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CENTER FOR CHARACTER & LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

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Cover Image: This issue addresses foundations of good character. Sound principles, nurtured by intentional habits of thought and action, combine to yield strong and resilient human beings who can chart the best paths and lead themselves and others well through future challenges.

JCLI Made Possible By The Max James Family Foundation
"...that others may lead, and lead with character..."

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FROM THE EDITOR

From Small to Large… a Culture of Character

Christopher D. Miller, *Executive Editor, JCLI*

Character development is both a series of individual actions and the influence of the culture that exists within a group, team, or organization. The thread that weaves the individuals into the organization and the organization to the individuals is the interpersonal relationships – whether a teacher, coach, or other person with influence. As the organization's traditions, purpose, and leadership reflect in its members, so too does the members' character reflect the organization. Looking through the kaleidoscope of character development, however, it remains unarguable that small actions taken for the right reasons, at the right times on the journey, are the genesis of what we can recognize as good character in an individual or a healthy culture in an organization.

This issue of the Journal of Character and Leadership Integration explores some of the building blocks of character development (defined broadly), in both individual and organizational settings. We look at one journalist and author's deep examination of individual, lifelong character development in historical figures; and another's analysis of the importance and nature of commitment. The application of ethics to inflight decision-making is examined, as is the development of warrior cultures over the centuries. We survey the relationship between power and status, and indirectly, the impact of a leader's character on manipulation of those leadership levers. Finally, we consider conclusions drawn from large-scale survey, and their implications for organizational

This issue explores some of the building blocks of character development in both individual and organizational settings.

Lieutenant General Christopher D. Miller, USAF (Ret) is the editor-in-chief of the *Journal of Character & Leadership Integration*. His active service included leadership as the Air Force's deputy chief of staff for strategic plans and programs, operational command of B-2 and B-1 bomber units, and in Afghanistan; and a wide variety of other positions in homeland defense, policy analysis, international relations, human resources, aviation and academic settings. He was a 1980 distinguished graduate of the Air Force Academy, and earned graduate degrees from the U.S. Naval War College and Oxford University.

excellence; and present one author's recommendations for using the understanding of military genius to shape character and leadership development. The common thread to these articles is the importance of character, although its development and manifestation varies in each and every leadership or life setting.

In this Issue

We interview David Brooks, of the New York Times, who is the author of the best-selling book *The Road to Character*. In spirited conversation with a cadet interviewer and the JCLI editor, he elaborates on the conclusions he reached in his book, which highlighted the importance of internal struggle and dedication to bigger causes than one's self in forming exemplary character. On reflection, he might now put more weight on the importance of emotion in shaping relationships, and the impact of relationships on character formation, beyond the cognitive aspects of character development he had emphasized in his book. He touches on the tendency of modern society to be socially isolating, and need for young people to overcome the forces which can compartmentalize and distract them. He highlights the value of perspective—"seeing things as they are"—to leading effectively. Finally, he stresses that people are driven by their loves—and finding that sense of purpose, the "ends" to which a person wants to dedicate themselves—is a very real part of character development.

Authors William Rhodes and Donna Neal combine professional ethics with aviation decision-making in a fascinating study of the positive impact of failure in an aviation decision-making scenario on subsequent performance in similar tests. Applying virtue theory, the authors conclude that professional performance does not simply follow from technical training or skills; rather, what a person cares about has a real impact. In professional ethics, having and understanding values is important. In aviation, caring about safety matters. The research protocol pursued by the authors placed subjects in positions where values they held—caring about safety—were challenged when they experienced unsafe outcomes, thus producing introspection and reordering of behavior in a direction favoring safer outcomes. In short, as the title suggests—failure produces success, and a professional ethical decision-making model is relevant for diagnosing and improving pilot performance.

In a provocative article, Kevin McCaskey blends thinking on character development pedagogy with military theory to propose that a Clausewitzian understanding of military genius can aid in conducting character and leadership education. Beginning with a discussion of the difficulty of measuring character and leadership education outcomes, the author discusses the interplay of physical and moral courage, "inward eye," determination, and intellect as they shape a leader's defining moments. A character education strategy that intentionally creates defining moments with opportunities for failure (without permanent adverse consequences) can generate important learning outcomes that better prepare young leaders for an uncertain world.

Authors Born, Hendrix and Pate analyze a large dataset to understand the impact of character and job enrichment on organizational effectiveness. Their work encompasses five measures of organizational effectiveness: organizational commitment, job satisfaction, work group performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and intent to leave the organization. Investigating the extent to which measures of leadership, character and job enrichment are predictive of those five outcomes, the authors test four hypotheses and conclude that character and job enrichment add to

Finding that sense of purpose, the "ends" to which a person wants to dedicate themselves—is a very real part of character development.

the prediction of desirable organizational outcomes above and beyond that of leadership. While their work does not establish causation, it bolsters the case that character itself is meaningfully related to organizational outcomes.

The relationship between power and status is explored by authors Kelley, Dobbs, Lucas and Lovaglia. In this clear explication, the definitions of power and status are delineated, and the argument made that both power and status are fundamental ways to change behavior, and understanding how to get and how to use them is fundamental for effective leadership. Power derives primarily from control of resources and can be increased through competition, or by creating a new and desirable resource. Status is positional, within a group, and based on respect. Status and power work conjointly in complex ways. Status is affected by the perception of competence and expectation of leader action to the benefit of the group. With a relevant historical example, they conclude that good leaders use power sparingly, and that effective leadership requires both power and status.

Professional performance does not simply follow from technical training or skills; rather, what a person cares about has a real impact.

In our concluding essay, Shannon French examines broad themes that constitute the "Code of the Warrior." With observations important for the military service academies, and relevant to the society they serve, this lecture--originally delivered in 2004 and still powerfully relevant today--reminds the reader that warrior codes are powerful in determining the effectiveness of the warriors and shaping their lives. In cases where warriors or groups "break" the code under which they live, they are at greater risk of moral injury and destruction of their individual and collective effectiveness. In essence, the warriors' code is "the shield that guards their humanity."

What's Ahead

With this issue of JCLI, we mark the beginning of a new phase of growth for both JCLI's parent organization, the U.S. Air Force Academy, and the Journal itself. With the relocation of the Academy's Center for Character and Leadership Development into a state-of-the-art facility and a reorganization intended to focus effort on research and collaboration across the character and leadership development community, we look forward to a regular rhythm of research and publication and continue to welcome contributions from those who wish to advance understanding of the integration of character and leadership development. We have temporarily put the planned book review section of the Journal on hold, reflecting pending editorial staffing decisions. Finally, in this issue's call for papers, we note the upcoming 70th anniversary of the U.S. Air Force, and solicit ideas, articles, and essays that incorporate the idea of innovation, whether to address new opportunities or to propose new ways to solve on-going, even ancient, challenges.

Today, it remains clear that the development of good character and effective leadership are as necessary as ever. We are grateful to our readers and contributors for their partnership and engagement in that noble endeavor.

