the mission.”

Therefore, we must attend in a fresh way to *individuals* – who / how we recruit, select, develop, retain, promote, and place in positions of trust⁵. The behavior of our members is a manifestation of perceptions, decisions, emotions, reasoning, biases, values, abilities, traits and many other complex factors—all of which must be considered when striving to enhance professionalism and ethical behavior.

We must be relentlessly committed to strengthening our professional ethic, for the individual and the organization, no matter how strong it currently is. Good enough is never good enough.

In the preface the 1970 “Ulmer” study, Major General G.S. Eckhardt stated, “The subjects of ethics, morals, technical competence, individual motivation, and personal value systems are inextricably related, interacting, and mutually

reinforcing” (Ulmer, 1970, p. i). Leadership and ethical behavior are demonstrated at the individual level, and we must be deliberately focused on reinforcing those whose behaviors align with our values, and correcting those whose behaviors don’t. When developing and leading these individuals, we must “meet them where they are,” understanding their unique motivations, strengths and limitations in order to maximize their potential. As Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark Welsh III has said repeatedly, “In order to lead them, you’ve got to know their story.”

But individuals exist in a context. Often, when unprofessional behaviors are observed, we quickly conclude that the problem lies with obviously “bad apples” who must be removed. But we cannot ignore how the organizational *environment* may contribute to these behaviors as well. Policies, processes, organizational cultures, and other elements impact and often drive individual and team performance. To borrow a phrase from behavioral scientists, we must look at both the *apples* and the *barrels* (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990; Kish-Gephart, Harrison & Treviño, 2010). Wong and Gerras (2014), in their thought-provoking paper entitled, “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession”, suggest that the unreasonable number of requirements levied on many good officers and NCOs has led to a “surprisingly common” level of untruthfulness (pg. ix). While not excusing this behavior, it is important for our profession to acknowledge

that it may unintentionally create conditions that encourage (or even reward) the wrong actions⁶.

There are powerful, systemic pressures in place that prompt otherwise good, professional

Service members to, for example, remain silent when they see inappropriate behavior from their peers; inflate scores of someone underperforming; grudgingly tolerate sexist comments in their unit; not confront a toxic supervisor, peer

or subordinate; or provide unauthorized help to a student on a test so they can meet the 100% standard.⁷ Again, these examples don't excuse the specific behaviors, but to ignore the existence of environmental pressures only increases the likelihood the behaviors will continue with the next batch of "apples."

We must acknowledge that, because people are involved, there will always be some level of imperfection. We must never be satisfied with behavior that is inconsistent with our values, but it is critical we recognize that "zero defects" in the area of character and leadership is unrealistic. Too often, we respond to crises by creating formal programs that address symptoms and not root causes. This reactive posture is analogous to spraying weed killer, which may kill the specific target, but also damages the surrounding grass (i.e., individual/organizational cynicism, frustration). Rather, we must take an approach more like "weed and feed," where the healthy lawn is also nourished, strengthened and reinforced, while addressing the isolated problem spots. Just as a rich, healthy lawn chokes out any weeds trying to take root, our approach should largely be to feed and strengthen the positive culture of our profession (starting at the unit levels) so that its members address/eliminate any behaviors inconsistent with our values. This is the true nature of a self-policing ethic.

Thus, in order to cultivate such a profession, we must proactively challenge both the individuals and the environment to align with the values we espouse. We must recognize and confront areas within unit cultures, Services or the Department as a whole where pressures (even incentives) exist which undermine adherence to standards, ethical performance and loyalty to do the right thing.

People are hungry to discuss this.

As we have engaged audiences at all levels about issues of professionalism, character and ethical leadership in our profession, we have noticed a healthy energy associated with the discussions. We say "healthy" energy because these topics could potentially elicit superficial lip service from participants or, even more likely, generate into dysfunctional gripe sessions and finger-pointing. Instead, we have consistently received sincere, solution-seeking, aspirational dialog from individuals deeply invested in elevating themselves, their teams and their profession. The "sensing sessions" we have hosted generated passionate and serious conversations that demonstrate the importance with which people approach this subject. Whether speaking with Marine NCOs, Air War College faculty, Army commanders, senior civilians, Naval aviators or the many

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other groups we've seen, there is a universal interest in topics of trust, respect, integrity, accountability, healthy cultures and upholding the standards that make our profession unique. These issues resonate with Service members in their professional and personal lives, and they are eager to move the needle forward.

The interest in these topics is not new. In General Ulmer's 1970 report, he concluded that the "Junior officers (lieutenants and captains) are deeply aware of professional standards, keenly interested in discussions about the subject and intolerant of those—either peers or seniors—who they believe are substandard in ethical or moral behavior or in technical competence" (p. iii). In our current interactions with service members, this insight continues to hold undeniably true.

Without question, members of our profession are interested in the moral and ethical aspect of the work we do. They are proud of the standards, recognize when others are out of alignment with those standards, and feel frustrated when they see others, especially senior leaders, do not uphold them. Conversely, they have shared with us countless examples of the Core Values being embraced and lived out by junior members to senior leaders across all components of our profession. Interestingly, there is also a consistent thread of humility where many of these same Service members acknowledge their shortcomings and commitment to strengthening their own performance, personally and professionally.

In the end, leaders own the cultures and climates of their organizations, and must be deliberate about engineering an environment that truly reflects the values they espouse.

But it is not only important *that* we communicate on these topics, it is equally important to consider *how* we communicate on them. These are intimate and challenging issues that require a level of personal reflection, synthesis and commitment. Because of that, the conversations must be offered in an engaging way that requires a level of candor and transparency potentially unfamiliar to our profession as a whole. When it comes to addressing personal character issues and complex ethical decisions in the real world, we must move away from traditional computer-based modules, predictable down-day mass briefings, compliance-focused training and reactive programs. Instead, to connect with the identity of the professional, we must move to a more intimate, interactive, applied and personal approach.

The solution must be organic and value-added, and it must directly link the desired identity and behaviors with mission accomplishment in people's day-to-day lives. This will require leaders at all levels to commit to not only modeling

this as part of their role as stewards of the profession, but also to ushering in a new era of (to use an Army term) "foot locker conversations" to keep a focus on the constant expectation of honorable thoughts and actions.

Leaders must build cultures that bring the Profession to life.

All of the Services have core values they hold sacred. These are essential guideposts representing what is expected in their respective part of the profession. But the core values can remain broad, aspirational "bumper stickers" to the service men and women if they are not brought to life by the leaders in their units. Those in leadership positions

across the Department must embrace the responsibility to translate and clarify what these core values look like in day-to-day life in their respective organizations, and then unquestioningly uphold those standards. For example, if an organization claims to value service, respect, courage

or even innovation, then the leader must ensure those values are relentlessly present, obvious, demonstrated and reinforced everywhere within the organization.

In our visits with military units, there are many wonderful examples of leaders at all levels who are clearly modeling "what right looks like." In some powerful cases, they also communicate with absolute clarity what will not be tolerated.⁸ Leaders are connecting their people with the pride associated with serving a noble cause, and are reinforcing the importance of stewardship to the profession. They are taking intentional steps to create cultures of trust and respect, and are growing the next generation of leaders.

But there are also cases where those in leadership positions have missed the mark in a big way. Although this represents a minority of the population, there are instances where those in positions of trust and authority have allowed power to negatively influence their decision-making and behaviors. In other cases, leaders have allowed dysfunctional or toxic⁹

subcultures to emerge, perhaps even as a result of their personal example or their unwillingness to uphold standards and maintain accountability. In still other areas, the absence of candor, transparency and open feedback by the leader serves to drive out healthy communication, ultimately undermining organizational trust and performance. As the saying goes, “A fish rots from the head”; so too does an organization with an unhealthy leader.

Over and over again, in our interactions with military and civilian organizations, as well as through insights from thought leaders and the academic literature, we are reminded of the importance of the *local* leader (i.e., the immediate supervisor) in people’s lives. To a large degree, that person is the face of the profession for their subordinates. Yes, Service members will definitely have opinions about their degree of trust toward their most senior leaders (e.g., Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries and Chiefs), but the perception most closely associated to the member’s commitment, attitude, effort and performance, is that of the leader *directly* above them. As a result, we must ensure these leaders see the enormous responsibility in how they articulate and reinforce the expectations of those in their immediate charge.

Peter Drucker famously stated, “Culture eats strategy for lunch.” This is because culture is the mechanism by which the human capital converts strategy into action. A strong culture can be a force multiplier for strategy, whereas an unhealthy culture can undermine even the best strategy. A 2013 study by the Ethics Resource Council demonstrated that in organizations with strong ethical cultures – that is, where leaders consistently communicated the importance of ethics and values, led by example, and held people accountable—the percentage of employees who observed misconduct was significantly lower than those with weak ethical cultures (20 percent in strong ethical cultures vs 88 percent in weak) (2013 ERC National Business Ethics Survey). Leaders set the tone the organization will mirror. Dr. Jeff Smith from the Air Force’s new Profession of Arms

Center of Excellence went so far as to say, “A culture is largely defined by the worst thing a leader is willing to tolerate.” One challenge we can offer is to ensure even our lowest-set bar still meets the professional standard for we can be proud.

But leaders must be on the lookout for cases where even well-intentioned approaches may work against the desired effect. For example, a “zero-defect” culture may originate from a pursuit of excellence, but can have the unintended effect of encouraging members to find unethical ways to maintain the appearance of 100% compliance in order to avoid a damaging professional outcomes (as was the case in the 2013 cheating scandal at Malmstrom Air Force Base) (Guiberson, 2015). Other examples include commanders who relax standards to set an informal, collaborative tone only to find military discipline spiral out of control, or a culture that espouses innovation and initiative undermined by a desire to drive out any risk in the organization.

In the end, leaders own the cultures and climates of their organizations, and must be deliberate about engineering an environment that truly reflects the values they espouse. Culture can be shaped and reinforced through policies, processes, decisions, communications (formal and informal), symbols, artifacts, awards, stories, behaviors and of course, the language of the organization. Again, what is modeled and reinforced by the leadership team clearly defines for the members what an organization truly values.

It all starts and ends with trust.

In his best-selling book, “The Speed of Trust,” Steven M.R. Covey defined leadership as “Getting results in a way that inspires trust” (p. 115). Mission accomplishment that shatters trust is not true success. He goes on to argue that the ability to establish, grow, extend and restore trust (what he calls trust abilities) “is the key leadership competency in the new global economy” (p. 106). Indeed, in our interactions with leaders from corporate, military, non-profit and academia, there was one, undeniable central tenant of organizational success that came up over and over again:

trust. This powerful topic has been shown by scientists to significantly enhance retention, satisfaction, commitment, leadership effectiveness, ethical behavior, engagement and performance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). In any relationship, it's the golden ticket.

Yet we know that trust, while critically important, is fragile and requires continual nourishment. General Dempsey's white paper "The Profession of Arms," stated clearly that the American people will judge the "extent to which we are a profession, and will do so based on the bond of trust we create with them based on the ethical, exemplary manner in which we employ our capabilities" (Dempsey, 2010, p. 1). This trust is earned through demonstration of *competence* and *character*, consistently aligned with our core values. When either competence or character is absent, the foundation of the relationship buckles—and we would argue that breaches of character do more damage and are harder to rebuild. Within the Profession of Arms, the trust of the members with their profession, the trust of the Services with each other, and surely the trust of the American people (and her leadership) with the profession represent our core lifeblood. To break that trust, we threaten the unique autonomy afforded us by the Nation. Ultimately, we must deliver on our promise to do what we say we will and be who we say we are.

Trust is earned through demonstration of competence and character, consistently aligned with our core values.

Trust always involves some degree of risk and vulnerability by at least one party in the relationship. Without this, there is no need for trust. The notion of vulnerability becomes particularly important as we look to the future of the warfighting environment—one that is immersed in volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). In short, our future operational environment is one where innovation, agility and initiation, and therefore, risk-taking, will be

absolutely necessary. Yet, large bureaucratic organizations like the Department of Defense are not inherently agile or comfortable with risk and vulnerability.

In order for us to stand successfully in the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity-laden future, we must build a bridge based on a culture of "bi-directional trust". The *upward* trust of our superiors must be earned through the consistent demonstration of competence and character and adherence to our espoused standards. Conversely, superiors in the Department must be willing to extend *downward* trust by empowering subordinate organizations and individuals to take responsible risks and explore new ideas that may require an unfamiliar level of vulnerability from the institution. We have amazingly talented and innovative Service members, eager to carry the Department of Defense from where we are to where we must go. To convert that potential energy, we must create a culture where the innovation and initiative we desire are met with support and trust.

The path to professional excellence is through habits.

Notice we said character and competence must be *consistently* aligned with our values. This notion of consistency is critical. In our profession, we already embrace this when it comes to the competence-related aspect of professionalism. We are relentless about training and repetitive rehearsal as the way to ensure consistently excellent performance. We "fight the way we train," and we expect the trained response to become automated.

The same focus must be applied to the character-related aspect of professionalism, leveraging intentional repetition to creating what amounts to moral muscle memory.

Let us acknowledge that very few of the senior leader misbehavior and cheating scandals that led to the establishment of our office— or any ethical, unprofessional behaviors that draw shock and disgust – happen for the first time in one dramatic event. Rather, the scandal is often the

culmination of a series of smaller transgressions that were easy to rationalize and justify, especially if no consequence emerged. Minor missteps reinforced the next larger misstep. The discussion about professionalism and character can be cleanly guided by the words of Aristotle, who stated, “We are what we repeatedly do; Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit.”

These habits, developed and strengthened in peace, prove critical during moments of intense conflict and challenge. They also arm us to stand firmly on the path we intend when the distractions of life might otherwise convince us to flirt with the slippery slope in all domains of our lives, whether physical, professional, relational, spiritual or other. And it is a journey that never ends – a “mountain with no top”.¹⁰ In his 1993 address at the Citadel, President Reagan beautifully articulated how, when forging our character, we truly do become “what we repeatedly do”:

[The display of character in life’s critical moments] has been determined by a thousand other choices made earlier in seemingly unimportant moments. It has been determined by all the little choices of years past—by all those times when the voice of conscience was at war with the voice of temptation—whispering the lie that it really doesn’t matter. It has been determined by all the day-to-day decisions made when life seemed easy and crises seemed far away—the decisions that, piece by piece, bit by bit, developed habits of discipline or of laziness, habits of self-sacrifice or of self-indulgence, habits of duty and honor and integrity—or dishonor and shame.¹¹

When these testable moments arise,

the challenge is to have the strength and stamina to align action with intention and one’s identity. The concept of “ethical fitness” (Kidder, 2005) is a natural analogy for the military profession. We have undeniably embraced *physical* fitness as an organic element of our culture, where it is

deliberately expected and practiced by our service members as a fundamental element of their professional lifestyle. Standards of performance are clearly understood, and are easily integrated into our daily activities. Just as physical fitness is a mindset and “lifestyle” commitment, so too must *ethical* fitness become part of the organic experience and conversation in our units at all levels to build strong, automated habits of honorable thoughts and actions.

So often, when we are offered the opportunity for professionalism or character development, the response is, “People should have learned these things from their parents by fifth grade.” So we tend to enter the discussion as if we have already “arrived”; implying that this conversation must be for someone else, and that those who have failed are simply weak, didn’t learn what we did as children, or are simply bad apples. In reality, many of us *did* get exposed to the fundamentals of professionalism and character early on. We may have even developed some strong habits. But one thing is clear: the test never ends. As we progress from fifth grade, new and more complex opportunities emerge to test our resolve on things we have learned earlier (like patience, humility, fairness, cheating, loyalty, generosity, self-discipline, etc.). We do not keep getting fifth grade tests. Just because we are familiar with these values does not mean they cease to become challenging (or require reminding). Very intelligent, (previously) professional and ethical people found themselves in situations they never expected (to include the front page of the newspaper) because they

In order for us to stand successfully in the “volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity”-laden future, we must build a bridge based on a culture of “bi-directional trust”.

stopped focusing on the test, and started building habits of *dishonor*, one moment at a time.

The intent here is not to be patronizing, but rather to offer a possible avenue for developmental conversations to follow. All of us are either in or out of alignment with our espoused

values, moment to moment. Based on our membership in this profession, there are values, expectations and standards that we have explicitly or implicitly agreed to uphold and demonstrate. As the testable moments emerge, we are either “in integrity” or “out of integrity” with our word (a notion defined as Behavioral Integrity)¹². As members of the Profession of Arms, as well as in our roles as parents, citizens, spouses and peers, how we perform during those moments is the basis for our identity, with ourselves and others. This lens of behavioral integrity may be useful for discussing personal and professional behavior in a way that does not reduce conclusions down to “you either have it or you don’t”.

Science can provide clarity in the human dimension.

One thing that distinguishes the world of the 1970s Ulmer report from today is what we know about the human condition. Advances in the fields of behavioral economics, statistics, industrial and organizational psychology/organizational behavior and other behavioral sciences have provided insights that we must leverage. In just the last 10 years, advances in human decision-making, development and motivation have challenged long-standing assumptions and highlighted opportunities our current systems are slow to recognize.

For example, recent research in behavioral economics highlights the limitations of traditional rational models of decision-making. In particular, we better understand the profound influence that biases, priming, framing, power, emotions and environmental cues have in shaping our behaviors¹³. This knowledge can be used both to explain unfavorable behaviors (to include sexual harassment/assault, bystander apathy, cheating, toleration, turnover, low performance, etc.) and to shape conditions for positive behaviors and outcomes. At the very least, these insights can affect how we access, train, organize, motivate, promote and retain the “Force of the Future”. Our knowledge of the

world and the human mind has advanced, and we would be remiss to not take advantage of it.