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The soaring spires of the Air Force Memorial in Arlington, Virginia

INTERVIEW

Exploring the Road to Character

David Brooks, New York Times

Interviewed by: Timothy M. Barbera and Christopher D. Miller

ABSTRACT

In 2015, New York Times columnist David Brooks published an introspective, compelling survey of towering examples of character: Augustine, Dorothy Day, Dwight Eisenhower, George Marshall, Bayard Rustin, A. Phillip Randolph, Samuel Johnston, and others. In The Road to Character, he describes their extraordinarily diverse stories in order to synthesize a map of the paths that led them to praiseworthy character. Brooks himself notes that he "wrote it because I wanted to shift the conversation a bit. We live in a culture that focuses on external success, that's fast and distracted. We've lost some of the vocabulary other generations had to describe the inner confrontation with weakness that produces good character." In the book, he concludes that the road to character in all cases is marked by profound internal struggle. Success in that struggle may or may not be extrinsically rewarded during the lifetime of the person involved, but "joy is a byproduct achieved by people who are aiming for something else." In this edited and condensed interview with the Air Force Academy's Cadet Wing Character Officer Tim Barbera and JCLI Editor Christopher Miller, Brooks shares further reflections on character and the society in which we live, and touches on the challenges university-aged young adults face today in developing the character they will need to lead and live meaningfully.

JCLI: ***Having had some time to reflect on what you wrote in* The Road to Character*, what would you say differently now, if anything?***

Brooks: I would probably focus more on the role of emotion in shaping character. One study I've seen says that what mattered in developing the great leaders of WWII wasn't IQ, and it wasn't social status, and it wasn't physical courage—the number one correlation was relationship with mother; the guys who had a model for how to love deeply were able to love their men and became good officers. We tend to downplay the emotional side of things...but beyond the emotional level of

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David Brooks is an op-ed columnist for The New York Times and appears regularly on "PBS NewsHour," NPR's "All Things Considered" and NBC's "Meet the Press." He teaches at Yale University and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the bestselling author of The Social Animal: The Hidden Sources of Love, Character, and Achievement; Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There; and On Paradise Drive: How We Live Now (And Always Have) in the Future Tense. He has three children and lives in Maryland.

what's love and how to love well—there's the habits level, and being around coaches or on a field where you learn the small habits of self-control; and there's an exemplar level, being given role models to copy and inspire you. And then there's an intellectual level—talking about concepts like courage, honor, and what those possibly mean; and then perhaps an institutional or mentor-level. You get these different levels that all have to happen at once. But then, I think we would say a person of character has somehow brought all of those different levels into focus, usually through one formative experience, and so as a result, they are integrated, whole and can be counted on. That's sort of a précis what I've been thinking.

The book is much too individualistic, and what I emphasize in the book is combating your own sinfulness, the internal struggles. But when you look at the character, characters—the people in the book, they all are capable of making amazingly strong commitments to something outside themselves. And it was really the promises they made to things outside themselves that solidified themselves within. It wasn't just an internal thing. And so my next book is about commitment making, and I've come to believe that to have a fulfilling life you make four big commitments: to a spouse or family, to a community, to a location, and to a philosophy and faith. And your life is determined by how you choose those four things, and then how well you execute them. So I'm much more communal than I was in that book, which was too individualistic. I'm a little more emotional than I was in that book, because I was too cognitive. And then I would say I'm maybe a little bit more spiritual, or maybe more moral, relying on moral drives, rather than just 'being utilitarian is what you need to do well.'

JCLI: ***In today's world, do we still have exemplars like George C. Marshall that we can point to? Would we recognize them if we did? Do we value them like we did in the past?***

Brooks: If you look at the social science research on this—the nature of who is admired most, that's changed. If you ask the question: "name the five people in public who you admire most," it was, people would name the president, and they would name some generals, or a figure like Einstein, or Thomas Edison, and now it's LeBron or Tom Hanks. Now it's actors and athletes, and so there's been a "celebritification." Political figures are almost never on there. Military figures, I would say, would be there in times of conflict. I always ask students in my commitment and humility course to list people and to write about people they really admire. And you'll get a mixture. Sometimes they write about a professor they had, but sometimes they'll write about Mother Theresa, and so I still think people still find exemplars. We are admiring creatures. In general there has been a shift toward celebrities, but if you ask people to name someone in their own private life, I think pretty much everybody could do that.

I've come to believe that to have a fulfilling life you make four big commitments... And your life is determined by how you choose those four things, and then how well you execute them.

JCLI: ***With the velocity of information today and the number of different perspectives, could any of those historical exemplars survive today's spotlight?***

Brooks: Everyone has severe problems. Marshall almost doesn't. He would have survived, because he was perfect, except for maybe being too emotionally stiff, but here's where I think, whether you're religious or not, is where a biblical background helps—because the exemplars in the Bible are all amazingly flawed, and so it introduces a little moral realism into "who you are."

JCLI: ***You talk a lot in one of your columns about the current state of higher education, and how one finds their personal road to character and builds their moral compass. How do you reconcile building your own moral compass in a higher education institution where you're supposed to 'find yourself,' when you may then go into a working environment where that compass may not necessarily always align with the people you're working with?***

Brooks: Well, one of the things you can do in a higher education setting to lay down character is to absorb a moral ecology. Our history has left us with all these different moral systems. There's a Greek and Roman system that's based on honor, which is prevalent in the military. There's a Christian system based on surrender to grace. There's a Jewish system based on obedience to law. There's a scientific system based on reason and thinking your way to truth and goodness. And there are Buddhist and other systems—one of the things you can do in college is to sample them, and figure out which one seems true to you. We tell students to come up with their own worldview, and if your name is Aristotle, maybe you can do that. The rest of us cannot. It's better to borrow somebody else's. I think doing that is super important.

...one of the things you can do in a higher education setting to lay down character is to absorb a moral ecology.

And second—this, Plato emphasized—is studying things of beauty. He said one of the ways we climb to higher moral status is by chasing what's beautiful. In his ladder of beauty, if you find somebody who has a beautiful face, you begin to appreciate the beauty of the face; but then you realize there is a higher beauty, which is the beauty of an idea. And then you realize that there is a higher beauty, which is the beauty of a great institution. Then there is a higher beauty which is justice. And then there's higher than that, which is eternal beauty from which nothing can be attracted or subtracted. And so if you just follow beautiful things, they sort of lift you up. That can be done reading a poem, or at a concert or whatever. So I do think that's something else that can happen in higher ed.

Another thing is just finding things to fall in love with. I do think the cultivation of emotion is something that doesn't happen naturally. You have to either fall in love with friends, or find a subject you fall in love with. Finally, and increasingly important to me, is the ability to see the world accurately. It seems automatic, you just look at the world—but if you look in this town (D.C.), people look and they see very distorted and weird things. There's a great quote from a literary critic named John Ruskin who said, "The more I think of it, the more this fact occurs to me, that the elemental human trait is the ability to see things clearly and to describe what you saw in a clear way." And he says, "A thousand people can talk for one who can think, and a thousand people can think for one who can see." And so, being around, especially writers, who see things clearly and then describe them clearly, is to me one of the things that higher education can do, whether it's a Tolstoy or George Orwell or whoever. Some people like Jane Austen are just very crystalline seers. If you don't see it clearly, everything else just falls apart.

So for me, what you do in higher ed is just lay down some kindling that will serve you when you get out. It's when you get out that everything changes and life gets a lot harder. I think that must be true at the Air Force Academy. It's certainly true where I teach that for students, everything seems structured in their lives, and people like me have been paid to listen to what they say and to give them loving attention, and when they get out here, nobody gives a damn and there's no structure around their friendships and suddenly they get surrounded by romantic breakups, which is what happens when you're twenty-four and twenty-five...and they really struggle.

JCLI: ***Building on that, do you think it's possible to build a capital "T" Truth or a capital "C" Character that everyone should aspire to? And does that matter?***

Brooks: Well, I think there is some core of truth—more than we acknowledge. Some things are relative, but when you get in an argument, you find that you're always appealing to a standard. You couldn't argue if you didn't have a standard unconsciously. You find often enough, that people are appealing to the same standard, which they interpret differently. Like, what's courageous behavior?

There's never been a society on earth where men are admired for running away from their buddies in battle. We have just some standards we don't even think about. There's never been a society where, when someone's cheated on a spouse people say, "oh, that's fantastic." No one ever says that. We have certain standards of honesty and we have more than we care to admit in our society, and we're a little embarrassed to say no, this or that is actually true. That doesn't mean that you have to be self-righteously punitive to anybody who violates it, but understanding our frailty, I do think we have more standards than we let on.

JCLI: ***In a society that has differing interpretations of truth and affirmatively values diversity in perspective, how do we re-crystalize some of these kinds of societal anchors?***

Brooks: I keep going back to my class as a frame of reference—there were 25 students in one group, we had 2 Nigerians, a Ghanaian, 2 Brazilians, a couple Koreans, and a Chinese student. I thought, they're going to have totally different values and the conversation may not flow. We were reading everything from Dorothy Day, who's in [Road to Character], other pieces not in the book, and yet I found that they were amazingly coherent. The conversation was just as if it had been 99% American. There was one difference, between a big preppie kid, a superstar student from a very fancy school in LA and a woman from Ghana. Both of them were very brilliant; he was very individualistic and she was very communal. At a flash point, he and I had a little back and forth when I told a story about somebody I'd spent that week with and he said, "Oh, stop name-dropping Brooks." He didn't call me Professor; he just called me "Brooks." We traded some pointed remarks and it was fun for me, but he had a little edge to him. And the woman from Ghana finally interrupted and said, "no—you do not talk to your professor that way." She had a certain standard of how you show respect. I stopped the class and asked who agreed with their Ghanaian classmate, and who agreed with the kid from LA. It turns out the whole class agreed with her; it showed me there's a community, there's a certain set of routines and rituals and they all wanted those respected, even in our supposedly relativistic, open, casual world. They want that respected. Those things are more universal than we think.

JCLI: D***oes technology and the increasing accessibility of information increase our ability to come toward the same truth on the world stage, or do you think it encourages people to surround themselves with an echo chamber?***

Brooks: I guess both. Obviously, there's an echo chamber effect. There are two kinds of social capital: bonding and bridging. Bonding is the kind you build with people like yourself, and I think we've done pretty well at that. Bridging is with people unlike ourselves, and I think we're relatively poor at that. First of all, I don't believe technology determines it—it's what you bring to the technology. If you're super friendly, Facebook is a tool for you to be super friendly. If you're lonely, Facebook masks your loneliness. It's not the technology itself; it's how you use it. I note this phenomenon, that we have more connections in our lives than before, but we're lonelier than before, and the number of people who have intimate

friends has gone down, the number of people without intimate friends is going up. The number of people who say, "I can trust most of the people I know" is going down, and this generation has the lowest levels of social trust on record. And so there's a weird amount of connection, without trust and intimacy. And I think the social media and texting even, like when we're talking we're not really in control of what the conversation is, but when we're texting, we can sort of control that. There's a contact, but it's hands off. I find that, especially amongst my students who are so rarely in romantic relationships in college and even among the twenty-somethings I know around here. There's much less romantic involvement. Everyone says they're so busy, but there's not as much complete intimacy, a lot of fearfulness, and that's made accessible by the technology, which allows a little push off.

There are two kinds of social capital: bonding and bridging.

JCLI: ***Beyond your writing on character, you've talked about "leading from the edge of inside." Can you expand on that idea?***

Brooks: The thought came not from me, but from a guy named Richard Rohrer, who is a Catholic monk out in New Mexico. In every organization, there are people at the core, totally surrounded by the organization, or even a group, a community, whatever. And then there are some people sort of on the edge who are not quite in the inner sanctum. They feel like a part-member of the group, but they can be a critic of it. They see it from sort of an outside perspective, and they're really good at dealing with the outside world from within the organization. Those people, I think, have perspective and creativity. They're less likely to have the group think problem that the people at the core have, and they're good at building bridges. I find that pattern in my life all the time. It has an advantage: you get to be around other people who are unlike you and sort of introduce them. It has the disadvantage that you're never really at the core of the core. You don't get the comfort and the security and maybe even the power and influence you get if you're at the core of the core, a total team player, but some people have that disposition.

JCLI: ***This would seem to put you in a position to be one of the people that you were talking about earlier who actually "sees" things. Are there still identifiable groups in Washington where you think that balanced perspective, the seeing of things from both sides, happens on a regular basis?***

Brooks: I think so. For example, we're surrounded by think tanks here. There is one liberal think tank that is sort of at the core, and they want to guard what they say so they won't offend the administration[1], because they're part of the team. And they have a lot of influence. Then there's another, which is probably a bit more center-left, and they're a little more independent. They may have less influence, but with them you feel like you're getting opinion based on evidence, not based on the cause of the moment. We all have different gradations toward the center, and I'd say, even in my experience with the military, this was true of Marshall, let alone today's players. Yet Marshall, when he took over Leavenworth for the Military Training Academy, was a radical; he seemed like such a boring guy, but intellectually was sort of a radical, and was pushing things in a very radical, fast direction. You can be very much institutionally committed, but be a radical at the same time.

JCLI: ***At all of the service academies, the student body is likely to be relatively predisposed to the idea of***

1 Reference is to the U.S. administration in 2016.

service. There is a recurring concern that with a fully professionalized force, with a fairly stringent value structure, we risk increasingly insulating those who come through that system from the broader society. Is that an accurate diagnosis, and where are the linkages that we should consciously be trying to keep alive?