In the same respect, there is a science to development. Scholars in areas from identity development (e.g., Erikson, 1980), military ethos formation (e.g., Snider, 2012) and adult learning theory (e.g., Mezirow, 1995) have examined how to best strengthen individuals’ sense of self. As a profession, we must ensure the latest insights are integrated into our developmental approaches, to include the application of technology in case studies and simulations, using psychometric tools for self-awareness, and leveraging episodes of failure for positive growth. For example, the Service Academies have implemented remediation programs for those with honor code violations. In many areas, these programs have garnered great results, including higher levels of commitment to the honor code and core values for those who have gone through the program versus those who have not. Perhaps these insights can travel into other aspects of our profession.

The science available also includes an understanding of the fundamental principles for character development program design. As we expend effort and resources in shaping our profession, we must leverage the principles that have been researched and validated over time¹⁴. In many cases, the military profession has been the benchmark in this arena, but our colleagues in industry and academia have much from which we can learn¹⁵. An opportunity exists for us to better leverage this expertise and collaborate in this area of common interest.

One encouraging example of applied science surrounds the area of assessment. From 360-degree feedback to culture/climate surveys to psychometric tools, all of the Services have continued to pursue better ways to understand their people and organizations. Particularly promising is the research surrounding the use of non-cognitive measures for personnel selection and job placement. Extensive research is demonstrating how assessing individuals on non-traditional dimensions (e.g., grit, self-discipline, risk-

tolerance, conscientiousness, emotional stability, etc.) can provide increase prediction of success beyond the academic/cognitive assessments we've historically used.

Leadership and warfare are indeed art and science, but since both are inherently human phenomena, we should recognize that science has taken a huge leap forward. Yet the DoD may be out of balance in its approach. We expect our members to demonstrate a necessary level of expertise, embrace their roles as stewards of the profession, hold themselves and others to a standard consistent with our core values, and earn the trust so critical for our health and success. We must understand and leverage the potential of our human capital as much as we do our technical capabilities, and science is our force multiplier.

Opportunities Ahead

Over the past 15 months, our office has been clearly reminded that the Services and the Joint Staff take the issue of professionalism very seriously. There are countless examples of deliberate efforts being taken to develop and strengthen the Profession of Arms. Our ethos remains strong due to the efforts of those across the Department. But an opportunity lies in aligning these efforts so we are more aware of and integrated with each other's "cylinders of excellence." On many occasions, we discovered instances where outstanding but very similar efforts were underway in different corners of the Department. Time and resources might be saved, with possibly bigger impact, if these groups coordinated more closely. There is a natural tendency in any organization for functional stovepipes to develop. To some degree, this is appropriate and necessary to accommodate the unique requirements of the respective Service missions. But across the Department, there are natural points of commonality – particularly around the human dimension

and our Professional expectations – where we must align and integrate.

This type of coordination also applies to 'connecting the dots' in our professional education programs. Officer, enlisted and civilian members of our profession attend formal training courses which, in many cases, include very limited curriculum on professionalism and values-based ethics, instead focusing on compliance and legal

The discussion about professionalism and character can be cleanly guided by the words of Aristotle, who stated, "We are what we repeatedly do; Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit."

aspects of ethical behavior. In addition to enhancing the professionalism content in these formal courses, we must also recognize that significant gaps in time exist between these formal "mountaintop" events. Some people may go 5 or more years between formal courses, yet they are expected to strengthen themselves as members of the profession. This is where the informal development efforts must deliberately extend and reinforce what is learned in the formal programs.

Strengthening professionalism is about committing to an identity; it is a mindset for how people connect what they do (on and off duty) with who they are trying to be. The issue of developing professionalism must be addressed in a manner that does not feel programmatic or reactive (i.e., a down-day or initiative in response to the latest scandal). This is less about doing something new, and more about approaching what we already do in a new and purposeful way. Members from the Josephson Institute, when talking with Air Force Academy faculty about their responsibility for bringing character development into the classroom, once stated, "Character is not something you add to the plate, it is the plate." So too is the case with professionalism in relation to our work lives. It must be "baked in" to everything we do.

To elevate the professional thoughts and actions even above today's exceptional level (for the vast majority of our service members), we must continue to recruit, select, develop and retain the highest potential service members. Luckily, within the Profession of Arms, we have a noble and compelling mission that attracts a special caliber of applicant. To a large measure, those who raise their hand to serve do so knowing there are standards and expectations unique to this profession, and they accept those standards. We must be absolutely clear about communicating those expectations to the population to fan the flames of commitment and enhance the likelihood of a fit between personal and organizational values.

The human dimension is the key resource through which we accomplish the mission. We can use this period of reflection to leverage the interest in this topic among our members, the advances in science and the strong foundation

For us, the subjects of ethics, morals, competence, motivation and values systems will always remain integrally related, because they are so fundamental to our identity as military professionals. General Dempsey's white paper makes it clear that, "Our profession is *defined* by our values, ethics, standards, code of conduct, skills, and attributes" (Dempsey, 2010, p. 4; emphasis added). We operate in the domain of combat, and to that end, we have been afforded a level of autonomy and responsibility not found in other professions. In return, we must consistently deliver on the promise to the American people an unquestionable competence and character worthy of that autonomy. When that promise is broken, the casualty is trust we cannot afford to lose.

Yes, today we can still recognize challenges shared with the profession described 45 years ago by then-Lieutenant Colonel Ulmer. But we are undeniably stronger as a

profession, and it is largely because we stay committed to never accepting "good enough." Yet again, we find ourselves in a period of reflection and re-commitment, and we are forcefully taking on the challenge. We

acknowledge that, because humans are involved, this will be an unending journey of testable moments and alignment with our identity. Leaders must always model what right looks like. Cultures that promote our values must be continuously nurtured. Our service members must be relentlessly vigilant about the slippery slopes that promote ethical "drift" in their personal and professional lives. And on and on it goes...for the next 45 years and beyond. The thing that makes this frustratingly persistent struggle so wonderful is that it matters. This *thing of ours* – this noble and honorable profession--remains a mountain with no top, but a mountain worth climbing.

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But across the Department, there are natural points of commonality – particularly around the human dimension and our Professional expectations – where we must align and integrate.

on which we currently stand. Our actions as members of this profession are reflective of our individual values, beliefs, attitudes, experience, strengths and weaknesses. But they are also shaped by the environment in which we operate. The Australian Defense Force's "Pathway to Change" document, which describes the strategy for strengthening their own profession, states, "The strategy starts with accepting individual responsibility for one's own behaviour, assisting others to live the culture, and putting the onus on leaders to be exemplars of positive and visible change at all times. It also involves amending policies and processes that do not align" with our values (p. 1).

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Wong, L. & Gerras, S. 2015. "Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession" Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press.

7 Marshall Goldsmith's book, "Triggers: Creating Behavior that Lasts— Becoming the Person You Want to Be" is an outstanding resource for understanding the power of environmental cues in shaping behavior.

8 For an outstanding example, see Australian Army General Morrison's bold stance regarding sexual harassment and assault at <http://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=Australian+Army+Morrison&FORM=HDRSC3#view=detail&mid=E228103406DA89253DC4E228103406DA89253DC4>

9 The Army has inserted language about toxic leadership in their Army Doctrinal Publication 6-22, Leadership (soon to be in Army Regulation 600-100, Leadership), in order to draw attention to this issue, and to clearly articulate that such behavior will not be tolerated.

10 This phrase has been attributed to Dr. Mike Jensen

11 This powerful speech in its entirety can be found at <http://www3.citadel.edu/pao/addresses/reagan.htm>

12 Behavioral Integrity (BI) is defined as the perceived pattern of alignment between an actor's words and deeds (Simons, 2002). It reflects impressions of whether the target (e.g., leader) consistently "walks" the values he/she espouses and keeps his/her promises. BI is a key pathway for trust formation and outcomes to include subordinate commitment, engagement, deviant/ethical behavior, performance, etc. For more on Behavioral Integrity, see work by Simons (2002) and Palanski, Kahai & Yammarino (2011).

13 See work by Kahneman (2011); Dan Ariely (2010); Thaler & Sunstein (2009); Haidt (2007); Goldsmith (2015).

14 See the "Conceptual Framework for Developing Leaders of Character" by the Air Force Academy's Center for Character and Leadership Development for a well-designed developmental model. The document summarizes many principles for development worth considering, and the "Own-Engage-Practice" model integrates many foundational theories of human development. Also, the Marine University's Instructor Mastery Model (Ross, Phillips & Lineberger, 2015) is a useful framework for identifying developmental stages and transition points.

15 For example, Center for Creative Leadership, The Josephson Institute, Boeing Leadership Center, Johnson & Johnson's Human Performance Institute, Institute for Excellence & Ethics.

Notes

1 Lieutenant General Ulmer's remarkable career of distinguished service spanned 33 years. He commanded at the Brigade, Division, and Corps levels, and served as the Commandant at West Point, where he presided over the introduction of the first female cadets and the adjudication of West Point's 1977 cheating scandal. After retiring, he went on to become the president and CEO of the Center for Creative Leadership.

2 18% of respondents in the 2013 Army's Annual Survey of Army Leadership indicate there was a state of discipline problem. 51% of Sailors surveyed in an independent study of Navy Retention by Snodgrass and Kohlmann stated they do not believe senior leaders hold themselves accountable.

3 Both the 2010 Department of Defense Ethical Culture Survey Project (Human Resources Research Organization, Council of Ethical Organizations) and the 2014 Navy Retention Study Survey Report by Snodgrass and Kohlmann present data where respondents do not report misbehaviors out of (among other things) fear of retribution. This can take the form of social punishment and isolation from peers to personal and professional consequences from supervisors.

4 Engaged employees are involved, enthusiastic and committed to their work. Engagement is strongly correlated to productivity, profitability, customer satisfaction and organizational performance. Disengaged employees are apathetic, "going through the motions," and "checked out," putting little energy or innovation into their organization. Actively disengaged employees are destructive to cultures and undermine their jobs and employers, driving down morale and performance.

5 Secretary of Defense Carter's "Force of the Future" initiative is directed at revolutionizing the Department's approach to these human capital activities, and moving it to a more innovative, agile system reflective of the information age (as opposed to the industrial age it currently reflects).

6 Kerr's (1975) classic article, "On the Folly of Rewarding 'A,' While Hoping for 'B'" is an outstanding primer for how common this unintended reinforcement is in organizations and our society.

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The Emotional Constructs of Trust: A Practical Approach

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ABSTRACT

This article seeks to add to the existing body of knowledge about trust; but more specifically, it attempts to increase a leader's self-awareness by examining a seldom considered aspect of trust - the emotional construct. We assert that it is the emotional aspects of trust that are the most difficult to build; but it is also the emotional aspects of trust that have the greatest impact on mission, organization, and leader-follower relationships. To make our case, we will define trust, consider the link between truth and trust, delve more deeply into the emotional constructs of trust, and finally offer leaders some practical actions for trust-building and trust maintenance with followers.

Anyone who has led, followed, or been part of a cohesive team intuitively understands the importance of trust. What most of us lack, however, is the ability to concisely define what trust is and state with clarity how it works (Solomon, Flores, 2001). In fact, while observing a recent Air War College focus group on the subject of trust, the senior leader participants had difficulty framing the notion of trust. One student actually stated that he could not define it, but “knew it when he saw it.”

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Trust Defined

To help leaders move past the “I’ll know it when I see it” understanding of trust, the following definitions are offered as a benchmark.

- *Trust is the belief that others act in the interest of fairness and social welfare rather than their own self-interest* (Martinez and Zeelenberg, 2015).
- *Trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations about another’s behavior* (Dunn, Schweitzer, 2005).
- *Trust is an expectancy held by an individual or group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon* (Gurbuz, 2009).

Unfortunately, there are too many definitions of trust for our list to be exhaustive. These definitions discuss the essence of trust, but leave a gap as how is it built. We also propose that trust is built upon “truth.” Borrowing heavily from philosophy’s Correspondence Theory, they establish a working meaning for the trust-truth relationship. Correspondence Theory states that, “what makes a statement true is that it corresponds or maps on to certain things in the world; if those things are indeed the way the statement says they are, then the statement is deemed true” (Pearce, McDaniel, 2005). To make this theory useful for leaders and followers, we will expand this theory to include both statements and physical action. Thus, for a leader’s actions and statements to be true, they must correspond or map to events that actually have occurred, or will occur. Simply: a leader’s words and deeds must align.

Emotional Constructs of Trust

There is a significant emotional contribution to trust-building. It is critically important for military leaders to understand this, because broken trust within the military

is difficult to repair. Service members are told from the first day of service to trust their training, equipment, and leaders. As new service members transition from civilian life to the military, they begin to change old supports, such as friends, family, coaches, and teachers, for new supports within the military community, like peers, leaders, and chain-of-command. In most cases, service members do not choose their leaders; however, they *do* choose to give them trust. Leaders should not take this transition for granted. General Odierno, former Army Chief of Staff, makes this very point.

“Whether you’re a Lieutenant, Captain, or a 4-star, you have to constantly earn trust, and they [soldiers] don’t ask for much; what they want you to do is be true to your word. They want to know you’ll fight for them if necessary. They want to know that you’ll make the hard tough decisions if necessary” (Odierno, 2013).

In “*Building Trust*,” Robert Solomon and Fernando Flores describe trust as a “mood,” a profound way of defining our relation to the world. It is something we can cultivate and often control. The authors further suggest that like other emotions, trusting someone is a choice; therefore, the leader must create the environment for the subordinate to be willing to offer trust. Getting to one’s followers and also knowing the history of the organization one is leading,

In most cases, service members do not choose their leaders; however, they do choose to give them trust.

will provide valuable insight into whether building trust will be easy or difficult. Trust is a skill learned over time. The goal is that trust behaviors become automatic to the leader, invisible, put in the background, and no longer occupying the leader’s attention. This then gives rise to substance and innovation, allowing leaders and followers to focus on mission demands keeping trust as the silent foundation. Trust is like air; when it is not present, you

notice and choke (Solomon, Flores, 2001). Trust cannot be compartmentalized. It is the total leader that is taken into consideration by the follower in order for them to determine trustworthiness. A leader's true reputation, personality, temperament, family life, and off duty behaviors cannot be hidden. There is also no set recipe for trust-building. It depends on leader self-confidence, character, genuineness, and truth.

The unique relationship between military leaders and followers is based on trust. It is rooted in the institution and built through a common purpose and mission. Trust is the bond upon which service members bet their lives. The moral purpose of an organization and of personal commitment is the soil in which trust can take root and grow (Christenson, 2007). If the military leader loses that trust, they have lost the ability to lead (Sones, 2013). Furthermore, developing mutual trust-based relationships between leaders and followers is critical for the organization and effective leadership. The follower's trust is what sustains the leader's real authority (Monzani, Ripoll, Peiro, 2015). Trust in an organization depends on the reasonable assumptions, by followers, that leaders can be depended on to do the right thing (Christenson, 2007). Leaders are always on stage, watched by their followers. If leaders panic, a sense of worry can spread. If leaders erupt in anger, that reaction can create a culture of fear. Leader words and actions set the tone for the organization. Leaders must know what pushes their buttons and how they react to different situations (Combs, Harris, Edmonson, 2015). Trust is built from the bottom up based on the leader's emotions and behaviors. Leaders need to be aware of how their attitudes and behaviors build up or tear down trust (Combs, Harris, Edmonson, 2015). The leader must take the time for a critical analysis of the self. Earlier this year, RAND (2015) concluded that, "The [military] services clearly value good leadership behaviors and tools that can help develop good leaders, and the 360 [assessment] is one tool that has value in developing leaders."

In fact, a leader's incidental emotions (emotions not related to the follower) can have a severe impact in trust of the leader. Incidental emotions, like displays of anger, panic, regret, or using derogatory and hurtful words in an open forum are quick ways to tear down trust with followers. These actions will likely create negative and cynical attitudes, leading to increased conflict and decreased productivity. Eventually lost profits or mission failure will result.

Research shows that leaders who recognize the impact of their incidental emotions on followers can actually change the way the follower judges their trustworthiness. Maurice Schweitzer and Jennifer Dunn (2005) describe trustworthiness by the following attributes: "ability, integrity, and benevolence." Leaders can learn to use their emotions as trust-building tools. Leaders should take the steps necessary to curtail the influence that negative incidental emotions have on their followers' perceptions. Successful leaders increase their knowledge of the sources of their own emotions and blind spots (Dunn, Schweitzer, 2005). They are self-aware. For example, if a leader treats people in an open and just way, as well as, displays certain traits such as integrity, honesty, and trustworthiness, this will likely provide a psychologically secure environment for followers, allowing for a foundation of trust to be built (Lu, 2014).

Siat Gurbuz further explained this concept within his article, "Some Possible Antecedents of Military Personnel Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB)." He hypothesized that OCB is a major result of a leader's trust-building efforts. OCB refers to followers that are willing to go above and beyond their prescribed job roles. Some of these traits are commonly known as altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, courtesy, and civic virtue (Gurbuz, 2009). Followers behave in this manner to gain a "connection of affective trust" with the leader and foster a mutual relationship based on this trust (Lu, 2014). A leader's trust-building efforts directly result in promoting


these traits in followers. In an era of do-more-with-less, followers high in OCB are critical for success. This makes leadership trust-building skills that much more important for mission accomplishment. Therefore, investing in these efforts is time well spent for both the leader and the organization.

Hierarchy of Trust

Building trust and maintaining trust is tricky. Leaders must have it in order to lead, and organizations run more smoothly with it, but when trust is broken, real or perceived, there is an emotional price to pay. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between levels of emotional investment and violated trust.

Building trust and maintaining trust is tricky. Leaders must have it in order to lead, and organizations run more smoothly with it, but when trust is broken, real or perceived, there is an emotional price to pay.