Brooks: Based on knowing military friends and students, it's easy to fall into an us-them mentality if you're in the military—that "we're doing the work and they're not," or "they really have contempt for us, they don't approve of what we're doing." Online anecdotes can feed an attitude which is both a little superior mixed with a little victimology. Victimhood is always to be resisted—it never leads to something good. There is, sometimes, a big divide between the 99 percent who don't serve and the 1 percent who serve, there's no question. Yet I always have six or seven active military in my class and the differences don't seem that great. They bring a perspective, because they either served abroad or bring a maturity because they're older, but their lives are not dissimilar. The things they talk about and worry about and how they deal with them are normal. And I would say, when I go to the Pentagon, it feels very much like a workplace to me. There's a huge "service" component obviously—people aren't making a ton of money—but there's a lot of professional jockeying, too, as there would be in any gigantic organization.

JCLI: ***Your book explores individuals who have demonstrated a commitment to something larger than themselves, and an ability to find virtue. Many seem to have epiphany moments where their calling becomes clear. Do young people need to seek out that epiphany moment, or is there a certain foundation they need to be laying so they're ready when it comes?***

Brooks: I would say seek it out. A horrible bit of common advice is "find your passion." 80 percent of people graduate from university or college and don't know what their passion is. Passion is something that comes after you've been doing something, and after you've been doing well at it. Then you become passionate about it, but not beforehand, it's not something that just springs forth. I quote in my book Viktor Frankl's advice, "don't look within, look for a problem that needs to be solved." Finally, when you ask somebody older than 40, what were the events that really shaped your life, no one ever says, "I had this amazing vacation in Hawaii." No one says that, it's not a good event. Usually it's a bad event, and how they dealt with it, that matters. So the question is, should you seek out suffering? And my advice is, don't worry, it'll come. You don't have to seek it out. That is different from seeking out hardship. My son told me "I need to do something hard before I really become an adult." And so he joined the Israeli military, and he just got out after two and a half years after being in action almost every day. He knew he needed some hard thing, not just for its own sake, but also to accomplish something.

JCLI: ***As you look at American society broadly, what are leaders doing nowadays that is exemplary, and what are not helpful trends?***

Brooks: What's better about society, than with most of the people I wrote about in the book from the 1940s and 50s, is that we're just more emotionally open than they were.

You can be very much institutionally committed, but be a radical at the same time.

They were very emotionally closed. That meant they could be brutal toward each other, or just did not know how to express their emotions, and I think we're definitely better at that. And we're definitely fairer across diversity lines, and gender roles are more equal. What they had that we don't have, I think, is that they had a consciousness of responsibility of being the elite. They knew if they were senior military or senior law firms, or in Congress, they

were "the establishment, the elite," and with that comes a certain code of behavior to live up to. I'm thinking of a case in Britain from the late 1800s where British politicians Disraeli and Gladstone were locked in a bitter contest. One of them got some personal letters sent to him that the other had written, and while they could have been used to destroy the opponent, he declined to read them, saying "that's not what a gentleman does." There were certain standards of how a leader behaved and if you tore away those standards, you were really tearing away the leadership of the country. Now I don't think we have anyone who thinks, "Oh, I'm part of the establishment, I'm part of the elite." Rather, it's more common to be against the establishment, an outsider, a renegade. And so when you have that attitude, you don't have a responsible leadership attitude.

JCLI: ***We often talk about the fact an officer's commission essentially means, whether you're a lieutenant or a lieutenant general, you should be trusted and trustworthy. It seems like you're talking about a code that helped make people in those days worthy of trust that people put in them.***

Passion is something that comes after you've been doing something, and after you've been doing well at it. Then you become passionate about it, but not beforehand, it's not something that just springs forth.

Brooks: Yeah, to me trust is repetition coded by emotion. And sometimes the things that are done over are not the "official" things to do. I'm reminded of the kids' video "Thomas the Tank Engine". One of the engines says, "It isn't wrong, but we just don't do it." There are certain things that we just don't do. And that consistency is part of building trust.

JCLI: ***As you have studied character and people's lives, is there a consistent kind of thing that makes us realize that we have both the ability and the responsibility to be effective; that "agency moment" that you have written about?***

Brooks: The word character has migrated in an unfortunate direction in my view. I differentiate between a résumé virtue and a eulogy virtue. Character used to be a eulogy virtue, but now when you see it in public discussion, whether it's in a management or leadership seminar or whether it's in K-12 education, it more often refers to traits that make you good at your job. Things like self-control, grit, resilience, being able to really focus on your homework. All those are important, you know, we all want to be good at our jobs. But that's not exactly what character used to be, which is a set of virtues that sometimes made it harder to be good at your job. And I can't remember if I put it in the book, but I used to talk about a guy I met who hired a lot of people. He would always ask them in interview, "name a time you told the truth and it hurt you." He just wanted to know that they put truth above being good at their job. Another problem is that leadership courses list these traits, which we all try to nail down, but no one is honest for the sake of being honest, or no one is courageous for the sake of courage. You're honest because you're serving a certain thing, like you're serving a certain country, a specific country, or you're defending a specific family, or you're fighting with a certain set of men and women. I think it's a mistake to think that we can do it without knowing what the end is. It's the ideal that inspires the behavior, and so if we don't focus on the ideal, and we just try to instill all the traits without an ideal, then it's not really going to affect people. Traits are means to an end, and we don't focus enough on the end.

JCLI: ***We are very interested in helping define a compelling identity that people can feel attracted to and part of, yet the military has a very diverse workforce that does many***

very specialized things. How do we focus on the "end" as you suggest?

Brooks: That's a society wide problem. Even in broader society, we have an ethos of what it means to be a steel worker or a farmer or a cop, but there are a lot of people around here who are IT specialists in some company. They don't have a distinct identity, so they go home and buy a pick-up truck and you don't need a pick-up truck to deal with traffic here, but pick-up trucks are super popular because it carries a certain machismo. That's a problem that the broader society faces as we shift to an information age economy. One of the things that distinguishes the military from everything else is that there's violence involved. There's a corrosive effect of being trained to exert violence. Dealing with that would, it seems to me, be difficult without losing your sense of humanity.

JCLI: ***Right...in the Air Force we have a wide swath of people, some of whom really get up close with exactly the type of thing that you're talking about, and some of them who are one, two, three levels removed from it. Yet everybody in the chain has to have the right perspective to do what they do. But there's no denying for the people at the pointy end, it's difficult.***

JCLI: ***You have written about "four pillars of commitment." One that you talked about was location; is that a very specific concept, or a more fluid one? This is important for a military that moves often.***

Brooks: I very much believe in physical space. And of course, as I understand it, when you get to a base, there's an immediate community, there's a structure, how you welcome people, how you join. But one of the things I know, during this election season I've been traveling all around the country trying to understand. One of the things that I find is that while there's a lot of dysfunction and a lot of towns that are just falling through the cracks and opiate abuse and all that, there are also a lot of "community healers"—I find this wherever I go. The examples are everywhere: a 24-year old woman from Bard College who went to Houston, set up an after school program, and takes care of 1500 kids every day. And she's a community healer in some random neighborhood in Houston. A couple came from Minnesota and settled down in New Mexico to run a drug treatment program for the Navajo Reservations. Another guy in Southeast DC, who works as a consultant, opened a home for guys who just got out of maximum-security prisons. There are fifteen of them and they live together and they try to start companies. These people and those places are everywhere. I do believe in creating those physical, good spaces, it's super important. We can't live in the virtual.