Figure 1: Trust Triangle



An individual joining the military usually begins with some imbedded “Institutional Trust and Respect.” This is the basic trust that exists based on our preconceived notions of our military leaders. These are largely engrained by our cultural perspectives. For example, if the follower grew up in a patriotic culture, it is likely that Institutional Trust and Respect is inherent from the first day he/she joins, with some initial trust in his/her military leaders from the start. This “Institutional Trust and Respect” is largely based on cooperation, mutuality, and sense of duty. It can open the door to the emotional aspects of trust-building as the individual moves up the “Trust Triangle” with their leaders. If trust is broken at this level, the follower may become cynical, indifferent, and disappointed with the organization and its leaders. However, broken trust at this level can be repaired.

The intermediate section of the “Trust Triangle” is “Truth Over Time” gained by the follower by seeing the military leader as competent, fair, consistent, and conscientious. These traits displayed over time generate hope and increased engagement for the follower building confidence, cohesion, and increased morale within the organization. Trust broken at this level is difficult to repair. Toxic leader behaviors like selfishness, outbursts of anger, and broken promises create confusion for followers and often lead to a hostile work

environment for them. It will take a consistent, deliberate effort by the leader, over time, to restore trust at this level.

The pinnacle level of the “Trust Triangle” is “Personal Trust.” This occurs when the leader moves the follower toward passion. When a follower becomes passionate, the emotional connection is strong between the follower and the mission and/or leader. It can be described as altruistic, an unconditional and unwavering truth that is tremendously empowering for the follower. This is largely developed by the leader’s genuineness, care, and commitment to the follower and unit. This maximizes mission success through high-level emotional trust. If trust is broken at this level, it is likely unrepairable. The leader may never reach this level of trust with the follower again. Actions like broken core values, betrayal, and treachery will most likely lead to resentment and indignation for the follower.

These two questions are good ones to ask for leaders who are concerned about building lasting trust: 1) What is the best way to invest in these trust-building efforts with followers? and 2) How do I take my organization from the “Institutional Trust and Respect” level to the “Personal Trust” level? Current research offers practical approaches to building trust and helps to answer these questions. Table I shows some of these approaches.

Table 1: Practical Approaches for Building Trust

Approach	Reference
Take everyone seriously.	Christianson, 2007
Translate personal integrity into organizational fidelity.	Christianson, 2007
Keep your promises.	Christianson, 2007
Hold the group or subordinate accountable.	Christianson, 2007
Demonstrate competence in your job.	Christianson, 2007
Set clear and compelling directions.	Combs, Harris, Edmonson, 2015
Express concern and appreciation for others well-being.	Combs, Harris, Edmonson, 2015

(table continues on next page)

(continued) **Table 1: Practical Approaches for Building Trust**

<p>Know and implement Covey's 13 behaviors for high-trust leaders:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Straight talk -Demonstrate respect -Create transparency -Right wrongs -Show loyalty -Deliver results -Get better 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Confront reality -Clarify expectations -Practice accountability -Listen first -Keep commitments -Extend trust 	Covey, 2006
Avoid making quick trust decisions. Make trust judgments over time and on the basis of interactions across multiple contexts.		Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005
Interact, socialize, and develop familiarity with subordinates.		Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005
Show that you care about your subordinates.		Lu, 2014
Provide a psychologically secure environment.		Lu, 2014
Build high-quality relationships.		Lu, 2014
Act as a role model and take responsibility for the organization.		Lu, 2014
Infuse the organization with ethics and stable principles .		Lu, 2014
Explore emotional competence through feedback.		Lucas, Pilar, Jose, 2015
Be open and look to the future, especially when facing challenging situations.		Solomon, Flores, 2001
Cultivate self-trust (trust in one's own abilities, emotions, moods, impulses) - required for building trust with others.		Solomon, Flores, 2001
Practice human leadership. Ensure employees know you are aware of, sensitive to, and understand their individual feelings, thoughts, and experiences.		Starns, Truhon, and McCarthy, 2009
Handle sensitive information judiciously.		Starns, Truhon, and McCarthy, 2009
Be honest by saying what will be done, act with integrity by doing what was said will be done, and be credible by following through with commitments.		Starns, Truhon, and McCarthy, 2009
Determine if organizational policies, procedures, and rules are applied consistently and equitably, and send the message that employees can be trusted.		Starns, Truhon, and McCarthy, 2009
Build a culture of openness and transparency.		Starns, Truhon, and McCarthy, 2009
Delegate as much as possible.		Starns, Truhon, and McCarthy, 2009
Determine what went wrong and why when problems arise, rather than who was responsible.		Starns, Truhon, and McCarthy, 2009
Use strategic emotional displays.		Tortosa, Strizhko, Capizzi, & Ruz, 2013

Applying these practical approaches for trust-building can help leaders transform their relationships with followers. Using Table 1 can improve leader-follower trust and work toward the top of the “Trust Triangle,” see Chart 1. Many of these approaches will directly assist with developing and preserving the emotional constructs of trust described in this article.

Lastly, leaders should remember that followers build trust at different rates. For some, trust-building is slow, for others it is fast. Followers with higher levels of emotional competence typically report higher levels of trust in leaders. Emotional competence can be defined as the capacity to clearly perceive, assimilate, understand, and manage self and other’s emotions. In terms of trust formation, a leader’s ability to understand and manage others’ emotions elicits positive affective states in followers, which is essential for the formation of a followers’ trust (Monzani, Ripoll, Peiro, 2015). Leaders may benefit from choosing followers that are higher in emotional competence to build quick trust-based relationships (Monzani, Ripoll, Peiro, 2015). Staffing an organization with many followers high in emotional competence can help create a healthy environment for all.

Summary and Conclusion

Definitions of trust can fall short in describing how trust is built, as well as its emotional constructs. In this article, we proposed that it is the emotional aspects of trust that are the most difficult to build; however, it is also the emotional aspects of trust that have the greatest impact on mission, organization, and leader-follower relationships. It is critically important for military leaders to understand the emotional constructs of trust and the connection between trust and truth. Leaders who ignore this understanding will not be as effective, nor will they be able to bring their followers to the pinnacle, “Personal Trust Level,” as described by the “Trust Triangle” in Figure 1. Therefore, the better leaders

understand the emotional constructs of trust, the more effective they will be at establishing and maintaining the trust of others, as well as repairing the damage caused by broken trust if it occurs.

There is an emotional component in every trust relationship. How big and how strong that component actually is depends on many factors including: longevity, specific circumstances and, of course, the track record established by the leader for telling the truth. The longer and more deeply followers trust a leader, the more emotionally vested that person becomes. Figure 1 conceptually depicts the relationship between trust and emotion. The higher the level of emotional investment (left side of the Pyramid) the more significant, and possibly more damaging to the emotional bond, that a breach of trust will have on a

Leaders should remember that followers build trust at different rates. For some, trust-building is slow, for others it is fast.

relationship (right side of the Pyramid.) To this end, Table 1 provides leaders tangible actions to accomplish and keep trust and its emotional constructs strong. Those leaders who wish to enhance their trust with those they lead would be well advised to use it as a reminder of the importance that emotions play in trust-building.

Finally, trust is built upon truth. “You can say all of these things, but unless you actually do them, your words will not build trust; in fact, they will destroy it” (Covey, 2004).

♦♦♦

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Leadership Development as Identity Change:

An analysis of the impact of a deliberate leadership development program

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ABSTRACT

According to Ibarra, et al (2010) leadership development requires re-creation of identity. For this article we examined a leadership development program, searching for evidence that identity change had occurred. Specifically, we collected data at a military academy where leadership development was the focal point of the institution's mission. Using leadership behaviors and skills suggested by Yukl (2008) we were able to show how the perceived importance of these skills changed as students progressed through the program. We also found that the perceived importance of certain leadership skills depended on a student's "change readiness." Finally, we searched for evidence that women value relationship-oriented leadership skills more highly than men.

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Introduction

As noted by Ibarra, et al (2013; p. 62) “people become leaders by internalizing a leadership identity and developing a sense of purpose.” Critically, this is a continuous process where each new role or leadership job invites the person to re-create themselves (Ibarra, et al, 2010). Learning who you are, or could be, is essential to leadership development (Cashman, 2008). The development of a new identity is a challenging process; new roles don’t automatically lead to identity change. As noted by Schein (1999; p. 59) any change in identity tends to be painful since the establishment of a new identity involves the unlearning of prior behaviors and the restructuring of new “thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and attitudes.” Changing identity, then, often requires a move away from a comfortable equilibrium while also potentially acting against the norms of the organization (Schein 1999).

The steps involved in developing a new leadership identity can be expected to parallel the steps required to develop any new identity. In studying how professionals developed new identities after they assumed new roles, Ibarra (1999; p. 764) found that re-creation of identity generally occurs over three stages: “1) Observing role models to identify potential identities, 2) Experimenting with provisional selves, and 3) Evaluating experiments against internal standards and external feedback.” The activation of these steps starts when people are faced with situations that require new behaviors. As noted by Lewin, new experiences tend to create new behaviors and judgment (Schein, 1999). While change can be obtained within an education environment (Petriglieri, et al, 2011), a new job, appropriately chosen, is often the best setting for identity change. (Hill, 2004)

Note that in this paper the terms “leadership behaviors”, “leadership levers”, and “leadership skills” are used interchangeably. In the literature cited below the authors generally use one of these three terms. However, all three terms connote specific actions taken to influence, or lead, others.

Literature Review

Exploring identity

According to Howe (2008) identity is defined both by a person’s internal individual characteristics and the social context in which that person is a player. More specifically, identity includes (DeRue and Ashford (2010; p. 629): “individual internalization, relationship recognition, and collective endorsement.” A change in identity requires “cognitive restructuring” in order to overcome prior individual and social cognitive positioning (Schein, 1999). This restructuring occurs in three areas: “semantic redefinition” where words can take on new meanings; cognitive broadening, where known concepts take on additional possibilities; and “new standards of judgment or evaluation” (Schein, 1999; p. 61).

Paralleling the three step process discussed in the introduction, Ibarra, et al (2010; p. 665) established that identity change also requires a second three stage process, “involving separation from established identities, transition, and integration of new self-conceptions.” The transition to a new role is a particularly important time during which the person must decide on their level of commitment.

Howe (2008) suggests that roles can be created where the incumbent is invited to simply play at the role; she explains that play can be an extremely valuable developmental tool since play allows the role incumbent to try out new identities that are extremely disconnected from a player’s current identity. Of course, the reason this is possible is because play is usually accompanied by lots of protection for the incumbent—it is understood that they are “just playing”. However, long term development depends on people internalizing change at deeper levels. Deep change is difficult and an important part of leadership development (Kaplan, 1993). Charan (2005), echoing Kaplan to some extent, suggests that deeper leadership development demands very strong evaluation as part of the feedback process. However, where feedback is direct and readily available it is important to have a guide or mentor to make the experience less dangerous. A major responsibility of the mentor is to create

enough “psychological safety” (Schein 1999) for the recipient to accept the need for change without becoming defensive. The guide also makes sure the right things are learned and that the experience is correctly understood (McCall, 2004). Finally, it is important to observe that change readiness is a critical determinant of identity change (Ibarra, et al, 2010; Avolio and Hannah, 2008). Readiness can be determined by a number of methods including judging reactions to past experiences and careful evaluation of recent behavior.

Countervailing Forces

Since identity, in part, depends on the social environment, the environment can block or inhibit identity change. For example, the entire social network often depends on the current collection of identities and positions (Van Vugt, 2012). Goffman (1959) observed this dynamic long ago, suggesting that the roles people occupy produce pressure to conform to a particular behavior set. Rather than fight system influences, it is often easier when stepping into a new role for people to simply assume prototypical behaviors (Hogg, 2001).

Beyond the maintenance of current system order, leaders also encounter opposition to a new identity from the people working for them. According to Hunt (1996) leadership behaviors and identities are often subject to prior judgment. Specifically, potential followers tend to rely on internal schemas to determine whether behaviors constitute leadership. Hence, when a leader decides to display a

disagree with the leader’s performance, they will reduce their commitment to that person. In Barnard’s (1938) terms the followers’ zone of indifference shrinks when the leader’s identity and behaviors don’t fit the “leader” schemas of the followers.

The extent to which new occupants are driven by the system instead of their own internal prerogatives often surprises first time leaders. First time managers discover that success in their new position requires significant behavioral changes. For example, they often find that as a leader they have less freedom and that they have become responsible for the actions and behaviors of others (Hill, 2004). In any new role if leaders are to remain authentic (Avolio, et al 2005) they must find a way to combine the pressures of their new role with their internal identity, which often requires changes to their identity.

Women and Men

Previous work suggests that women and men favor different leadership skills. For example, Eagly and Carli (2007; p. 66) found that women leaders are “associated with communal qualities, which convey concern for the compassionate treatment of others.” In contrast men were “associated with assertion of control.” To support their argument, Eagly and Carli (2007) reported the results from a meta-analysis of 45 studies. This meta-analysis found that women, more so than men, were likely to rely on leadership behaviors associated with the transformational leadership style. The study also

found that women were more likely to work to enhance relationships and to ensure that others felt a sense of inclusion. Men, more so than women, were found to be inclined toward laissez-faire leadership, often granting more follower autonomy than warranted.

Other research has found that women favor more democratic and participative types of leadership; men favor more autocratic and directive types of leadership (Eagly and Johannesen, 2001). Overall, Eagly and Johannesen (2001; p787) explained that, relative to men, women are

Since identity, in part, depends on the social environment, the environment can block or inhibit identity change.

new identity and new behaviors, followers will resist if these behaviors do not meet their internal “leadership” expectations. This can be critical in terms of establishing real identity change because the power of leadership and authority is generally determined by both the leader and the followers (Kahn and Kram 1994). Where followers

likely to be “more interpersonally oriented, democratic, and transformational.” In accordance with the transformational style, women were also more likely than men to set high standards and clearly define future goals.

Some research has questioned these differences. For example, while Bass (1981) agrees that there is some evidence that women are more relations-oriented than men, he maintains that in actual leadership situations the differences are negligible. Chin (2011), too, suggests that differences are more likely to be found in laboratory experiments, where there is likely a reversion to gender roles, which is then confused with leadership differences. However, actual leaders seem convinced that important differences exist. For instance, Rutherford (2001) surveyed both female and male leaders. She found that 84% of the women maintained that women managed differently than men; 55% of men concurred. Both genders agreed that women were more relationship oriented, yet more demanding with better organizational skills. As noted above, Bass (1981) suggests that the differences are minor, yet some of the research he employs suggests otherwise. For instance he cites Banfield (1976), who interviewed women leaders. These leaders reported that they were compelled to incorporate masculine characteristics while sacrificing their femininity.

USAFA as an Intentional Leadership Program

For the current paper, we required a leadership development program where the developmental phases (Ibarra, et al, 2010; Ibarra, 1999) could be readily identified, allowing us to measure identity changes at specific points. At the U.S Air Force Academy leadership development is accomplished through an intentional, time specific process, which serves our requirements quite well.

The Air Force Academy is very focused on the concept of identity-based leader development. This commitment is immediately evident in the Academy mission statement: “We educate, train, and inspire men and women to become officers of character motivated to lead the United States Air Force in service to our nation. “ (Air Force Academy, n.d.)

This statement makes it clear that the Academy is about more than just supplying skills. The aim of instilling character and motivation to lead requires a change in identity. And the Academy’s four class system commits a lot of resources to produce these identity changes. Of central importance to leadership development at the Academy is the focus on character. Students are asked to internalize “integrity first”. The Academy provides many role models who demonstrate both “moral identity symbolization” and “moral identity internalization” (Mayer, et al 2012).

Upon arrival at the Academy new students, referred to as “cadets”, enter Basic Cadet Training. Where business schools often talk about creating “boot camp” experiences to get to deeper identity change, the Academy provides an actual boot camp. During this six week period even the expressive parts of identity are attacked: the students have their hair cut very short, they are required to wear the same uniform, their freedom is extremely limited, and their “voice” is virtually non-existent. This boot camp is followed by an entire year during which many of the identity restrictions are continued. Interestingly, in accordance with Ibarra’s (1999) developmental model, freshmen are frequently invited to observe and think about their leaders—they are asked to find role models.

Following the intense initial six weeks, cadets formally enter the Academy’s Officer Development System (ODS), an overarching program covering the entire four years cadets are at the Academy (Officer Development System, n.d.). This system integrates all aspects of the Academy experience, with a focus on outcomes. A number of leadership development models are employed. The primary model, informing cadet experiences during each of their four years is the Personal, Interpersonal, Team, and Organizational (PITO) Model. (USAFA pamphlet 36-3527, 2013). In the first year (“P”) at the Academy cadets are taught to be followers, while beginning to more intentionally build a sense of personal identity; during the second year (“I”) personal growth continues to be emphasized, but cadets also become responsible for coaching first year cadets, thereby

emphasizing interpersonal growth. During the third year (“T”) cadets work on “group identity and cohesiveness”. Finally during the fourth year (“O”) cadets learn to “drive organizational norms” while creating “an environment where all members of the organization can reach their full potential” (USAFA pamphlet 35-3527, 2013). Since the start of each academic year coincides with a distinct promotion to the next class level, the upward movement is somewhat abrupt, inviting cadets to fully engage in their new roles and tasks.

During each of the last six semesters cadets are generally given a leadership job commensurate with their class year, one that parallels the four-class Officer Development System. For example, during their junior year most cadets are given formal leadership jobs where they take responsibility for the activities of a team (representing “T” in the PITO model) of 10-14 students. During their senior year (“O” in the PITO model) cadets are provided leadership positions where their actions impact the culture and activities of whole squadrons (approximately 100 students) or larger units. As observed by Ibarra, et al (2010), new roles with new responsibilities encourage people to try on new identities. And she notes that in trying on new identities, old identities tend to be left behind. Importantly, for the purposes of the current study, as cadets assume higher level positions the required mix of leadership levers or management skills should change significantly (Hunt 1996; Katz 1974).

As discussed above, according to Charan (2005) leadership development demands very strong evaluation and mentorship to support the feedback process. Leadership development depends on learning the right things and the only way to insure this learning is to use a coach or mentor (McCall, 2014). Each Academy squadron (approximately 100 cadets) has two full time mentors and evaluators. Cadets are provided feedback throughout each semester. However, the most intense feedback occurs at the end of each semester when cadets are given a feedback score which ostensibly captures their performance under the Officer Development System. This score, their military performance

average (MPA), is comprised of inputs from the two full time squadron evaluators and written feedback from other cadets in their squadron. The MPA is thought to capture the sense in which a cadet is a leader among peers, and is ready for additional responsibility. As further discussed below in our methods section, for this research the MPA measure was used as a proxy for change readiness.

Leadership Skills and Organizational Levels

Since the leadership changes we examined for this research are directly related to the changing leadership skills required at different organizational levels, a bit more discussion on this topic is necessary. Simply stated, many prior researchers have found that the skills used by leaders change as they move up the organizational hierarchy (e.g., De Meuse, 2011; Mumford, 2003, Hunt, 1996; Jacobs and Jaques, 1987; Katz, 1974) In an early study Pinto and Tornow (1975), surveyed hundreds of managers at different organizational levels, asking them to choose the skills that were most important to their current position. Their research demonstrated that managers at each level favored very different leadership skills. Of particular value for our research, they found that managers at the highest leadership levels valued strategy and planning skills, took a broad, systems-oriented sense of the organization, and recognized the need to deal with complexity. This finding parallels Katz’ (1974) work since he discovered that as leaders move up in an organization conceptual skills become more important. For example, higher level managers need to take a systems view of their organization and develop an ability to anticipate interconnections. Also included in conceptual skills (Katz, 1974) are the ability to deal with complexity and ambiguity, the anticipation of organizational change, and the promotion of innovation. Finally, Hunt (1996), too, emphasized the need for different leadership skills at different organizational levels. Paralleling the work of Pinto and Tornow (1975) and Katz (1974), Hunt pointed out the need for top level leaders to skillfully deal with change, complexity and innovation, while developing an ability to see beyond organizational boundaries.

There is some argument about whether lower level skills continue to be important as a leader moves upward. Mumford (2003) believes that early leadership skills continue to be important; De Meuse (2011) found evidence that earlier skills continued to be used by leaders as they moved up their organizations. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the salience and use of leadership skills shifts substantially as leaders progress upward.

Hypotheses

(Based on the leadership levers listed in our research methods section below)

The Academy's Officer Development System intentionally moves cadets from lower to higher levels of responsibility. Prior research has found that different levels of leadership and management require different types of skills, or at least a different mix of skills (De Meuse, 2011; Mumford, 2003; Katz, 1974). To successfully lead at higher levels of a hierarchy, leaders must take on a more abstract view, focus on leading change, create a vision, work beyond organizational boundaries, and develop an ability to deal with ambiguity while making decisions. The leadership levers we used for hypothesis 1 provide a proxy for these higher level leadership skills.

Hypothesis 1: Cadets in their eighth semester will rank/value the following leadership levers more highly than cadets in their fifth semester: A) "Be socially aware while dealing with others"; B) "Communicate the need for change"; C) "Envision new possibilities"; D) "Facilitate change"; E) "Foster Innovation"; F) "Influence outsiders to support change"; G) "Make sense of ambiguous situations"; H) "Make timely decisions"; I) "Try new ways of doing things"; J) "Willingness to take risks."

Even though other leadership levers, such as "Build group identity through the use of symbols" and "Develop new strategies based on strengths" seem to match the "Organizational" level jobs given to Academy seniors, the

actual duties of cadets do not allow them use these levers. Hence we had no expectation that fifth and eighth semester cadets would value these levers differently.

As discussed above, the Academy's Military Performance Average (MPA) evaluates prior cadet leadership performance and is meant to identify cadets who are leaders among their peers, leaders who are ready for additional challenges. Higher scores on this cadet measure have been strongly linked to later Air Force success for Academy graduates (Didier, 2012). Since change readiness is a critical determinant in the development of new identities (Ibarra, 1999), and leadership development requires identity change (Ibarra, et al, 2010) we sought to understand how cadets who demonstrated higher change readiness (higher MPA scores) differed in their ranking of leadership levers.

Hypothesis 2: Cadets with higher MPAs will demonstrate a preference for leadership levers that are likely to make them stand out among their peers.

For Hypothesis 2 our aim was exploratory; hence, we do not identify specific leadership levers that will be favored by cadets with higher Military Performance Averages (MPAs). Our intent was to find the levers favored by cadets with higher MPAs, and then map those to the statement in Hypothesis 2, if possible.

As discussed in our literature review, prior research has shown that women tend to focus on relations-oriented leadership levers more than men.

Hypothesis 3: Women will rank 11 of the 13 relations-oriented leadership levers more highly than men.

We did not include all 13 relationship-oriented leadership levers in hypothesis 3. For the "Build group identity through the use of symbols, ceremonies, and stories" lever we expected cadets to realize that their Academy jobs do not allow for the use of this lever. Hence we didn't have a prior expectation about which gender would favor this lever. In terms of "Provide significant autonomy." we expected men to rank/value this leadership lever more highly than women

based on prior research showing that, on average, men valued “laissez-faire” management much more than women.

Research Methodology

Leadership Levers (aka, leadership skills, leadership behaviors)

As noted by Yukl, leadership taxonomies are abstractions “derived from observed behavior in order to organize perceptions.”(2008; p.66) Naturally, when organizations are examined using different lenses, different leadership taxonomies emerge. Moreover, levels of analysis can also affect any resulting taxonomy. Thus, there is no set of “correct” leadership categories. Nevertheless, Yukl provides a general leadership focus. His review of hundreds leadership studies has demonstrated the effectiveness of particular leadership levers in specific situations. These levers can each be assigned to one of several sub-categories of leadership levers rendering Yukl’s identification from the vast leadership literature particularly relevant for our purposes (see Davis and Levy, 2010).

To inform and test our three hypotheses, we employed Yukl’s three factor model (2008) and added a list of self-focused behaviors as a fourth factor. Yukl’s three

dimensional leadership behavior model includes the following: 1) task-oriented behaviors—primarily concerned with accomplishing tasks in efficient and reliable ways; 2) relations-oriented behaviors—primarily concerned with increasing mutual trust, cooperation, job satisfaction, and organizational identification; 3) and change-oriented behaviors—primarily concerned with understanding the environment, finding innovative ways to adapt to it, and implementing major changes in strategies, products, or processes. By combining Yukl’s three dimensional model with self-focused behaviors we were able to present our respondents with leadership levers that represented the “full range” (Michel, et al., 2011) of leadership.

Our four factors contain 54 leadership behaviors or skills (see table 1 below). For our research these behaviors and skills are referred to as “leadership levers”. Although this list largely adheres to Yukl’s taxonomy, a few of the leadership levers have been expanded. For example, during our prior research we found that respondents often view Yukl’s “personal integrity” leadership behavior as being too broad. Hence we separated it (personal integrity) into “be truthful” and “be consistent.”

Table 1: Levers of Leadership (in Alphabetical Order)

Behavioral Orientation	Leadership Lever	Behavioral Orientation	Leadership Lever
Self-focused	Able to endure high stress	Change	Foster team learning
Self-focused	Acknowledge strengths and limitations	Change	Identify symbols to capture new vision/strategy
Self-focused	Actively seek organizational influence	Change	Identify threats and opportunities
Task	Assess performance	Task	Improve processes and procedures
Task	Assign workload	Change	Influence outsiders to support change

(table continues on next page)

(continued) **Table 1: Levers of Leadership (in Alphabetical Order)**

Self-focused	Be confident	Relations	Involve people in decisions affecting them
Self-Focused	Be consistent	Relations	Keep people informed
Self-Focused	Be socially aware while dealing with others	Self-Focused	Maintain high energy level
Self-Focused	Be truthful	Self-Focused	Make sense of ambiguous situations
Self-Focused	Believe destiny can be controlled	Self-Focused	Make timely decisions
Relations	Build group identity through the use of symbols, ceremonies, and stories	Self-Focused	Model appropriate behavior
Relations	Build interpersonal relationships	Task	Monitor work activities
Change	Celebrate organizational progress	Task	Organize work activities
Task	Clarify expectations/goals	Task	Plan short-term operations
Relations	Coach and mentor	Relations	Provide encouragement
Change	Communicate the need for change	Relations	Provide feedback
Task	Coordinate work activities	Relations	Provide significant autonomy
Relations	Develop good relationships	Relations	Recognize contributions and accomplishments
Change	Develop new strategies based on strengths	Task	Recruit new members
Self-Focused	Display flexibility in thinking	Relations	Resolve conflict
Task	Emphasize accountability	Task	Resolve immediate problems that would disrupt work
Relations	Encourage people to consider other perspectives	Task	Set Standards
Change	Envision new possibilities	Self-Focused	Stay committed
Self-Focused	Exhibit self-control	Self-Focused	Strong desire for achievement
Relations	Express confidence in subordinates	Change	Study competitors
Change	Facilitate change	Change	Try new ways of doing things
Change	Foster innovation	Self-Focused	Willingness to take risks

Procedure

The list in Table 1 was reproduced on card sets. Respondents were tasked with ranking the 54 levers in order of importance. This sorting exercise was conducted at the beginning of a meeting period. Participants were told that they were going to engage in a leadership exercise. Each subject was handed a shuffled stack of cards and the following words were read verbatim:

“This stack of cards contains a set of phrases and terms related to leadership. Your task is to sort the cards in order of importance for effective leadership. The top card should describe what you believe to be most important aspect for effective leadership, the bottom card the least important for effective leadership.”

The only additional information given was a suggestion to initially sort the cards into three piles (most important, important, and least important) and then rank order each pile. Participants were given as much time as they needed. In most cases everyone was finished within thirty minutes.

Demographics

Our data was collected during 18 separate sessions with cadets who were enrolled in either their fifth or eighth semesters at the Academy; a total of 365 cadets performed the exercise described above. Unsurprisingly some of the cadets produced unusable data sheets. Usable data was collected from 168 cadets in their fifth semester (30 women) and 185 cadets in their eighth semester (32 women). For our test of MPA differences we only used male data since splitting by semester and then by MPA would have spread the data too thin to make definitive statements for females. For males in their fifth semester 87 had MPAs at or below 3.00; 66 had MPAs above 3.00; for males in their eighth semester 49 had MPAs at or below 3.00; 76 had MPAs above 3.0. Since the average MPA for Academy graduates is about 3.05, and MPAs rise a bit each semester, these numbers are generally in line with the overall cadet population.

Analysis

As noted in our first hypothesis, in line with prior management and leadership research we expected cadets in their eighth semester to value the leadership levers in table 2 more highly than cadets in their 5th semester.

Table 2: Levers 8th semester cadets were expected to rank/value more highly than 5th semester cadets

Leadership Lever
Be more socially aware while dealing with others
Communicate the need for change Envision new possibilities Facilitate change Foster innovation Influence outsiders to support change Make sense of ambiguous situations
Make timely decisions
Try new ways of doing things Willingness to take risks

To test each of our hypotheses we examined the card sorts performed by our cadet respondents. Since the data was rank-ordered, non-parametric methods were used. Specifically, to address each hypothesis, we employed Mann-Whitney U tests to search for differences between two independent groups. This test is the equivalent of a Student *t*-test used for parametric data (Field, 2005). Table 3 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney analysis for hypothesis 1.

Table 3: Levers used to test Hypothesis 1

Leadership Levers	Data Analysis Finding: Lever is More Highly Ranked by:	Sig level
Be more socially aware while dealing with others	8th Semester Cadets	.029*
Communicate the need for change	8th Semester Cadets	.043*
Envision new possibilities	8th Semester Cadets	.007**
Facilitate change	8th Semester Cadets	.009**
Foster innovation	8th Semester Cadets	.013*
Influence outsiders to support change	8th Semester Cadets	.001**
Make sense of ambiguous situations	8th Semester Cadets	.007**
Make timely decisions	8th Semester Cadets	.016*
Try new ways of doing things	8th Semester Cadets	.528
Willingness to take risks	8th Semester Cadets	.04*

* = significant at the .05 level; ** = significant at the .01 level

Our second hypothesis was simply that cadets with a higher MPAs (proxy for identity change readiness) would demonstrate a higher preference for levers that would make them stand out as leaders among their peers. As an exploratory research question, we did not have preset assumptions about exactly which levers would be preferred. Table 4 shows the results of this test.

Table 4: Levers more highly favored by cadets with high mpa's (change readiness proxy)

Leadership Levers	Data Analysis Finding: Lever is More Highly Ranked by:	Sig level
Assess	> 3.00 MPA Cadets	.023*
Be consistent	> 3.00 MPA Cadets	.022*
Be truthful	> 3.00 MPA Cadets	.048*
Model appropriate behavior	> 3.00 MPA Cadets	.026*

* = significant at the .05 level; ** = significant at the .01 level

Our third hypothesis was informed by prior research showing that women and men differ in their leadership styles. In particular, women tend to emphasize relations-oriented leadership levers more than men. However, because men tend to favor laissez-faire leadership more than women, we expected men to favor the autonomy relationship lever more than women. We had no prior expectation in terms of the relationship lever “Build group identity through the use of symbols ceremonies & stories” because the roles cadets serve in generally do not allow them to impact their organization with this lever. Table 5 shows the results of the comparison of women and men in their eighth semester at the Academy.

Table 5: Hypothesis 3 Comparison of rankings on 11 relationship oriented variables (8th semester cadets)

Leadership Levers	Data Analysis Finding: Lever is More Highly Ranked by:	Sig level
Build group identity through the use of symbols, ceremonies & stories	Men	.806
Build interpersonal relationships	Women	.806
Coach and mentor	Women	.59
Develop good relationships	Women	.482
Encourage people to consider other perspectives	Women	.68
Express confidence in others	Women	.944
Involve people in the decisions affecting them	Men	.986
Keep people informed	Women	.256
Provide encouragement	Women	.247
Provide feedback	Women	.213
Provide significant autonomy	Men	.019*
Recognize contributions and accomplishments	Women	.017*
Resolve conflicts	Women	.128

* = significant at the .05 level; ** = significant at the .01 level

Discussion

Our assertion for hypothesis 1 was that 8th semester cadets would rank certain change-oriented and relationship-oriented leadership levers more highly than 5th semester cadets. Table 3 strongly supports this expectation. Our findings support previous research suggesting that higher level organizational roles require very different skill sets than mid-level roles. In addition our analysis demonstrates that the Academy Officer Development System produces measurable identity changes in terms of the leadership levers favored by cadets.

For hypothesis 2 we explored how differences in change readiness affected cadet rankings of our leadership levers. Change readiness was determined by each cadet's cumulative Military Performance Average (MPA). The MPAs achieved by cadets at the Academy have been shown to be solid predictor of later Air Force success (Didier, 2012). Interestingly, relative to cadets with lower MPAs, cadets with higher MPAs favored "Assess Performance", "Be Consistent", "Model Appropriate Behavior", and "Be Truthful". These levers line up comfortably with the general expectation expressed in hypothesis 2: "Cadets with higher MPAs will demonstrate a preference for leadership levers that are likely to make them stand out among their peers." Cadets can indeed expect to stand out if they emphasize accountability, behave and judge consistently, and serve as role models for expected behaviors. The additional emphasis on "Be truthful" is slightly surprising but should probably be expected to move in tandem with the "Be consistent" leadership lever. This finding is also consistent with De Meuse, et al (2011) who found that integrity and honesty are valued more and more highly as a lever as one moves up the hierarchy. They suggested that integrity is aligned with consistency.

Hypothesis 3 proposed that women would favor 11 of the relationship oriented levers more highly than men. While

Table 5 supports this hypothesis (10 of the 11 are favored by women), the significance isn't impressive.

Conclusions and Future Research

Our work supports prior research, strongly in the case of Hypothesis 1, less strongly for hypothesis 3. Our findings for hypothesis 2 provide support for the idea that change readiness is an important element in any leadership or identity development process (Avolio and Hannah, 2008; Ibarra, 1999). Finally, we also found evidence that an intentional leadership development program can change leader identity in the form of movement toward valuing leadership behaviors and skills very differently.

Further research is needed to understand why female cadets at the Academy do not favor relationship-oriented leadership behaviors as strongly as expected. Eagly (2007) reported that when they are working in male dominated environments, women tend to adopt masculine norms. Further, Eagly (2007) found that while women would prefer to employ a participative style, when there aren't enough women to support one another, women will conform to the style of the men. Since males comprise more than 75% of the Academy student body, Eagly's work provides a partial explanation for the weak support found for hypothesis 3.

Even in organizations where men don't constitute such a large majority, masculine behaviors are still often viewed as "leadership behaviors" (Ely, et al, 2011). Women who

Cadets can indeed expect to stand out if they emphasize accountability, behave and judge consistently, and serve as role models for expected behaviors

lead in organizations that emphasize masculine behaviors know that calling attention to their differences may result in their being viewed as lacking leadership skills (Rutherford, 2001); hence, women often seek to minimize perceived differences. The collection of additional data

from women at the Academy would help us develop a better understanding of the environment.

Additional research is needed to compare cadet rankings of the leadership levers with the rankings of graduates. Specifically, it would be interesting to examine whether cadet changes in terms of ranking the levers continues to move in the same direction after graduation. If the rankings do not continue to move in a consistent direction, that would provide support for the view that identity change is strongly driven by environmental pressures (Hogg, 2001; Kahn and Kram, 1994; Goffman, 1959). In that case it would also be interesting to explore the extent to which our change readiness measure (MPA) predicted role flexibility.

We do not expect the changes in the rankings of specific levers to apply in other environments. Since every environment possesses different leadership challenges (Conger, 2004; Blanchard, 2008), we should expect that the salient levers for each environment are somewhat different. For example, do lawyers have a different view of leadership than engineers? And does success in particular field depend on would-be leaders changing their identity to emphasize particular leadership levers?