JCLI: ***Any parting thoughts about character?***

> *Traits are means to an end, and we don't focus enough on the end.*

Brooks: A lot of what's needed is just clarity, and the other thing that I think is hard to express, especially in military institutions, might be that emotional piece. It's hard to talk about. Who's building character today? Many of the people who support character building think it has to be tough, like "integrity" and "courage." But I'm a believer that we're primarily led by our loves—by what we really love. And you have to emphasize that. It's the things that are soft and squishy that are most difficult; if it's all cognitive or if it's all willpower, it's not real, it's the old 19th century version.

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FEATURE

The Call of Commitment:
Implications for the Direction and Intensity of Our Leader Behaviors and Actions

Arthur J. Schwartz, Oskin Leadership Institute

ABSTRACT

The word "commitment" is ubiquitous and interpreted in a multitude of ways. This essay surveys definitions of commitment used in various disciplines, and examines different types of commitments, ranging from those involving personal objectives, to values and principles, to ultimate concerns. Commitment shapes human lives in a variety of powerful ways. Commitments are structured in ways that generally include a belief, care, declaration, practice, readiness for challenges, persistence, and identity. It is possible to develop and hone commitments through expression, reflection, self-scrutiny, conditional scripts, understanding of ritual and images, practice and partnership, and intentionality, et al. Commitments often spring from a calling that can be discerned.

> *Our mental health always requires the tension between what one has already achieved and what one still ought to accomplish, or the gap between what one is and what one should become. What man needs is not a tensionless state but rather the striving and struggling for some goal worthy of him.*
>
> - Viktor Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning*

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Introduction

Commitment is ubiquitous. Yet what do we know about commitment? Are there different types of commitment? What are the building blocks of commitment? How do commitments shape our habits and behaviors? Our identity? What are the antecedents of commitment? How does commitment develop? Finally, and perhaps most critically for any profession, can we intentionally train for commitment, like we train to become pilots or athletes? Viktor Frankl suggests we can because we're hard-wired to strive and struggle for goals worthy of us.

The first section of this chapter examines how scholars have defined commitment across a variety of disciplines. Next, I explore six different types of commitments. The third section focuses on the structure of commitment, including seven features that seem to be present for a commitment to fully develop and mature. Finally, I posit that we can train for commitment and I offer nine different exercises to strengthen our commitment muscle.

Defining Commitment

In the United States, some of us are committed to serving our Nation. Others are committed to losing weight or being an accountant or abolishing slave trafficking in Africa. These are all examples of commitment. Yet not everything we do can be woven into a story about commitment. While some people may enjoy word puzzles, it sounds a bit strange to hear someone say she is committed to solving the daily Sudoku puzzle. It makes perfect sense, however, to hear this same person say she is committed to her family or to protecting the environment. So what's the difference?

Commitment has been studied across various scholarship domains, including psychology, sociology, organizational behavior, religion, relationship studies, and philosophy. For example, researchers within the field of organizational behavior have defined commitment as a "force that binds an individual to a course of action that is of relevance to a particular target" (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). A prominent scholar who studies relationships defines commitment as "the tendency to maintain a relationship and to feel psychologically attached to it" (Rusbult & Buunk, 1993). One sociologist defines commitment as "the attachment of the self to the requirements of social relations that are seen as self-expressive" (Kanter, 1972). Finally, one of the most common definitions suggests that commitment is the "pledging or binding of an individual to behavioral acts" (Keisler, 1971).

Yet to me each of these definitions somehow misses the mark. In many ways, commitment is one of those concepts–like creativity or spirituality–that defies an easy-to-operationalize definition. This is especially so within a military context, where the idea of commitment is woven so deeply into our enduring pledges and daily duties. In other words, these definitions, steeped as they are in the social sciences, don't quite capture the "call" of commitment, and how this call has tangible implications for the direction, intensity and duration of our leader behaviors and actions.

Types of Commitment

The term commitment conjures an entire family of mental images. Some of us have made a commitment to a particular career field, while others have made a marriage commitment. Some of us make personal commitments ("I am committed to my Lord") and dare I say that we make various behavioral commitments on a daily basis ("Sorry I can't go for a beer tonight... I made a commitment to go shopping with my wife"). These are all expressions of commitment.

Commitment is one of those concepts–like creativity or spirituality–that defies an easy-to-operationalize definition.

My research on the various academic and popular literatures on commitment suggests that our commitments can be placed in one of six categories:

- *Commitments to people* (family, friends, marriage)
- *Commitments to personal achievements* (career, leadership aspirations, influence)
- *Commitments to personal growth* (self-understanding, faith, physical fitness)
- *Commitments to values and principles* (honesty, social justice, defending our Nation)
- *Commitments to groups* (the football team, Wings of Blue, Sierra Club)
- *Commitments to ultimate concerns* (God, Deity)

Of course, these categories overlap. For example, while a husband might be faithful to his wife because he loves her, another husband is faithful because he's committed to the principle of marital fidelity. In addition, some of us keep our jobs because of our commitment to feeding and sheltering our family while others keep our jobs because we love what we do.

Furthermore, some of us make a significant commitment to a singular goal, often to a challenging career or a noble purpose (see Colby and Damon, 1992). Others of us seem to have difficulty making a commitment to anything; indeed, these individuals often perceive commitment as an infringement on their freedom (Kenniston, 1965).

Balancing our various commitments is a perennial challenge for most of us. The ongoing effort to integrate or "harmonize" our commitments is certainly more complicated and challenging than the life of a person who is committed to one goal only. Indeed, some of us strive to establish a *hierarchy of commitments* (for example, family comes before fitness) while others have identified an *ultimate commitment* (to God? Nation?).

There are also people who too easily break their commitments, almost habitually so. These individuals can establish a commitment (e.g., to learn a language or to call friends on a regular basis) but their day-to-day motivation makes their commitment less salient. And finally, there are those who can only be described as "commitment prodigies." These individuals seem to effortlessly make and keep their commitments with exceptional resoluteness.

In sum, the reality is that the "objects" of our commitments is almost limitless. Moreover, the wonderful thing about the nature of commitment is that we can be committed to something and yet fully understand and accept that not everyone should have to make the same commitment. Clearly, while some philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant, posit that there are numerous "universal commitments" that all of us *should* make (to justice and fairness, for example), our commitments are mostly understood as examples of self-expression.

How Commitment Shapes Our Lives

Commitment seems important. But do our commitments make a difference? While there is relatively little empirical research on this question, here's what we know. Researchers have examined the relationship between goal commitment and performance and found strong evidence that the level of our commitment to a goal is a significant variable in predicting goal success or failure (Locke and Lathem, 1990). More particularly, there is compelling evidence that commitment is a strong mediating variable in smoking cessation and weight loss interventions (Oettingen, 2010). And researchers who study organizational behavior have clearly documented that a worker's level of commitment (to his or her job, organization or career) correlates with employee turnover, absenteeism, performance and job satisfaction (Meyer, 2001).