♦ ♦ ♦

Notes

Opinions, conclusions and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the USAF Academy, the U. S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other government agency. In addition, because the methodology is the same, some sections of this article are reproduced from Davis and Levy (2010) (see references).

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Self-Leadership in Purpose-Driven Organizations: Analyzing Human Perception For More Integrated Decision- Making

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ABSTRACT

Productive decision-making requires appropriate perception of the facts relevant to the decision. It may be necessary to perceive and integrate diverse and conflicting perspectives appearing inside and outside of the decision-maker. This paper scrutinizes theoretical and empirical findings on individual human perception as a basis for decision-making and behavior. Special attention is paid to the role of the unconscious (e.g. Bargh, 2006), dual-system approaches (e.g. Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), self-regulation (e.g. Muraven, Baumeister & Tice, 1999, Moffitt et al., 2011), and self-leadership (e.g. Manz, 2013). Guiding self-leadership principles are derived for more sustainable internal balancing and more comprehensive integration of external stimuli. Such self-leadership guidelines allow leaders and organizations to identify blind spots more easily and to improve the perception of the inside and the environment. In purpose-driven organizations with distributed authority, the power to decide is distributed among those employees who appear to be competent for the specific topic. Therefore especially within such self-organization this self-leadership competency appears to be crucial for success. Three conclusions of this paper may be applied: Firstly, it provides a basis for both individuals and "conventional" organizations to develop their own decision-making abilities and processes further. Secondly, it points out ways traditional hierarchical organizations could increase their flexibility and adaptivity through self-organization. Finally, organizations which apply self-organization already may find insights for the improvement of their internal decision-making processes.

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Introduction

It has been shown that a number of organizations – both profit and non-profit – show very successful results by applying organizational practices which radically contradict conventional wisdom. The U.S.-based company Morning Star produces tomatoes worth \$700 million annually with about 400 employees. They achieve a double-digit growth rate compared to the 1% of their competitors. The Dutch neighborhood-nursing organization Buurtzorg grew from 10 employees to 7000 with a market share of 75% within 7 years. These are examples of organizations which differ fundamentally from well-known organizational structures. Among others, three central characteristics of these types of self-organization may be summarized as follows (Hamel, 2011, Laloux, 2014):

Serving the purpose or mission of the organization provides the leading orientation for every decision and action. Whether an idea or argument is good or bad will be judged by this standard. Every employee at Morning Star, for example, “is responsible for drawing up a personal mission statement that outlines how he or she will contribute to the company’s goal of ‘producing tomato products and services which consistently achieve the quality and service expectations of our customers.’” (Hamel, 2011).

The power to take decisions is allocated to those people in the organization who are competent for such decisions. Employees choose how much money to spend on what, even including salaries. They are responsible for acquiring the tools needed to do their work. Employees even define the strategy. There are no titles nor promotions because there is no hierarchy. In such organizations there are no longer any managers. However, everyone is a manager in terms of competencies to decide. One employee puts it like this: “I’m driven by my mission and my commitments, not by a manager.” (Hamel, 2011).

Employees negotiate responsibilities with their peers. They apply market-style practices within their relationships.

If they want to make investments larger than what they are able to finance themselves they have to convince colleagues to lend them the rest. “There is a social risk in doing something your colleagues think is stupid.” (Hamel, 2011).

People do not have to fit into predefined boxes. They are expected to take on bigger responsibilities as they develop further competencies. Therefore there are broader and more complicated roles than elsewhere (Hamel, 2011).

It may be concluded that in such organizations the employees have a lot of freedom to do what they are convinced is the best thing to serve the purpose. Simultaneously they have peer-negotiated responsibility for the results of their actions. There are almost no rigid structures like hierarchy and status markers which keep them from fulfilling their mission.

Such a fundamental shift of organizational structure and culture also has its drawbacks. It usually takes a quite a long time to get accustomed to it and to get productive. Not everybody is willing to enter such an organization or suitable for it. Employees who are used to working in a rigid hierarchical environment may not be able to adjust. Selection criterion are difficult to assess and constitute a limitation for growth in terms of number of employees. Without a hierarchical ladder to climb, employees may also find it difficult to evaluate and communicate their progress relative to peers. That can become a handicap when they want to switch companies. Peer-negotiated responsibility requires explicit feedback in case a counterpart did not meet his / her promises. This may be challenging for employees on both sides, but it constitutes a core factor for productivity (Hamel, 2011).

It appears to be evident that such a new type of purpose-driven organization requires people with the ability and willingness to manage their actions and competencies quite independently and to coordinate them with colleagues. On top of their professional expertise they have to establish self-management and self-leadership abilities. Self-leadership

may be defined as “a comprehensive self-influence perspective that concerns leading oneself toward performance of naturally motivating tasks as well as managing oneself to do work that must be done but is not naturally motivating” (Manz, 1986: p. 589). Through focusing on the “why” and “what” of self-influence, individual self-leaders address the underlying reasons for effort and behavior (Manz, 2013). Increased self-leadership corresponds with better affective responses and improved work performance (Stewart, Courtright & Manz, 2011).

The following sections of the paper will analyze the relevance of human perception to self-leadership and derive adequate guidelines for employees, and draw conclusions for purpose-driven organizations.

Perception

“All you have is what you notice.” - Roshi Baker

Perception is the main basis for learning and behavior. As human beings, our abilities to perceive the environment and our own bodies with our senses are very limited in quantity and quality. For instance we are not able to perceive magnetic and electric fields like some birds and fish, ultraviolet light and carbon dioxide like bees, or ultrasound like bats (Chittka & Brockmann, 2005).

Perceiving starts with input signals from the senses which are handled in a cascade of cortical brain regions (bottom-up). This flow appears to be in a constant interaction, with feedback from the brain facilitating it (top-down). The brain first uses rudimentary signals to derive analogies, linking that input with representations in memory. Therefore we may understand perception as a mutual activity of bottom-up and top-down processes. The latter seems to build upon expectations of the most likely interpretations of the input image. The top-down process facilitates recognition by substantially limiting the relevant object representations. This provides focused predictions which facilitate

perception and cognition (Bar, 2007). Recognition thus rather resembles an iterative approximation than an exact matching process. It builds upon what is already known.

Limitations of our senses--like the blind spot in our eyes where the nerves leave the eyeball--are automatically corrected by the brain. We do not see anything missing or unusual at this point. “We do not see that we do not see.” (von Foerster, 2003, p. 284).

To focus on something means overlooking almost everything else. An experiment shows that even a highly salient human in a black gorilla suit walking through a scene and showing off by beating his or her breast may be invisible for viewers for this reason (Most, Scholl, Clifford & Simons, 2001). Even substantial changes in images are not recognized under certain circumstances by many observers, which is an effect known as change blindness. Change blindness seems to be very counterintuitive because most people firmly believe that they would notice such large changes – a kind of “change blindness blindness” (Simons & Rensink, 2005, p. 17).

We may conclude that human perception is very limited in quantity and quality, highly subjective, iterative and approximate. It is strongly influenced by our internal patterns which consist of both a legacy of evolution and a product of personal history. The limitations of our perception are easily overlooked. We do not see what we do not see.

Automaticity and Consciousness

“The intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful servant. We have created a society that honors the servant and has forgotten the gift.” -Albert Einstein

People who recalled an experience of social exclusion, experience a lower room temperature than others who recalled an inclusion experience (Zhong, Chen-Bo, & Leonardelli, 2008). Watching pictures of items drawn from business contexts (e.g. briefcases, boardroom tables,

fountain pens, etc.) leads to a more competitive behavior than watching pictures of neutral objects like cups (Kay, Wheeler, Bargh & Ross, 2004). These are just a few examples of very many studies where the so-called priming effect takes place in a statistically significant way: A stimulus unconsciously and automatically triggers and shapes the response to a later stimulus. It is suggested that these effects increase with the degree of ambiguity (Kay et al., 2004). Hence priming seems to be an unconscious solution to fill the disturbing gap of uncertainty.

Human decision-making was found to be distorted from rationality in many ways (e.g. Ariely, 2008). One example of many is myopia, the tendency to search for immediate gratification and to fail in long-term planning (e.g. Hardin & Looney, 2012). Even if people know that biases may occur in human judgment, they tend to unconsciously ignore the possibility to be biased themselves (Pronin, Olivola & Kennedy, 2008). Regarding business plans, it was found that there is a cognitive bias to accentuate the positive aspects, which is called planning fallacy (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003). Thus there are many indications that we tend to favor everything which attunes us in a positive mood and flatters our ego: seemingly immaculate perception, unbiased judgment, very promising business plans, etc.

These examples show that unconscious mental processes exhibit a strong distortive influence on behavior and decision-making. However, it is very efficient and fast to process inputs automatically. Daily activities like driving a car mainly rely on automatic and unconscious processes which are believed to have high capacity and to be fast and independent of the central working memory (e.g. Evans, 2008). Novice golfers, for example, perform more poorly under time pressure whereas skilled golfers even benefit from reduced performance time (Beilock, Bertenthal, Hoerger, & Carr, 2008). Automatized, unconscious processes allow us to rapidly and holistically interpret our environment, to process these interpretations and to act.

Unconscious effects “are ubiquitous and pervasive across the major forms of psychological phenomena: appraisal and

evaluation, motivation and goal pursuit, social perception and judgment, and social behavior. This research has been impressive in demonstrating the wide scope and reach of nonconsciously instigated influences on our daily lives” (Bargh, 2006, p. 148). They even dominate behavior according to results of empirical research: “Everyday intuitions suggest full conscious control of behavior, but evidence of unconscious causation and automaticity has sustained the contrary view that conscious thought has little or no impact on behavior. [...] conscious causation is often indirect and delayed, and it depends on interplay with unconscious processes” (Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs, 2011, p. 331).

Consciousness was not necessary for the survival of life as such. This ability probably appeared very late during the evolution of life. Nevertheless it seems to be the key factor for at least many of the successes of mankind: it allows us to integrate behavior across time. It enables us to benefit from past events for present and future events. Furthermore, consciousness introduces social and cultural factors. Conscious thought helps us to deal with multiple alternatives and conflicting possibilities (Baumeister, et al., 2011). Another powerful aspect of consciousness is self-awareness, which means becoming the object of one’s own attention. To have self-awareness and to be able to experience your own mental states is a logical basis for making inferences about other people’s states of mind. The theory of mind signifies “the cognitive capacity to attribute mental states to self and others” (Goldman, 2012, p. 402).

We may conclude that the unconscious inevitably influences our awareness without being noticed. It offers fast, comprehensive and powerful processing but is not directly manageable. Consciousness and self-awareness first of all allow us to identify inconsistencies within ourselves and with the external context. “[M]ost and possibly all human behavior emerges from a combination of conscious and unconscious processes” (Baumeister, et al. 2011, p. 354).

Homeostasis and Self-Regulation

“Between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our freedom.” - Viktor E. Frankl

An organism has to maintain more or less stable internal conditions despite a changing external environment. The self-regulating process which “maintain[s] stability while adjusting to changing conditions” (Billman, 2013, p.159) is called homeostasis. Regarding physiology, e.g. blood pressure, breath, etc., this is an unconscious automatic process.

Humans may achieve the ability to regulate themselves mentally as well. Self-control and self-regulation are crucial for a person’s ability to deal with emotions. They include the ability to alter one’s own responses, e.g. to inhibit emotions, to modify one’s thoughts, feelings and behaviors. There is strong empirical support for the assumption that these capabilities play an important role for the whole life. “Insofar as self-regulation liberates human behavior from being driven solely by external stimuli and automatic, reflexive, or instinctual responses, it contributes greatly to the diversity and flexibility of human behavior.” (Muraven, Baumeister & Tice, 1999, p. 446). The presence of these abilities in childhood correlates with attributes like high socio-economic status, good health and a low percentage of criminal incidents and pathology as adults. People who manage to acquire these abilities during their life-times still may profit from the positive effects (e.g. Moffitt et al., 2011).

Using the Best of Both Worlds

“To play a symphony you have to tune your instruments.”
- Ivar Vehler

Summing up we may say that unconscious and conscious processes exhibit characteristics which represent strengths and weaknesses relevant to specific contexts and objectives. Unconscious, intuitive mental processes are automatic, effortless, associative, rapid and parallel and result in skilled action. Consciousness by contrast is controlled, effortful, deductive, slow, serial, self-aware and results in rule application (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).


Being aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the conscious and the unconscious allows us to consciously integrate them into real life and to activate them appropriately (e.g. Nordgren, Bos & Dijksterhuis, 2011). Some examples follow.

It is a truism that you should think before doing something. However, in most day-to-day cases we do not. Usually we just act automatically like we are used to, e.g. when brushing our teeth or driving a car. If something unexpected arises like toothache or surprising roadworks, we have to stop automaticity and start to think about what to do. We tend to use consciousness as rarely as possible due to its demand in energy and the limited capacity of our working memory.

We know that thinking has its merits, but thinking too much can result in drawbacks. It potentially reduces preference consistency (Nordgren et al., 2011) and decision satisfaction (Ariely & Norton, 2011), e.g. decisions that would provoke arguments lead to favoring other decisions which are easy to explain to others but are not consistent with our own feelings and preferences anymore.

Another very common aspect of thinking too much is to address too many attributes and options. Basically, an increase in available information improves decision accuracy but not infinitely. In the case of a mismatch between the amount of information input and the cognitive abilities we may call it a situation of information overload. If someone has to handle too much information, accuracy decreases (see figure 1, Eppler & Mengis, 2004, p. 326).

Figure 1. Information Overload



Focusing perception is obviously necessary for analyzing, planning, etc. Otherwise, focusing leaves out a lot of the context which could be important. Thus non-focusing may also be advantageous. Mind-wandering for example has positive effects like making diverse perspectives visible and fostering creativity (Schooler, Mrazek, Franklin, Baird, Mooneyham, Zedelius, & Broadway 2014). Automatic, spontaneous associations build upon unconscious resources. They offer a potential source for new perspectives and alternative approaches.

The concept of 'sleeping over a problem' is more than just a manner of speaking. During sleep, when consciousness and focus are mainly deactivated, memory is reprocessed which appears to be an important factor for how our memories are formed and ultimately shaped (e.g. Stickgold, 2005). Sleep shapes internal structures and helps to process contents unconsciously.

For both individual and collective intentions it may be concluded that "... the decision maker might be wise to ask both questions - 'Am I thinking too much? Am I thinking too little?'" (Ariely & Norton, 2011, p. 44).

Deidentification

"What happens when people are ...over-attached to their creation and ideas? ... What is my new role in life?"

- Dan Ariely

It appears to be logical that planning for the future and learning from the past are crucial for private life and leadership, but not sufficient. Also being able to become aware of the present moment is important. To perceive what is actually going on in an open-minded, comprehensive and multidimensional manner (facts, emotions, desires, fantasies, weak signals, intuitions, etc.) means detaching oneself at least partially from what has been taken for granted up to now. The abilities to be patient and to tolerate ambiguity, frustration and anxiety are not only required to identify a good point of time for action, but also to avoid bustling and to send signals of calmness and firmness to other people and colleagues (Simpson & French, 2006). Practices like individual self-dialogue and mental imagery may increase mental performance, show positive effects like enthusiasm, job satisfaction, and self-efficacy, and decrease negative affects like nervousness (Neck & Manz, 1996). It is also found that methods to foster mindfulness and contemplation may change brain and immune functions in a positive way. By applying them it appears to be possible to enhance a sense of equanimity and clarity, and increase empathy and relational satisfaction (Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Siegel 2007).

Summing up, we may say that detachment and deidentification from present convictions and expectations releases perception for what is actually "out there." It releases awareness of something unknown up to now. This potentially could even open a door for the self to develop further (e.g. Graves, 1966; Loevinger, 1997; Cook-Greuter, 2000; Beck & Cowan, 1996; Cowan & Todorovic, 2000; Rooke & Torbert, 2005). To watch earth from outer space proved to be an eye opener for some astronauts as well as for observers watching it on TV. This was called the big picture or overview effect (White, 1998), and is an example of how individual minds tune into a global context.

Orientation For Self-Leadership

“A lasting, committed daily practice is the only way to produce sustained transformation.”

-Wilber / Patten / Leonard / Morelli 2012

Based on the arguments demonstrated above, the following points for orientation show – like lighthouses – the direction towards more connected and integrated self-regulation, perception and behavior. I propose these guiding principles to support internal and external balancing and to improve adaptability:

Foster self-perception and self-awareness: Train the ability to mentally step outside of yourself and to become aware of inner feelings, desires, memories, tensions, weak signals, intuitions, etc. Comprehensive self-awareness is required to become the leader of yourself. Become aware of and appreciate your personal (or organizational) “instruction manual”, the unique characteristics of your internal structures: What are your strengths and weaknesses? How did your history lead to the current status? What are you able to appreciate? What is “just” a result of history? What do you want to change? How do you perceive your own body? Does it tell you something? What are your core topics and core purposes?

Avoid data overflow, and search for blind spots: Keep your capacity for information-processing in mind, reduce noise that is data which cannot be processed anymore and confuses instead of improving orientation. Reflect on the impact of the quantity and quality of external stimuli on your internal state.

Invite conflicting perceptions and perspectives, guide your ways in unusual directions every now and then, try to appreciate contradiction and to examine paradoxes instead of denying them. Open yourself up for detours and for getting touched by something unknown. Connect yourself to the bigger picture.

Shape your internal structures, train self-regulation, find your personal ways for internal balancing and regeneration: Usually we do what we are used to. Therefore it is important

to take care of what we get used to. Design your habits consciously. Establish your ability to consciously deal with emotions, deliberation, desires, memories, fantasies, weak signals, intuitions, etc. Maybe you decide to let them naturally flow or to direct them in order to prevent damage. Self-regulation is a precondition to avoid troublesome and devastating decisions and irreversible damage. Find your ways to come back to an appropriate level of internal tension somewhere between burden and floppiness.

Consciously invite your unconscious, the powerful automatic resources: Create space for both focus and mind-wandering, for closed and open modes, try to articulate and integrate suppressed perspectives, provide space for weak signals, for perceptions of pressure and contradiction, for dreams and spontaneous associations, use sleep for unconscious processing, leave open spaces, enjoy the silence.

Integrate analysis and contemplation: Complexity may be approached in two ways: first to divide it into pieces analytically and second to dissolve the ego in it without words. The first one is easily traceable and communicable. The latter allows for taking advantage of much more diverse, comprehensive, yet implicit, subjective and unconscious resources within oneself and collectives than the explicit, analytical one. Individual experiences during contemplation can partly be made explicit, individually and collectively.

Aim at appropriate modesty based on limited human resources on the one hand and almost unlimited complexity on the other: As human perception and its processing are very restricted in relation to the complexity of the world, our ability to understand and control even a small fraction of the environment will always be extremely limited and iteratively influenced by developments elsewhere. The impact of narrow-minded actions may be shattering.

Aim at appropriate courage based on resonance of the inside and the outside: Explore the unknown possibilities mindfully. Listen carefully whether self-perception and perception of the surrounding field resonate with each other. Listen to your inner voice and accept it as one instrument of an orchestra. There are memories, rationality, emotions,

desires, fantasies and weak, unique signals from the depths. Train to distinguish those various voices. These multifaceted voices are not reality, they are not the truth, they are what they are. Accept this orchestra as it is: If it does not communicate at all, if it communicates in a gentle or vague manner, if it is very clear and strong and does not leave you in any doubt.

Aim at detachment and deidentification from existing internal structures: “Yes, that’s the way how I (we) act at the moment ... Yes, that’s the way how I (we) decide at the moment ... Yes, that’s what I (we) believe at the moment. All this is not me (us). What I (we) am (are) at the moment does not limit myself (ourselves). What I (we) am (are) right now does not restrict what I (we) will become to be right afterwards or in weeks, months, years, decades.”

Step into and continue your personal way to connect yourself practically to the bigger picture and support the evolvement of life as such, e.g. through interaction with the younger or elder generation or in nature.

Conclusions

In this article some selected findings on human perception and cognition are briefly depicted. On this basis guiding principles for individual behavior were derived. They are applicable to day-to-day life and promise to reduce unproductive and devastating ways of homeostasis. To follow these guidelines allows more comprehensive integration of internal and external stimuli and fosters more sustainable decision-making and behavior. If trained and automated in practice, they appear to increase the adaptability of individuals, teams and organizations.

In purpose-driven organizations with distributed authority essentially any employee fulfills management tasks. Therefore it may be found advisable for such organizations to support their employees in the development self-leadership competencies. They seem to be essential for the execution of their professional role. The employees have need for the competency to perceive stimuli around and within themselves and to integrate them into their behavior and decision-making. Additionally in such organizations the lack of status markers and the focus on participation could be challenging for newcomers. To be able to deal with a need for self-affirmation and with the desires of the own ego could also be crucial. The development of self-leadership capacities could make it easier for new employees to get accustomed to a fundamentally different organizational culture.

♦ ♦ ♦

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Developing Character at the Frontier of Human Knowledge

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ABSTRACT

The US military service academies have both a mission and a mandate to develop character in the future officers they train and educate. This paper uses a real-world case (in which names, dates and locations have been changed) to re-frame character development in terms of character's function during ethical dilemmas. We propose that the character that will be required in the professional lives of future officers is necessarily a combination of virtue cultivation and ethics education. Further, we propose a novel pedagogical concept for motivating students to pursue the rigors of character education, offering the concept of "awe" as a means of instilling the internal drive necessary to develop character. Ethics education, indeed all forms of education, then are propelled by a sense of "awe" at the frontier of knowledge, the threshold between that which we know and that which we do not. Approaching character in this way is of particular importance for military members because war creates the space in which ethical dilemmas are more frequent, and often more consequential, than in civilian life. It is because military officers are likely to face unscripted ethical circumstances that their character development must include training in navigating frontiers of ethics knowledge.

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Preface

“Say when ready to copy 9-line,” the joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) transmitted to the Air Force pilot on a secure frequency.¹ The 9-line attack briefing serves as the contract between the ground force commander and the aircrew for when, where, and how weapons are to be employed (US DoD Joint Publication, 2009, p. V-39). It is not a clearance to release weapons, but if a pilot receives a 9-line, weapons release clearance is often not far behind.

Second Lieutenant Dave Brown watched the video generated by his infrared targeting pod closely. He saw the target, Objective Santa Fe, standing in a field just north of his home. He was a tall man with an even taller shadow in the early morning sun. Lt Brown knew that the person-hours that had gone into finding this al Qaeda leader were too many to count. He and a number of other aircrew, intelligence analysts and ground personnel had been watching him for weeks to confirm his identity and enable a strike. There Santa Fe stood—in the open—90 meters from the nearest building. If the crew was unable to strike this target today they may never get another chance; and Lt Brown knew it.

The 23-year old lieutenant keyed the mic. “Standby 9-line. Standby. There are kids in the field of view. Confirm you copy kids?”

Lt Brown and his crew watched as Objective Santa Fe’s children fluttered around him on the silent video monitor. The presence of the children was unmistakable. Aside from the height difference, which was pronounced in the long morning shadows, Afghan adults do not typically run. Children do.

The radio was silent for a few moments while the JTAC undoubtedly conferred with the ground force commander. The JTAC responded, “I copy kids. I see the kids. But when I tell you to shoot, you’re gonna shoot.”

Introduction

Lt Brown’s true story is a reminder that future officers must be equipped not only with the technical training to

act proficiently, but with the character to act ethically. The service academies’ mandate to develop leaders of character, and certainly the mission of the Air Force Academy’s Center for Character and Leadership Development, are derived from the fact that officers will face moral dilemmas like the one Lt Brown faced. What Lt Brown needs, the resource to which officers will turn in situations like these, is character.

This paper offers a framework for developing the character of future Lt Browns, along with a novel pedagogical concept for motivating students to pursue the rigors of character education. A precise definition of character may be difficult to find, and unanimity on such a definition would be nearly impossible. Instead of defining the term, we ask what its function must be in contexts like Lt Brown’s. To this end, we consider character to be the combination of virtue cultivation and ethics education. Further, we offer the concept of “awe” as a means of instilling the internal drive necessary for students to develop their character. Ethics education, indeed all forms of education, are propelled by a sense of “awe” at the frontier of knowledge, the threshold between what we know and what we do not know.

This concept of the frontier of knowledge is especially relevant to future officers. War creates the space in which ethical dilemmas are more frequent, and often more severe, than in civilian life. When a military officer is faced with an ethical dilemma, he or she may not be able to fall back on the collective learning of a community of ethicists. Every Lt Brown dilemma is not quite like any that has come before. It is because of the nature of the work of a military officer, and the possibility that such an officer is the first to navigate a particular circumstance in the field of applied military ethics, that character development must include training in navigating frontiers of knowledge.

Character

Though there are a few dissenters, many philosophers divide the history of normative ethical theories into three broad categories (Honderich, Ed., 1995, p. 941). Deontological views, associated most closely with Immanuel Kant, suggest

that the primary concern in ethical thought is duty. One faces moral duties to act in certain ways regardless of the consequences. Teleological views hold that the ends which one pursues are paramount. The most popular of these is utilitarianism, attributed to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. It defines the proper end as happiness and suggests that an action is right insofar as it produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.

Many contemporary military ethicists suggest that both of these systems, whatever their merits for the populace at large, are insufficient in the military context precisely because no pre-planned ethical system of acts can anticipate the nuances and difficulties that arise in the contemporary military environment and that therefore a third way, a virtue-centric approach, is best suited to military members. While asking *how ought we to act*, as both deontology and consequentialism demand, may be sufficient for many, those training to be military officers (and military members more broadly) must instead ask *what kind of people ought we to be*? One immediately sees how closely this question posed by virtue ethics is connected with character development. For such a system we must look beyond Kant, Bentham, and Mill, back to Aristotle.

Aristotle builds his system of ethics around excellences of human character—around *virtues*. The virtues are cultivated by the habituation of right action in our desires, emotional reactions, and modes of thinking. The intellectual virtue that governs action most supremely, on Aristotle's account, is a particular kind of wisdom. *Phronēsis* (usually translated 'prudence' or 'practical wisdom', Aristotle, 1999, p. 345) informs the agent's actions such that he or she acts "to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right end, and in the right way" (Aristotle, 1999, p. 29).

If one cultivates the virtuous states of being courageous, and honest, and kind, and generous, and magnanimous, and wise, Aristotle supposes, then when faced with a troublesome dilemma, one will act well. Aristotle, against his intellectual descendants, Kant, Bentham, and Mill, is primarily concerned, not with whether a person *chooses the right act*,

but with whether the person is *of the right character*. These virtues do not necessarily come easily, argues Aristotle, but they are a necessary for a properly functioning human being. Thus, with the proper training, our nature is conducive to character.

Here we return to the service academies' missions. Producing military leaders of character relies on an approach like Aristotle's because war is hell. It is not hell simply because of the physical dangers, the bloody battles, and loss of life—though surely these are terrible corollaries. It is hell because our typical conceptions of ethical behavior are stressed. War generates some circumstances that leave us with no readily available moral determination—no moral out—not unlike Lt Brown's circumstances in the opening paragraphs. Philosopher of war Brian Orend admits that such a circumstance is "a wretched moral tragedy and, no matter what you do, you're wrong" (Orend, 2013, p. 168).

If we, as military members and civilians entrusted with the character development of future officers, could predict the ethical dilemmas that will plague the next war, we could give our students either a rulebook for utilitarian calculations or a means of deconflicting deontic principles. For most of society such guides already exist. One may appeal to the state's laws or to societal norms in order to make ethical decisions; but these standards are insufficient in war. Though the law often conforms to ethical principles, war takes place at the fringes of posited law where what is ethically obligatory may be legally prohibited and where what is legal may nevertheless be unethical. Societal norms that otherwise govern our interpersonal relationships are of little value when two societies, each with its own set of norms, clash in lethal conflict. Such norms are insufficient to guide military personnel—and especially military leaders—to the "right" answer. So instead we cultivate character. We habituate virtue. We do not produce people who know right answers to predetermined questions. Instead we seek to produce the *kinds of people* who will answer well the difficult questions we cannot possibly foresee.

The role of virtue cultivation in military training has

already received significant scholarly attention (Olsthoorn, 2011; Robinson, 2007, pp. 23-26; Robinson, 2007, pp. 259-269; Castro, 1966, pp. 60-78; Aronovitch, 2001; Olsthoorn, 2005, pp. 183-197). What we add here is a conception of character development that requires both virtue cultivation and ethics education. Virtue then, while a necessary condition, is insufficient to develop the character of future officers. Aristotle himself recognizes that if virtues are to produce the “right action,” they must be in accord with “correct reason” (Aristotle, 1999, p. 86). What, then, is “correct reason” and how can our future officers come to possess it? To address this requirement we turn to the second component of

character development: ethics education; in particular, an ethics education that emphasizes struggling with ethical dilemmas rather than merely achieving a “textbook” answer. This two-fold representation of character is recognizable in Lt Brown’s story. If Lt Brown is to act well in the deeply troubling circumstance with which he is presented, he needs not only the virtues of courage, honor, *phronēsis*, etc., but also the capacity to work through difficult ethical dilemmas that comes only from practice and forethought. Before addressing ethics education itself, we must spend some time discussing the proper motivation for such education.

Awe

We recommend that a sense of awe should motivate ethics education. Our challenge in preparing future military officers is to instill in them the drive to continually seek the unknown in the domain of ethics, both now as cadets and on their own after commissioning. If our students are motivated, not merely by external sanctions, but by an internal desire for greater understanding, they will be more likely to wrestle with difficult ethical problems in training, which will better prepare them for the difficult ethical problems they will face as officers.

We define awe as the sensation that fills the human mind when it is confronted with a rare and vast unknown. This sense of vastness provokes a desire to accommodate the unknown (Keltner & Haidt, 2003, pp. 297-314). Research into the effects of awe has shown that students who were primed to feel awe felt less of a need for “mental closure,” and were more open to concepts that were “bigger than themselves” (Shiota & Kelter, 2007, p. 944). In other words, the desire to accommodate the vast unknown is the root of

Producing military leaders of character relies on an approach like Aristotle’s because war is hell...not simply because of the physical dangers...[but] because our typical conceptions of ethical behavior are stressed.

an internal motivation to continue learning more, to seek more and more vastness. Each time the student reaches some new “known,” he or she better appreciates how much is left unknown. The internal motivation of awe, not the external sanctions of grades, professional success, or graduation, ought to motivate us and our students to investigate ethics. And the success or failure of this motivation, that is, the degree to which our students practice working through the most difficult of ethical dilemmas, will determine whether they are prepared for the ethical dilemmas like Lt Brown’s that await them as military officers.

Ethics Education - The Universal Frontier

It is because learning takes place between what is known and what is unknown that we have characterized learning as a process of interacting with a frontier. The learning to which we refer is not merely the act of hearing and remembering bits of data. We instead have in mind a genuine learning during which the subject adopts as *truth* what may have been previously known only as *fact*. There is a difference between being able to mimic the math teacher’s movements on a particular problem and understanding the principles well enough to operate on other problems. It is

this kind of understanding that is achieved at the frontier. Properly framed, to learn something new—that is, to try to understand something previously not understood—is to face at once both the intrepid aspiration to venture out and the paralyzing fear of the immense vastness of our own ignorance.

Learning understood as confronting the frontier is most recognizable in the natural sciences. Researchers devote their

Each time the student reaches some new “known,” he or she better appreciates how much is left unknown. The internal motivation of awe, not the external sanctions of grades, professional success, or graduation, ought to motivate us and our students to investigate ethics.

professional lives to discovering the unknown, motivated by awe and wonder at the vastness, not of what we know about the universe, but of what we do not (Firestein, 2012, p. 2 & 7). A physicist is not initially inspired by the promise of wealth or rank, but by the sense of wonder drawn from observing the night sky. This frontier is easily recognized in the physical sciences, but the vastness of the material universe is only one frontier among many. A similar—and equally compelling—frontier is found in the study of ethics. After all, “philosophy, according to its three greatest inventors, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, begins in wonder and ends in wisdom” (Kreeft, 2015, p. 9). As such, the history of ethical thought has been a pursuit of the unknown every bit as much as the history of science has been—and neither has been without its missteps and mistakes.

For example, no one holds Democritus’s view on the structure of atoms anymore; but how right he was close to 400 B.C. to claim that the whole perceptible world is made up of imperceptibly small particles of various sizes and shapes (Curd, 1996, p. 79). The theory was not much altered for 2,200 years until John Dalton added that atoms can only combine in whole number ratios (Rex, 2002, p. 14). Albert Einstein predicted the mass and sizes of atoms and molecules and J.J. Thompson added electrons (Rex, 2002, pp. 16 & 18).

Niels Bohr added electron orbits, though he put them in the wrong places and Werner Heisenberg discovered the limits of our knowledge of such small elements (Rex, 2002, pp. 137 & 181). Each iteration was a venture into the frontier of that which is unknown. Each development was right about some things and wrong about others. Renowned physicist Marie Curie captured this iterative progression of science further into the frontier of ignorance when she said, “one

never notices what has been done; one can only see what remains to be done” (Chiu & Wang, 2011, pp.

9-40). Kant too recognized the iterative nature of scientific study when he said that “every answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question, which likewise requires its answer” (Kant, 2001, p. 86).

Though the history of ethical study is not identical to the history of scientific study, it has also been a search for truth. Socrates and Plato introduced the study of virtue (Kreeft, 2015, p. 80) and justice (Kreeft, 2015, p. 89) in the Fourth and Fifth Centuries BC, but it was Aristotle, a generation later, who proposed the first system of ethics (Deigh, 1995, p. 245). In the 13th Century AD, Thomas Aquinas undertook to reconcile Aristotle’s system with the Christian one (Foot, 1978, p. 1), producing a system of ethics that acknowledged the value of humans as image-bearers of God (Auguas, 2009, p. 55). It was not until the enlightenment period when philosophy distanced itself both from theology and from science that Immanuel Kant produced a system of ethics centered on human dignity and grounded in secular terms, and specifically, in the will (Kant, 1993, p. 35). But where Kant grounded the whole of human morality in the will, in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill grounded the will in happiness (Mill, 1993, p. 140), producing a seismic shift in ethical thought that one can still feel in popular contemporary conceptions

of “the greater good.”

Some will say that the fact that these philosophers disagree with one another is evidence that there can be no right answers to the spurious questions philosophy asks (or at our institution, that philosophy is “too fuzzy” to produce any legitimate truth claims). But this criticism can just as easily be leveled against the physical sciences. Why are we willing to accept that a new principle about the universe in the physical sciences that is only partially right is a step toward truth, but in ethics is an indication of the absence of truth? Einstein’s discoveries did not prove Newton’s *wrong*, his discoveries retained Newton and made the whole of science, inclusive of both Newton and Einstein, “applicable to a wider range of phenomena” (Rosenberg, 2005, p. 99). The same is true of Socrates, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Mill, and the rest. The most robust picture of the workings of the universe is only available if we take Newton and Einstein together as answering two different questions. Likewise, the fullest picture of ethical truths is only available to us when we accept the discrete truths produced from each ethical system.

Just as the history of science has led us to the knowledge we now possess about the material universe, though it has made mistakes along the way, the collected work of these ethicists has brought us to a world in which we take for granted certain ethical truths. Though it may seem obvious to us that humans have inherent dignity and rights simply because they are human, it only seems so because we stand on the shoulders of such giants as Immanuel Kant. Likewise, though it may seem obvious to us that military strikes must be proportionate, the ethical principle that an act must produce more good than harm is only obvious to us because we have inherited the work of Bentham and Mill. In this way the history of ethical thought has been a venture into, and an investigation of, the frontier of human thought every bit as much as the study of science has been.