Yet the empirical study of commitment does not quite seem to fully capture the "call" of commitment as a source of power in our lives. Scientific studies often do not have the power of stories. Thus, the humanities can also help us glean and grasp the ways in which our lives are shaped by this mysterious yet powerful call. We have all been moved by stories of commitment found in history, biographies, and the sacred scriptures across religious traditions. Woven together, these various sources tell us that our commitments:

- Give us direction
- Shape our behavior and conduct
- Change us
- Place demands on us
- Help us know when to take a stand or to show resolve
- Shape our notions of accomplishment and achievement
- Motivate and energize us
- Offer us meaning and purpose
- Form and shape our identity
- Reveal our character

The Structure of Commitment

There seem to be seven discrete features that form the structure of commitment. That is, for any "object" of commitment (X), these seven features appear to be essential for that particular commitment to fully develop and mature. These features are:

1. Belief – I believe in X.
2. Care – I care about X.
3. Declaration – I make an intentional, often visible commitment to X.
4. Practice – I practice the habits and virtues of X.
5. Be Ready for Challenges – I need to be ready for the challenges I will face in my commitment to X
6. Persistence –I persist in my commitment to X, even in the face of crisis, setbacks or sacrifice.
7. Identity – Over time, X becomes a part of my identity.

These seven features are examined below:

1. ***Belief*** **(I believe in X)**

Beliefs come in all sizes and shapes. The seven Army Core Values are beliefs. Freedom is a belief. The expression "blood is thicker than water" is another belief. Beliefs are the seeds of our commitments. No one can form a commitment before they form a belief. Typically, children and adolescents "try on" and test out different beliefs, ranging from the prescriptive ("treat others as you would like to be treated") to the proscriptive ("don't drink and drive"). But at some point in time, we begin to establish for ourselves the beliefs we want to live by.

2. ***Care*** **(I care about X)**

Beliefs are a necessary but insufficient condition for developing a commitment. Too many people "believe" in this or that idea – but never act on those beliefs. Thus, we also need to *care – and care deeply* – about the beliefs that underpin our commitments. Our caring for X is the motivational force that connects us to our commitments. What we care about generates the emotional fuel and energy necessary to act on our beliefs. When we care deeply about a belief we literally "feel" its importance and seriousness; we begin to aspire to live in fidelity – often passionately and intensely – to these beliefs.

When we care deeply about a belief we literally "feel" its importance and seriousness; we begin to aspire to live in fidelity–often passionately and intensely–to these beliefs.

3. ***Declaration*** **(I make an intentional, often visible commitment to X)**

The stage is set: the marriage between our cognitive beliefs and our passionate cares. We are prepared, metaphorically, to adopt our commitment. We are ready to invest significant time and resources toward this commitment. We are also ready to make "visible" our commitment. Sometimes this "declaration" occurs through a public pledge, a shared oath or a sacred vow. Other times, we make visible our commitment to ourselves *only*. Whatever form or shape this declaration takes, we usually strive to find ways to valorize this commitment. We begin to invest in this commitment, endowing it with significant meaning, for this commitment now expresses and signifies a noble purpose, one of our life goals.

4. ***Practice*** **(I practice the habits and virtues of X)**

The field of character education suggests that character consists of the head, heart and hands. Thus, in the model

of commitment presented here our beliefs ("head") and our caring ("heart") motivate and energize us to practice the habits and virtues of our commitments ("hands"). Put simply, our commitments are built on the anvil of habits. These habits form and focus our commitments. Moreover, what philosophers and theologians call the virtues can also be understood as habits of thought, emotions and actions in service to our commitments. As an example, let's say a soldier is committed to being a good brother or sister. What does having a commitment to being a good sibling mean in terms of habits and virtues? Showing concern? Sacrifice? Honest feedback? Most of us are committed to specific life-projects (such as being a good brother or sister) and it's through these commitments that we experience the virtues.

5. ***Be Ready for Challenges*** **(I need to be ready for the challenges I will face in my commitment to X)**

Every commitment has a cost attached to it (either to our time, resources, or to pursuing other opportunities). In addition, every commitment worth having will – at one time or another – face an internal or external threat. Having doubts or regrets about your career choice is an example of an internal threat. Learning that you will soon be deployed to Afghanistan and being concerned how this will affect your marriage is an example of an external threat. Anticipating and being ready for these internal and external challenges – *before* these threats emerge – is a critical but often overlooked step in the structure of our commitments. Those who care deeply about their commitments will find ways to ensure that they are holding themselves accountable to their commitments, whether through the *support* of prayer, family, or friends (or other "accountability pathways" such as self-regulatory strategies). In sum, for most of our commitments it is prudent to "build a dyke" before the proverbial storm hits.

6. ***Persistence*** **(I persist in my commitment to X, even in the face of crisis, setbacks or sacrifice)**

In some ways, our commitments are like quests. As we strive to keep a commitment, many of us will face adversity and crisis. Our strength of will and volition will be tested. For some of us, we will "devalue" our commitments, and over time care less about showing fidelity to them. However, the good news is that there is a body of research suggesting that when we persist through adversity and setbacks we bolster and escalate our fidelity to what we're committed to. In short, when a person's commitment is being challenged or attacked, a person with "high commitment" will respond by strengthening his or her commitment (Keisler, 1971).

7. ***Identity*** **(Over time, X becomes a part of my identity)**

My untested hypothesis is that the progression through the above features (or "steps") is invariant, but the pace is not. Often, we are unaware of these features and their progression. But there is an endpoint: Our commitments become the fiber and connecting threads of our life narrative, the story lines that become the plot of our lives. Our primary commitments become sacred to us. They tell us what we're willing to die and live for. We identify with our commitments and over time they form the core of our self-identity. Put simply: *We become our commitments and our commitments become us*.

Training For Commitment

The very idea of training for commitment sounds a bit strange. How could we ever build "commitment muscle" in ways analogous to developing a physical muscle? What would a "commitment workout" look like? I've listed below nine exercises to develop and hone our commitments. Think of these nine as a training regimen for anyone who wants to strengthen his or her commitment muscle:

1. **Each of us should be able to articulate our current life goals**

Our life goals are much broader than our commitments. For example, many students, soldiers and young professionals might have a life goal to get married but they've yet to make that commitment. A college student might have "being a leader" as a life goal, yet his or her commitment to this goal may be difficulty to fully enact

in their current role or responsibility. *Our life goals serve as the main bridges to our commitments.* In many ways, they help to formulate our commitments. It's also important to underscore that our life goals are more than just a listing of platitudes, ideals and principles ("I want to keep all my promises"). Instead, they are unique to our personal narrative (for example, one student recently shared with me that one of his life goals is to display the same strong "work ethic" as his grandfather and father before him). Finally, our life goals do not have to be a fixed blueprint, but a true response to our experiences and learning about ourselves. In other words, our life goals can (and should) evolve and change.