Ethics Education - The Individual Frontier

To this point, we have described the frontier of human

knowledge—the “universal” frontier—between what we as collective humanity know and what we do not. There is another kind of frontier, though, that is more relevant to undergraduate students. This second frontier is between that which *the individual* knows and that which she does not. When introduced to a field of study for the first time, students live, for the moment at least, at this individual frontier. We have seen the sense of awe that such a frontier generates in our students. One student will find it when she discovers Kant’s compelling claims about the limits of reason. Another will find it when he sees how compelling Plato’s account of recollection really is. Students find it when they confront Aristotle’s assertion that man is a political animal; or when they read Madison’s and Tocqueville’s claims that man is by nature ambitious, yet at the same time deeply desiring of equality with others.

There may be an impulse to ignore this individual frontier entirely. In teaching undergraduates, one who has worked at the universal frontier of human understanding as an expert in the field may be tempted to say that there once was a frontier in this area, but experts in the field have traversed it, collected data, and written down the results. The frontier is now closed. The student’s task is to memorize the discoveries those experts have made. The result is neither awe nor understanding, but passive receptivity.

The alternative, more motivational method, is quite different. Rather than describing the universal frontier that has already been traversed, the teacher invites students to discover their own individual frontier; the boundary between that which they know as individuals, and that which they do not. Students engage in their own journey into ignorance. This is not an invitation to ethical relativism, rather it is an acknowledgement that when the frontier is explored, there is, in fact, something out there to be discovered, though different students will approach the frontier from different angles. The role of the teacher is not to tell them that it has already been discovered, but to set the conditions under which students may themselves discover it.

Our claims in this section conform to the education

literature. One study found that the best teachers “don’t think of [learning] as just getting students to ‘absorb some knowledge.’ ... Because they believe that students must use their existing mental models to interpret what they encounter, they think about what they do as stimulating construction, not ‘transmitting knowledge’” (Bain, 2004, p. 27). Though the metaphoric language is different, the fundamental assertion is the same. In the act of genuine learning, the teacher creates an environment in which students are self-motivated, not merely to retain data, but to construct understanding on the one metaphor, or to explore the frontier on the other.

To use a different picture, in the first method, the teacher walks a path she has walked many times before. She says to her students “here, walk behind me. I will point out to you the things that we (the experts) have determined are important.” In the second method, the teacher walks the same familiar path, but instead she says to the students “you lead the way. Every twist and turn is an adventure. Point out to me what you discover and what you find important, and if you get too far off course, I will help to correct you.”

This, too, is present in the literature. Ken Bain quotes one educator who says, “when we can successfully stimulate our students to ask their own questions, we are laying the foundation for learning.” Another says, “we define the

own personal threshold of new knowledge—challenges some of these conceptions and affirms others. In either case, we are working at the individual, personal frontier between what an individual person knows about moral facts and what she does not know. This is an exciting journey into the unknown—it is every bit as exciting (and can be every bit as terrifying) as its scientific counterparts.

Frontiers and The Military Officer

Up to this point we have described the act of learning as the confrontation with a frontier, and we have described the role of awe in motivating the student to venture into that frontier. So far, though, the discussion has been equally applicable to all disciplines and to all students. In this section we will show why approaching ethics education as a contact with the frontier is particularly important in the character development of military officers.

If the sense of awe at the frontier is that by which students are spurred into a lifelong love of learning, then we should expect to find such a result regardless of the field of study; and so we do (Shiota & Kelter, 2007, p. 944). Students who are overwhelmed with the vastness of space may go on to push that frontier forward by discovering a new heavenly body. Students who are overtaken by the depths of the sea may go on to discover the migratory patterns of the great

white shark. But most of our students will not. Though the service academies place a heavy emphasis on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)

courses, few of our graduates will go on to work at the frontier of human knowledge in these fields. Some will make careers in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or in the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, but most service academy graduates with STEM degrees will not spend their lives doing STEM work. They will spend their lives doing *officer* work. And military officers, regardless of

In the act of genuine learning, the teacher creates an environment in which students are self-motivated, not merely to retain data, but to construct understanding on the one metaphor, or to explore the frontier on the other.

questions that our course will help them to answer, ... but we want [our students], along the way, to develop their own set of rich and important questions about our discipline and our subject matter” (Bain, 2004, p. 31).

In ethical study, each student brings his or her conceptions, or preconceptions, to the question at hand. Philosophical inquiry—discovery at the frontier of their

their academic upbringing, will likely spend some time at the frontier of human knowledge in *ethics*.

It is not merely the case that we cannot tell our students *which* moral dilemmas they will face. The ethical demands war places on its practitioners are so numerous, vast, and unpredictable that we cannot even know *what kinds* of moral dilemmas they will face. In order to train like we fight and fight like we train we must teach our students to venture out into the frontier of *individual* ignorance now because when they find themselves in the fight, facing moral dilemmas whose nuances have never been covered in any ethics textbook, they will be asked to take the journey into the frontier of *universal* ignorance. For these future officers, the distinction between individual ignorance and human ignorance in the field of applied ethics will collapse.

Recall Lieutenant Brown's story from the opening paragraphs. As an Air Force second lieutenant, he had less than two years of military experience.² Nevertheless, this junior officer was faced with a terrible choice. In the short pause that followed the JTAC's radio call, Lieutenant Brown asked himself one of the most difficult questions of his life. Does he have an unrestricted duty to defend the lives of innocent children, no matter the consequences? Or does he have the responsibility to measure the consequences of firing against those of not firing? Objective Santa Fe has killed before, and would kill again. He had orchestrated multiple complex attacks against the US Marines in Southern Afghanistan, and Brown knew that unless he and his crew prosecuted the attack, Santa Fe would kill more Americans and more Afghans tomorrow.

In that brief moment, Lieutenant Brown grappled with hundreds of years' worth of normative ethical theory. The deepest split in ethics since the Middle Ages has been between consequentialism, in which important ends can justify any means, and Kantian deontology, in which the

primacy of one's moral duty stands fast against even the most severe of contingent circumstances. The philosophic debate between Kant, Bentham, Mill, and all the others came to rest on that mid-June night, in that cockpit, on the gold bar-laden shoulders of an Air Force Second Lieutenant.

Brown's voice broke the brief silence on the aircrew's intercom. "What do you think, guys? You OK with this?" After a brief discussion among the crewmembers, Brown made a plan. In the end, Lieutenant Brown told the JTAC that he would wait a few more minutes, hoping that the children would depart the local area. A few minutes later they did, yielding a clean shot against Santa Fe alone in the field. The JTAC called "cleared hot," and the crew released the weapon. Objective Santa Fe was killed and there was no collateral damage.

Lieutenant Brown, with less than 24 months of Air Force service, handled that situation with the poise, responsibility, and command presence of a far more experienced officer. In this case, what was at stake was nothing less than the taking of innocent life. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Just War Tradition upon which that law is based assert that any collateral damage, and especially civilian casualties, are permissible only if the military value of the target exceeds the magnitude of collateral damage. Both the philosophical and legal normative standards available,

The deepest split in ethics since the Middle Ages has been between consequentialism, in which important ends can justify any means, and Kantian deontology, in which the primacy of one's moral duty stands fast against even the most severe of contingent circumstances.

however, offer no more precision than this (Orend, 2013, pp. 125-126).

When conducting close air support (CAS) operations with a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC), joint US military doctrine directs that the "target priority, effects, and timing of CAS fires within an operational area" are the

purview of the ground force commander, not the aircrew (US DoD Joint Publication, 2009, p. I-3). Thus, it is the ground force commander who best knows the situation on the ground, the enemy, and the expected collateral damage from a given strike. In Lieutenant Brown's case, when the

...military officers, regardless of their academic upbringing, will likely spend some time at the frontier of human knowledge in ethics.

JTAC and the ground force commander deliberated, the subject matter of their conversation was undoubtedly the proportionality demanded by the laws of war. When the JTAC returned to the aircrew and directed them to continue the attack, he was acknowledging that the ground force commander had weighed and considered all the salient variables—some of which were simply beyond the scope of the aircrew's situational awareness—and decided that the attack, even with the presence of the children, was proportional.

It is for this reason that Lieutenant Brown's story is so illustrative of the claims in this paper. War is so challenging a venue precisely because in wartime contexts the law often fails to adequately capture the ethical principles involved. The attack, if prosecuted as the JTAC requested, *would have been legal*. And yet, would it have been *right*? In spite of the legality, many of us are left with a deeply troubling intuition that such things ought not be done, that children ought not be killed, even collaterally, simply for standing in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Further, Lieutenant Brown's internal struggle to determine whether he faces an inalienable duty to defend innocent children, or whether that duty can be overcome when such significant ends justify terrible means, is precisely the historical conversation that students encounter when they study the history of normative ethics. Deontology, on the one hand, suggests that we have moral duties that stand against the heaviest of consequences. Utilitarianism,

on the other hand, suggests that if the ends are extreme, any means are admissible, even those that appear to violate our other duties. This paper does not intend to settle the centuries-long dispute. The presence of the dispute, and the illustration Lieutenant Brown's story has offered, point us back to the previous discussion of virtue.

It is, in part, because deontology and utilitarianism come into unexpected and seemingly insoluble conflict with one another in military life that we must train our warriors to be virtuous. This

is what it is to be a leader of character. Though Lieutenant Brown could not have properly labeled utilitarianism and deontology in his analysis of his mission, he had nevertheless spent his life cultivating the virtue of *phronēsis*, or practical wisdom, such that he could, despite the terrible circumstances, act "to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right end, and in the right way" (Aristotle, 1999, p. 29).

Character cultivation, as demonstrated in Lieutenant Brown's story, is a combination of virtue cultivation and ethics education. He had the capacity to work through the difficult dilemma set before him; a capacity that comes only from practice. He also had the virtue of practical wisdom, cultivated in part during his military training, to act well. We must teach our students to take journeys into the frontiers of both ethics education and virtue cultivation now so that they are practiced, trained, and equipped to navigate unforeseeable frontiers when they are sitting in Lieutenant Brown's chair in just a few short years.

Conclusion, Examples, and Questions for Further Discussion

Developing the character of future Lieutenant Browns is a mission that encompasses all aspects of the service academies. The framework that we have provided here, namely that virtue cultivation and ethics education are equal parts of character development, can apply (in varying degrees) to academic, military, and physical training. At

our first encounter with these terms, our intuition may suggest that virtue cultivation ought to take place in the cadets' leadership and physical training and that ethics education ought to take place in the academic environment. In practice, this is the case at the Air Force Academy, where virtue cultivation falls under the Commandant of Cadets' military training, and ethics education falls under the Dean of Faculty's Philosophy Department. We suggest, instead, that the line between virtue cultivation and ethics education is too blurry to allow for a clean distinction between who "owns" one or the other. The ideal of dual ownership of virtue cultivation and ethics education points out a pair of shortfalls in our current approach. First, a virtue training seminar cannot adequately build character without the motivation to pursue the frontier that is ethics education. Second, a single core philosophy course, as is currently required at the Air Force Academy, while necessary, is insufficient exposure to the ethics frontier.

Regardless of the "mission element," we should embrace a sense of awe as a pedagogical tool for motivating cadets to make the difficult journey toward the ethical frontier. In practice, this means showing students the vastness of knowledge that remains to be explored—challenging their sense of mastery of a subject—and then giving them tools to start accommodating that vastness. This is an iterative process: each attempt at accommodation yields new questions that inspire awe, propelling the journey onward. This kind of learning can (and should) take place in any academic discipline. As we have shown, though, there is a special role in character development for the exploration of the frontier in ethics.

A pair of examples from the Air Force Academy—the Cadet Honor System and Character Education programs—can serve as case studies for how to instill a sense of awe at the frontier of the unknown.

A distinguishing factor of the Air Force Academy's Cadet Honor System is that it is operated by cadets themselves.

Its decisions, the most severe of which result from Honor Board hearings, can be the difference between expulsion and commissioning as an officer. These stakes are among the highest possible in a training environment. The Honor System provides an example of a mentor pointing out an ethical frontier and giving cadets the freedom to investigate it without a predetermined destination. The frontier in this case is applied justice, the nuance of which implies that the frontier will never be completely mastered; the freedom to investigate comes from the responsibility that the cadets alone have to make a decision. Those familiar with the program will recognize that each board has an active duty officer mentor. This officer holds the same role as the teacher in the classroom. His or her function is not to tell the cadets how to vote, or to tell the cadets what the answer is, but to facilitate the cadet board's journey into the frontier. It is possible that the circumstances of the case are new and different, that the cadets who must decide the fate of the accused have never grappled with these kinds of questions in quite this way before. The officer, then, stands off to one side, both inviting the cadet board to investigate the frontier for themselves, and making him- or herself available in any cases of concern or confusion. For the cadet who stops to consider the situation, the result is awe and a yearning to learn more. From personal experience, one of the authors

...the line between virtue cultivation and ethics education is too blurry to allow for a clean distinction between who "owns" one or the other.

can attest that serving on a Cadet Wing Honor Board is a profoundly formative experience.

Though the Cadet Honor System provides an example of the Academy teaching ethics as a frontier even outside academic classes, there are negative examples as well. In their first year of commissioning education, for example, cadets are presented with a list of nine virtues.³ The virtues are defined by the Air Force, and no ethical reasoning is given for why these nine virtues were chosen. There is no

sense of a frontier remaining to be explored, much less any discussion about why it should be explored. As presented, this is information not to be understood as truth, but merely retained as fact.

In this case, we recommend a slight change to the order of this education: character education should point out an ethical frontier by asking “why are these virtues important in the first place?” Or even by asking cadets “which virtues are important and why?” In our experience, much of ethics training in the Air Force begins with a scripted training module in which the proctor holds the instructor sheet containing “the right answers.” When students, or military members, are brought into this kind of training environment, they are offered, not a frontier, but courses already charted. All one has to do in such environments is recite the right answer. This work is easy when the ethical questions at stake are about My Lai, Haditha, or Abu Ghraib. But, as we have shown with Lieutenant Brown’s story, not all scenarios in the real world include such obvious ethical lapses.

One improvement to character development, then, may be to begin the character training by presenting extraordinarily difficult ethical dilemmas, followed by a discussion during which the moderator is not pre-loaded with the “right” answer. The moderators, like the honor board officer mentor, like the teacher in the classroom, would only point out a frontier, inviting cadets to engage in the difficult work

of investigation. The group may, indeed, come to an answer, and it may indeed be the right one. But character cultivation takes place, not in the rote memorization of right answers, but in this act of discovery.

Rather than closing with a fixed set of proposals for the way forward, we instead propose that readers within and across service academies consider viewing character development through the lens we have presented. Some questions open for discussion are these: How can those responsible for military training contribute to the ethics education of the cadets? How can academies better incorporate virtue cultivation in the classroom? How can those of us responsible for cadet training and education increase the cadets’ exposure to moral dilemmas given the time restraints that are already in place? How can we better identify and propagate to cadets the real-world moral dilemmas officers are facing in the fight right now?

In a very short time, our graduates will be the ones caught up in those moral dilemmas. Whether they navigate them “for the right end, and in the right way” will depend on the challenges we ask them to face in their time of preparation, and whether those challenges imbue them with a sense of awe at what remains to be discovered at the ethical frontier.

♦♦♦

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Notes

- 1 This account is a true story that took place in the recent past. The names and operational details have been changed to protect anonymity and operational security.
- 2 Lieutenant Brown was not prior enlisted.
- 3 The virtues are honesty, courage, accountability, duty, loyalty, respect, mission, discipline, and teamwork.

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ESSAY

Creative Chances and the Burden of Freedom

Michelle D. Johnson, U.S. Air Force Academy

Midway through my third year as Superintendent of the United States Air Force Academy, I feel very fortunate to be in this post at this time – a time when America and societies worldwide are facing many varied challenges, all flying at us at a rapid pace. At the global scale we see the paradoxes – attacks in Paris and San Bernardino in the name of ISIS juxtaposed with over 190 nations brought together, also in Paris, to develop a global solution to climate change. On the national scale our leaders are attempting to balance order and the security of our citizens with the freedoms so fundamental to our Constitution. And even within higher education we see contradictions between educational efforts to prepare our students for lives of meaning and purpose – a goal that often requires provocation – and contrasting, competing calls to provide safe spaces for our students to grow and learn.¹

Each of these lines of thought reminds me of an August 2015 opinion in the New York Times, penned by Roger Cohen, in which he attributes to some ISIS sympathizers a desire to “be released from the *burden of freedom*.”² This is an extreme case of what we are perhaps seeing on the national scale, and even within our students – a desire for the freedom to make their own decisions, only to become overwhelmed by the need to make so many decisions. Therein lies some of the appeal of operating within our own comfort zones – operating around people basically like us, studying subjects that we’re comfortable with to prepare for jobs that we think we’ve always wanted.

As articulated by Richard Riley, Secretary of Education under President Clinton, “We are currently preparing students for jobs that don’t yet exist using technologies that haven’t been invented in order to solve problems that we don’t even know are problems yet.”³ That is...to do our jobs properly and prepare the next generation, we must challenge ourselves and our students to expand their horizons well beyond their comfort zones and learn to operate where difficult ideas intersect.

Lieutenant General Michelle D. Johnson, USAF is Superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy, where she directs a four-year regimen of military training, academics, athletic and character development programs leading to a Bachelor of Science degree and a commission as a second lieutenant. She was a distinguished graduate of the Academy in 1981, and completed graduate studies as a Rhodes Scholar. She has served in various assignments in air mobility, airlift and tanker flying operations and training, USAFA academic instruction, Air Mobility Command personnel, Air Force public affairs, JCS and COCOM strategic plans and policy, NATO operations and intelligence, plus multiple training, flying and deployed commands, and duty as AF Aide to two Presidents of the United States. General Johnson is a command pilot with more than 3,600 flying hours.