2. **Each of us should be able to articulate our current commitments**

Many people do not have a keen insight into their own commitments. What does it truly mean to commit to a military career or a medical career? Isn't it just a job? Most societies have yet to find a mechanism or a structure by which young people are challenged to articulate their commitments (professional, relational, ethical) in ways that are imbued with meaning and purpose.

3. **Each of us should fiercely scrutinize whether our commitments are truly self-determined**

The research is clear: "Borrowed" commitments (from our parents, our faith tradition, what a profession expects) are less likely to be adhered to than those we authentically "own." No one can impose a commitment upon us. We need to both self-legislate and self-govern our commitments. Put simply, our commitments are more than simply "walking the talk." Our commitments are about determining what our talk should be about. Identifying our commitments is an achievement in self-determining what is most important in our lives (Deci & Ryan, 2002).

4. **Each of us should have our own "if/then" commitment scripts**

"If/then" planning is common to the research on goal commitment. It is also a key insight of the leader self-structure, developed by Hannah and colleagues. In this model, a leader's cognitive affective processing system (CAPS) is activated when a particular situation primes the preferred behavioral or cognitive response. We don't possess traits, suggests Hannah, we possess skills and behavioral tendencies ("scripts") that are activated during particular situations. In other words, we can learn – via training and feedback on that training – how to produce consistent behaviors within particular situations. For example, the CAPS model explains how a first responder, soldier or fire fighter can be trained to face danger and uncertainty with confidence and competency. The question is whether this training orientation can be applied to situations where our commitments will likely be challenged. Clearly, such training would need to be individualized to ensure that these "if/then scripts" focuses on our particular commitments and the relevant challenges that each of us may face, including challenges to particular oaths, vows and pledges we've taken (Hannah, Woolfork & Lord, 2009; Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2010).

5. **Each of us should be aware of the "images" and "rituals" that speak to our commitments**

Images matter. We all have mental pictures of people who are our commitment role models. For many of us, our parents serve as these commitment exemplars. For others, stories from sacred scriptures summon for us what it means to be committed. In addition, there are various "commitment rituals" that express and embody our commitments, ranging from people who run in marathons to religious pilgrimages. Each of us should be able to identify what images and rituals nourish our commitments.

6. **Each of us should be able to explain how we practice the habits and virtues of our commitments**

Aristotle suggests that habits are indispensable to our commitments. Indeed, there is empirical evidence (Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2010) to suggest that encoding particular habits ("behaviors of commitment") can actually lead to *caring more* about that commitment (what is generally known as a "felt commitment"). The point here

is not to allow the habit or behavior to become so settled that we forget or devalue the "why" of our requisite duties or responsibilities. It is this reflective quality that ultimately defines and gives depth to our commitment.

7. **Each of us should be encouraged to reflect on what we've learned when one of our commitments was challenged or threatened**

We know that learning from our challenges, even our failures, predicts growth and development. Just as pilots are trained to fearlessly examine their mistakes (and to learn from these mistakes), each of us should train ourselves to gain insight on how we responded when one of our commitments was challenged or threatened.

There is empirical evidence to suggest that encoding particular habits can actually lead to caring more about that commitment...

8. **Each of us should be able to identify someone who will hold us accountable to our commitments**

We have coaches for sports and non-athletic teams (such as the chess or debating teams) because we know that coaching can make a difference in performance. Coaching can also hold us accountable. Thus, when it comes to showing fidelity to our commitments, each of us should have our own "accountability coach." We should be able to understand how our coach holds us accountable to our commitments and helps us to be our best possible selves.

9. **Annually, each of us should reflect on our commitments**

Once a year, men and women in the military take a physical fitness test. Why? Because we recognize that physical fitness is important to being in the military. The test is a way to quantify and measure our fitness. Analogously, might we one day develop a way to measure the extent to which we are living our commitments? In several faith traditions, there is a time of the year when we are commanded to intentionally self-reflect on our behaviors during the past twelve months. Can we imagine a time when each of us, in our own way, fiercely reflects on the extent to which we have shown fidelity to our commitments? Taking the time to conduct this inventory would seem especially salient to becoming a leader of character.

Conclusion

There are several dimensions of commitment I have not addressed. For example, I have not examined the antecedents of commitment. Personal characteristics are also clearly important to the concept of commitment (age and education have been linked to levels of commitment) and so is a person's disposition (e.g., our need for achievement, affiliation, autonomy). In addition, environmental factors and family structure also play a role (Johnson, M, 1999).

I have also not discussed the seminal relationship between commitment and integrity. As I understand the term, integrity is being true in word and deed to a set of values and principles to which one is committed. In other words, we should strive to show integrity to our commitments—whether these commitments be personal, ethical, intellectual or professional.

In addition, I have not sufficiently addressed the relationship between commitment and noble purpose. Not all commitments are noble. Some are selfish and destructive. I have also tended to emphasize the "positive commitments" rather than our "negative commitments." For example, a student can have a positive commitment to being a good friend as well as a negative commitment to take whatever steps are needed to avoid failing physics a second time.

Nor have I adequately explained the ambiguity of some commitments. For example, what does it mean—in terms of specific actions—if I am committed to ending poverty in Africa? This commitment may not immediately translate to any specific action steps. This sort of commitment serves only as a backdrop for potential action rather than serving as a general rule of behavior (such as a commitment to keeping one's promises).

Finally, I believe we are "called" to our commitments and that discerning this call requires a certain kind of listening - a listening to the heart. All of us can be trained to hear this call and to become shaped by a vision of noble purposes that extends beyond mere self-interest. Indeed, I'd argue that we're most alive when we do. Perhaps this is why the wisdom literature suggests that if memory is the mental organ of our past, commitment is the mental organ of our future.

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FEATURE

Failure Predicts Success:
Professional Ethical Decision-Making in Aviation Simulators

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ABSTRACT

This research investigated the ongoing problem of pilot-induced mishaps from the perspective of professional ethics. The research relied heavily upon precedent work in philosophical virtue theory and moral psychology, including MacIntyre (1984) and Rest, et al, (1994). Anonymous field surveys were used to collect samples of behavior judged by SME's as likely to induce or preclude an aircraft mishap. These observations were reduced to a Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale (BARS) diagnostic and to construct simulator scenarios. Participants in the simulator phase were entered into a 3 x 2 pre-test / post-test experimental design. The scenarios offered participants opportunities to display relevant behaviors and experience the resulting session outcome (safe landing at an airport or other). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three intervention groups (control, FAA, and experimental). Experimenters were kept blind to group assignment. Diagnostic scores proved predictive of session outcome. No significant difference in pre- to post-test improvement was observed between experimental groups.

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Strongly significant (X2 = .007219) pre- to post-test improvement was observed in those pilots suffering a mishap in the pre-test, regardless of experimental group.

General aviation mishaps in the United States claim an average of about 500 lives annually. This statistic has remained constant over the last decade and shows no signs of improving. (See Table 1). The persistence of this accident rate is somewhat surprising, given the fact that there have been significant developments in the availability of onboard weather, GPS navigation units, as well as the introduction of aircraft parachutes over this same time.[1] The main cause (of at least 70%-80%) of general aviation accidents is pilot error. Completely satisfactory causal accounts of these "errors," however, are difficult to find. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Department of Defense (DoD) currently use the Human Factors Accident Classification System (HFACS) to analyze and describe the cause of accidents.[2] Arguably, the HFACS fails to capture some of the more nuanced dimensions of human behavior, to include the values that underlie and motivate behavior.