A popular entrepreneur magazine, *Fast Company*, echoes this mentality--this need to operate outside our comfort zones--by suggesting the knowledge economy is becoming a creative economy and touting individuals who break molds with spectacular results.⁴ Even the new Air Force Strategy published in 2014 makes it very clear that positioning the Air Force for success in the coming decades will require adoption and mastery of two strategic imperatives: mental agility and inclusiveness.⁵ These imperatives seem to call for a critical mass of “unicorn” officers capable of excelling outside their comfort zones. In any group of successful leaders, it’s likely some will have been unicorns in their own ways, pushing the boundaries of multiple disciplines. In my own experience, I was repeatedly kept out of my comfort zone when I had to blend ops research, political science, economics, leading people, and piloting aircraft around the world--among other things.

Yet despite many mandates and successful examples, the problem still remains: how does any university prepare good, but “non-unicorn” students for their futures?⁶ It’s something we’re grappling with at the Air Force Academy. How do we design a curriculum that has the elements necessary to prepare graduates to succeed in this complex, networked environment – does our curriculum challenge them and push them outside their comfort zones? Does it force them to practice at the intersection of disciplines, to demonstrate the courage needed to gracefully bear the “burden of freedom?”

Reviewing and updating a curriculum isn’t the easiest endeavor, even at a military service academy – or perhaps *especially* at a military service academy. Take the time-forged bureaucracy of government service and combine it with the meticulous methodology of faculty – and the outcome is likely to be what a fellow college president termed an “organized anarchy.”⁷ Anyone currently in a faculty or administrative role should instantly connect with that idea.

In this prescribed, structured, demanding environment, no division or discipline can imagine an “Academy

Graduate” getting a complete education without exposure to their specific content. This perspective, combined with national calls for more Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math – STEM – emphasis, has caused me, our Dean of Faculty and other Air Force senior leaders to question whether we have the right balance: are we pushing the STEM-oriented students enough to benefit from liberal education, and pushing the humanities-oriented students sufficiently to benefit from understanding the STEM basics?

This is where we might look to C.P. Snow to help define an answer to the question, and in particular to his famous Rede lecture given in 1959 at Cambridge University, in which he gave voice to his concern over the two cultures and the scientific revolution. He observed that the scientists and the “intellectuals” – a term used at the time, for what today would likely be called humanities or social science scholars – were at cultural poles. Their attitudes, standards, patterns of behavior, assumptions and approaches were at odds.⁸ He asserted that the feelings of one pole became the “anti-feelings” of the other pole with a net practical, intellectual and creative loss. And yet in the face of that negative dynamic, he persuasively argued that the *nexus* of

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the humanities, the basic sciences, and the applied sciences and engineering is where we best produce “*creative chances*.”

This space of creative chances is where we would like students to practice what Snow termed the “astonishing intellectual courage” needed to integrate disciplines, to recognize the “moral un-neutrality of science,” and in today’s vernacular, to become a reader of something that Nancy Scola of POLITICO labelled as *Liberal Arts Majors are from Mars, and Geeks are from Venus*.⁹

Unfortunately, this integration doesn’t happen often enough. Steve Jobs famously remarked “it is in Apple’s DNA that technology alone is not enough. It’s technology

married with liberal arts, married with the humanities, that yields us the result that makes our heart sing.”¹⁰ Those who can’t go more than a few minutes without checking their mobile phones illustrate what he meant. Similarly, Fareed Zakaria (in his book, *In Defense of a Liberal Education*) rightly suggests Facebook is as much psychology and sociology as it is technology.¹¹

When such integration does happen, we see how powerful it is when preparation meets opportunity. As a wing commander in Kansas, hosting an airshow, we had flown in metal detectors from another Air Force base to support the necessary security screening. A strong Midwest windstorm the night before the airshow battered the detectors and left them inoperative. But because the First Sergeant of our security forces squadron had served in a medical logistics squadron, he knew that medical logisticians could fix MRI machines—which are based on the same technologies as the metal detectors. That serendipitous connection resulted in the right people repairing the detectors in time to support a successful event. It was a wonderful example of *creative chance at the intersection of disciplines!*

At another level of this same idea, while assigned on the Joint Staff several years ago as the Deputy Director for Information and Cyberspace Policy in the J5 (Strategic Plans) directorate, I found myself responsible for sorting out how to establish a new military command, US Cyber Command, with responsibility for a domain that didn’t exist in any measurable way when I graduated from the

challenges of the global network. Rather, I found my role playing out at the intersection of many disparate threads – helping convert engineer- and science-speak to political, global and operational concepts so that leaders across operations, intelligence, and IT communities could better understand the cyber domain. It’s akin to C.P. Snow’s example of advocating for a new technology un-proven at the time of World War II (radar); or advocating for GPS long before automobile drivers put away their car maps for good and began to just type addresses into their phones. It was even clearer after that experience that being able to integrate across disciplines is what allows us to capitalize on those “creative chances.”

But today, my focus has shifted from how we develop commands and processes and policy, to how we can best develop the young men and women who will live, and must learn to lead, in that complex world. Certainly, our graduates must continue to build, maintain, operate, and defend unequaled air and space capabilities for the indefinite future. That is what America’s Air Force does. Yet we must also successfully master appropriate aspects of the cyber domain: both new and modernized air and space systems are so cyber-empowered and cyber-dependent that their value is inseparable from our ability to use that domain; many of our country’s most robust cyber defense capabilities are governmental but not all are DoD; and the majority of networks exist either in civil government or private infrastructure like regional power grids and financial

networks. Complex, sometimes contradictory incentives mix with information sharing, compliance, and regulatory standards imposed by a variety of government agencies to make for a very difficult and often reactionary environment. Beyond

the technical complexities of the problem, we—and the international community—are in the infancy of developing a comprehensive understanding of cyber security that would clarify the structure & limits of civilian and military

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Academy in 1981. Nevertheless, then-Vice Chairman General Cartwright gave me marching orders to take the lead on “everything cyber.” To be sure, I did not learn the intricacies of the computer code or the engineering

authority and cooperation. Here I can offer only a question rather than an answer: how do we build trust and incentives across both industry and government, in a conflict spectrum that as yet recognizes no clear delineation between peace and war?

As departments, governments and international organizations debate such questions, there's tremendous value in using the academic arena to explore new paradigms with the freedom afforded by higher education. It is on these pillars--of developing a new generation of innovative thinkers and bridging the public-private partnership to improve both--that the Academy and Air Force are establishing a center of excellence whose purpose is to improve cyber education while providing rapid and creative solutions to dominate the evolving and contested cyber domain.

Our vision for an Air Force Cyber Innovation Center (AFCIC) is a highly virtualized environment anchored at USAFA, fostering collaboration with the other Service academies, other institutions of higher education, industry, and other government agencies to track and influence the development of innovative, state-of-the-art technology and research—a conceptual “cyber-sandbox.” In doing so, the Air Force will be able to educate and train officers to enter the Air Force well-prepared to keep up with the rapidly-changing pace of technology evolution as we look holistically to integrate operations in our three mission domains – air, space and cyberspace.

Cyber is too complex, too personal, too intertwined, too global for a single town, service, or government agency to claim primacy or even ownership of cyber. Starting with the strong support of the Air Force's senior leadership and centered on the Air Force vision of sustaining an asymmetric operational advantage over any potential adversaries, improving our mastery of cyber's social, operational, strategic and technical challenges will require us to model the domain, by way of interconnected nodes of excellence that inspire collaboration and creativity across geographic and political boundaries.

It is my conviction that cadets and faculty are uniquely postured to tackle these problems from a truly multidisciplinary perspective, within the context and thoughtful appreciation of the multi-order effects across the military, technology, ethical and policy spectrums. It is also my conviction that we have no choice but to tackle and master them.

The Academy curriculum is a case in point that illustrates the delicate alchemy we must achieve to reach such ambitious goals. The “core” constitutes about two thirds of our entire curriculum – 32 courses total in basic sciences, humanities, social sciences and engineering. We have the balance almost exactly 50-50 across the poles I mentioned above. *What* we teach is probably about right; *how* we teach it is where we rise or fall. *Why* we must succeed—why it's important—is increasingly clear in our technologically-dependent, human-driven missions.

Hence, the Academy's Dean of Faculty has been working across the faculty and staff, and has successfully revised our desired outcomes. Faculty members are currently progressing through the arduous work of aligning core curriculum with outcomes in a way that maximizes interdisciplinary learning: a core that will better prepare graduates with the mental agility our Air Force Secretary and Chief know they need. Successful focus on outcomes—which are inherently inter- and trans-disciplinary, and which reflect the capabilities and potentials of student-officers, not the boundaries of any future professional specialty—will inherently lead graduates to be more ready to seize creative chances.

There are formidable challenges to this vision. How do we reconcile the mindsets of those who have spent much of their intellectual lives studying the second law of thermodynamics, with those who have devoted their professional energies to studies of renowned novelist Toni Morrison? Perhaps Samuel Taylor Coleridge's words are fitting: “a great mind must be androgynous.”¹² Our graduates will need to gain and exploit the technical cognizance necessary to operate today's sophisticated technologies and weapons, but they will be under

increasingly complex and significant pressures to do so with the emotional and social intelligence that typically comes from a deeper understanding of the human condition.

After all, we aim to graduate leaders with the moral character and stamina, as Nobel Laureate Arthur Lewis suggested, “to practice the same thing over and over again, while others are enjoying themselves; to push oneself from the easy part to the hard part; to listen to criticism and use it; to reject one’s own work and try again.”¹³ In effect, we aim to prepare cadets to identify their boundaries, to recognize their strengths and weaknesses, and to embrace the realization that our most effective solutions require a witting and continuous melding of scientific and technical disciplines *and* the humanities.

One of the most pleasant and rewarding aspects of the Superintendent’s position is meeting with a broad spectrum of people –faculty and staff, cadets, young men and women that want to join our ranks, and leaders in our Air Force, private industry and government. I was recently on Capitol Hill visiting members of Congress about a variety of issues. As you can imagine, ISIS was at the forefront of many discussions. One point that resonated was that “ISIS is an idea that we can’t bomb away.” Of course, this wasn’t an original or glaring insight, and it obscures the fact that no other military tool alone will be effective either; but for me, that concept reinforces the importance of education – particularly at the military Academies, but really across all higher education – that prepares graduates to employ the full spectrum of human endeavor to solve our world’s problems in creative ways.

If we can rise to the challenge—encouraging the knowledge and attitude that empower leaders young and old to create and take creative chances—our graduates will not find freedom a burden, but rather will find purpose and meaning in exercising, defending, and extending the blessings of freedom.

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Notes

- 1 Andrew Delbanco, *College: What it Was, Is, and Should Be* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2012), xiv.
- 2 Roger Cohen, “Why ISIS Trumps Freedom” *New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/opinion/roger-cohen-why-isis-trumps-freedom.html?_r=0, 13 August 2015, accessed 8 February 2016.
- 3 Richard Riley, quoted in Delbanco, *College*, p. 25.
- 4 Noah Robischon, ed., *Fast Company*, No. 201, Dec 2015/Jan 2016.
- 5 General Mark A. Welsh, III, “A Call to the Future: The New Air Force Strategic Framework,” <http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/digital/pdf/articles/2015-May-Jun/SLP-Welsh.pdf>, accessed 8 February 2016.
- 6 The USAF Academy already has programs that target our highest performing students (e.g., the Scholars program). This is true across higher education, as many institutions have honors programs and learned societies with undergraduate members. How do we design experiences that target the ‘average’ student... and bring the very best out in them?
- 7 Delbanco, *College*, p. 162.
- 8 C.P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1961) p. 10.
- 9 C.P. Snow, quoted in Thomas Ricks, “C.P. Snow (I) on radar, chaff, and science in the years leading up to World War II,” <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/03/c-p-snow-i-on-radar-chaff-and-science-in-the-years-leading-up-to-world-war-ii/>, 3 December 2013, accessed 8 February 2016; C.P. Snow, “The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science,” speech given to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 27 December 1960, accessed at http://archive.monthlyreview.org/index.php/mr/article/view/MR-012-10-1961-02_2, 7 February 2016; Nancy Scola, “What WWII, Radar, and C.P. Snow Teach About the Intersection of Technology and Politics,” <http://techpresident.com/blog-entry/what-wwii-radar-and-cp-snow-teach-about-intersection-technology-and-politics>, 8 May 2009, accessed 8 February 2016.
- 10 Jonah Lehrer, “Steve Jobs: “Technology Alone is Not Enough.”” *The New Yorker*, (7 Oct 2011), <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/steve-jobs-technology-alone-is-not-enough>, accessed 7 February 2016.
- 11 Fareed Zakaria, In Defense of a Liberal Education, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), 83.
- 12 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Specimens of the Table Talk of the Late Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, 2 Vols. (London: John Murray, 1835), vol. 2, p. 96.
- 13 Delbanco, *College*, p. 42.

Call for Papers

Character Development for 21st Century Leaders

For the next issue of JCLI, *we solicit manuscripts from both scholars and practitioners of character and leadership development that illuminate how timeless principles, methods, and ideas for development of character and leadership either continue to work, or must be adapted, to effectively respond to the needs and demands of the current generation.*

This call for papers specifically seeks exposition of how particular character or leadership development approaches have stood the test of time, as well as exposure of those evolving methods that have more recently been judged to have merit or which are undergoing examination for their promise in achieving desirable outcomes. Subthemes of particular interest are the development of *commitment* as a component

of enhancing character and leadership; character development and expression in the presence of evolving environmental factors such as social media and collegiate athletic competitive pressures; and the definition and impact of *defining moments* on leaders' character.

This focus area does *not* restrict any author's freedom to submit manuscripts for consideration on other topics of interest; rather, it seeks to enable the upcoming issue to appropriately inspire foundational conversations that will begin and take flight from the Academy's new Character & Leadership Development building.

Articles should be submitted no later than 31 March 2016 for the publication in the next issue, and may be sent directly to JCLI@usafa.edu or submitted through SSRN. We welcome inquiries and suggestions for future themes.

Call for Books

It is said that *leaders are readers*. As such, the Journal of Character & Leadership Integration will begin accepting thought-provoking and meaningful English-language publications that speak to the themes and topics of interest to the JCLI readership.

Any topic pertinent to the JCLI readership – character development, contemporary leadership issues, philosophy, professional ethics, history, military studies, education, integration, leadership biography et al – will be considered for review. Books to be reviewed

may be either traditional print sources or e-books available for download. While we accept unsolicited submissions for book reviews, we do not guarantee publication of submissions.

Should you have recently published monographs that you feel might be of benefit to our readers, we invite you to submit your book for review. It is our goal to provide JCLI readers with reviews of the latest scholarly material by noted experts in the field.

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The Journal of Character and Leadership Integration intentionally juxtaposes scholarly and applied understanding of the integration of character and leadership. Its purpose is to illuminate character and leadership development as interdependent areas of study whose *integrated* understanding is directly relevant to the profession of arms. Consequently, JCLI applies the highest standards to guide publication of scholarly work—to include blind-peer review by recognized experts across the character and leadership development spectrum—while also welcoming thoughtful, practical and well-articulated perspectives relevant to that same continuum.

Manuscripts should normally align with one or more of the following categories: Educational Methods & Techniques, Theory Development, Individual Development, Organizational Development and Culture, Empirical Research, Student Perspectives, or Senior Leader Perspectives. Manuscripts outside these categories will be considered if relevant to the broad purposes of the Journal. Submissions are welcome from military and non-military contributors alike. Articles may be submitted to JCLI in two categories: **scholarly contributions** intended for peer review, and **applied leadership and integration articles/essays** which provide a complementary, practical perspective on JCLI-relevant scholarly topics.

Scholarly articles should comply with the following standards:

- Manuscripts should be electronically submitted in standard American Psychological Association format (APA, 6th edition) to include proper headings, subtitles, and citations in 12 point Times New Roman font, double spaced, with page numbers and running headers.
- Manuscripts should not exceed 25 pages in length to include attachments, charts, and other supporting materials.
- Author(s) guarantee manuscripts submitted to the JCLI for consideration are exclusive to the submission and is not currently submitted to other peer-review journals simultaneously.
- Abstracts should be 12 point Times New Roman font, double spaced and should not exceed two pages.
- All submissions must include an abstract submission.
- Primary investigator(s) should be listed on a title page first with other researchers following and all contact information for each author should be included in the submission.
- Primary Investigator(s) should include a short biography not to exceed 125 words for inclusion if submission is selected for publication.

“Applied leadership and integration” articles should comply with the following guidelines:

- Manuscripts should be submitted electronically in standard Chicago-style format in 12 point Times New Roman font, double spaced, with page numbers and running headers.
- Manuscripts should not exceed 25 pages in length to include attachments, charts, and other supporting materials.
- Primary Author(s) should include a short biography not to exceed 125 words for inclusion if submission is selected for publication.

For all submissions selected for publication, authors must agree to make edits as needed for space and clarity. The editorial staff can be contacted at JCLI@usafa.edu for submissions, questions or clarifications.



Cadet Taps Vigil, November 16, 2015
Photo Credit: C3C Joshua Graham

About the JOURNAL OF CHARACTER & LEADERSHIP INTEGRATION

The Journal of Character and Leadership Integration (JCLI) is dedicated to bringing together the expert views of scholars and leaders who care about both character and leadership, and to the integration of these vitally-important concepts.

JCLI is produced at the U.S. Air Force Academy. It is motivated by, but not exclusively concerned with, preparation of cadets to lead as officers of character in service to our Nation.

Combining quality, peer-reviewed scholarship and the experiential perspectives of leaders at all levels, JCLI aims to enhance intellectual understanding and empower real-world development of the effective, character-based leadership that both individuals and organizations need to succeed in a complex and demanding world.



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