For example, the cause of a pilot-induced mishap may be classified as "pilot's failure to recover from an unusual attitude." While that may very well be the final (failed) action of a pilot in the mishap event, there are often antecedent events that may offer more insight into how the mishap flight evolved in the first place. For example, perhaps a pilot watched an airshow and decided that he would try to roll his airplane, without having received any aerobatic training. While at face value, the cause of the crash is a "failure to recover from an unusual attitude continued VFR flight into IMC," at least part of the root cause of the accident lies elsewhere, namely, in the pilot's failure to keep priorities straight, or perhaps even to perceive the risk involved in such a maneuver for an unqualified pilot. Unfortunately, accident reports made available to the public rarely offer the full context of the events leading to a mishap. Furthermore, it is impossible to interview the dead pilot(s) to find out what actually happened.

Mitigating Operator-Induced Mishaps (M2) sought to develop a research protocol that would more fully investigate the causes of pilot-induced mishaps and the values that underlay pilot performance. The overarching thesis of the research is that pilot-induced mishaps result more from failures of professional ethical decision-making rather than from basic "stick and rudder skills." Hence, the research protocol used a professional ethics model, previously validated in medical ethics (Bebeau 2006), and applied it to aviation mishap analysis.

The overarching thesis of the research is that pilot-induced mishaps result more from failures of professional ethical decision-making rather than from basic "stick and rudder skills."

Theoretical Background

The theoretical framework deployed by M2 is a hybrid that combines a psychological model of ethical decision-making with a professional ethical model grounded in philosophical virtue theory.

The Four-Component Model

The project uses an adapted version of the University of Minnesota's "Four Component Model" (FCM) of ethical development for diagnostics and scoring. The social science fundamentals underlying the project are well

1 Cirrus Aircraft introduced a ballistic recovery system (BRS) also known as the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) in 2002.

2 The original framework (called the *Taxonomy of Unsafe Operations*) was developed using over 300 Naval aviation accidents obtained from the U.S. Naval Safety Center (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997). The original taxonomy has since been refined using input and data from other military (U.S. Army Safety Center and the U.S. Air Force Safety Center) and civilian organizations (National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration). The result was the development of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).

established and work from the Center for the Study of Ethical Development at the University of Minnesota[3] and professional ethics education in other fields form the basis for the research (Rest & Narvez 1994, Rest & Narvez 1999, Beabau & Monson 2008) According to Rest et. al, the four components of ethical decision-making are perception, judgment, commitment and competence. For example, a person needs to first *perceive* that there is an ethical issue at stake; *deliberate* as to the best course of action to resolve the problem; *commit* to following through on the chosen course of action; and be *competent* to carry out the course of action. The FCM was deployed successfully in the field of dentistry. The results of that research showed that when dental students were introduced to the FCM during their training they had a lower rate of malpractice when tracked longitudinally (Bebeau 2006).

M2 adapted the FCM to the aviation domain. The four components, as modified are: Perception: pilot sensitivity to and detection of factors important to effective decision-making; Judgment—effective decision-making, especially in ambiguous situations; Commitment—the ability to carry out good decisions in the face of temptation to do otherwise; Competence—the skills to execute decisions reliably.

If a safe landing has not been achieved, it is impossible to evaluate that flight as "good," even if all the other actions during the flight were executed perfectly.

Virtue Theory and Professional Ethics

While the FCM provided the basic heuristic for categorizing ethical behaviors, M2 enfolded the FCM into an overarching virtue ethics model. The virtue ethics model is basically Aristotelian, as articulated by Alasdair MacIntyre (1984). A virtue theoretic approach insists that every activity has a *goal* or *telos*. Likewise every *craft* has an overall *goal* as well.[4]

With respect to aviation, the overall goal of the craft of aviation is judged to be a safe landing, or "on the ground and OK." While it is true that airplanes can be used in a variety of ways, e.g. as a means of transportation, for aerobatic demonstrations, for pleasure, etc., no one would judge any pilot to have met the goal of the craft of aviation if he failed to land the plane successfully, regardless of the particular use of the aircraft at the time.[5] In other words, if a safe landing has not been achieved, it is impossible to evaluate that flight as "good," even if all the other actions during the flight were executed perfectly. When mechanical failures arise, or if some other condition not attributed to pilot error occurs, virtue ethics would judge the pilot virtuous if the pilot successfully negotiated a landing without injury to himself and others, or if he undertook a course of action to mitigate injury to others, either in the plane, or on the ground, as much as possible. An example of such a case might be a pilot who has an engine failure during flight and steers his aircraft away from houses and populated areas. The pilot might die in the crash, but his actions minimized the loss of life to others.

M2 used the FCM and virtue theory as the basic theoretical model to frame the problem of pilot-induced error. The FCM was used to form the basis of a diagnostic tool to evaluate pilot behaviors in the area of perception, judgment, commitment, and competence, and used the virtue theoretic approach to establish the

3 The Center is now located at the University of Alabama.

4 For example, the goal of using a hammer is to drive a nail, and the overall goal of the craft of carpentry is to build or repair something using wood. Behaviors are valued as "good" or "bad" in accordance with how well they serve the function of the craft. A craftsman is considered "virtuous" to the extent that his behaviors are functionally oriented and ordered to achieving the overall goal of the craft.

5 The use of aircraft for military purposes might prove to be an exception. However, the use of aircraft in war is purely instrumental and is subsumed into the larger craft of warfare, whose goal is victory.

desired outcome of a flight, i.e. mishap or non-mishap.

Research Hypotheses

In light of the theoretical model used above as well as new work in cognitive neuroscience, M2 tested four research hypotheses:

- H1: *Pilot-induced simulator mishap rates are negatively correlated to scores in the 4 components.*
- H2: *Simulator performance scores are positively correlated to scores in the 4 components.*
- H3*: M2 educational intervention will improve scores in components one, two and three on the post-test.*
- H4: *M2 educational intervention will improve simulator performance scores on the post-test.*

Method

The research methodology consisted of three phases: 1) survey work; 2) simulator scenario design; and 3) data collection.

Phase I: Survey Work

Using the categories of perception, judgment, and commitment from the FCM, a survey was designed and distributed to flight crew subject matter experts (SME) around the country using Survey Monkey. Pilots and non-pilot flight crew participants, who had at least 1,500 hours of total aircraft time, were asked to provide basic demographic data and to answer open-ended questions which pertained to behavior that they had observed in the cockpit that correlated to excellent, average and poor examples of flight crew perception, judgment, and commitment. Survey respondents were also asked to list one trait of the pilots who scared them the most and one trait of the pilots that they trusted the most.

The first survey had 119 respondents who provided over 430 discrete pilot behaviors. After this first round of survey data was collected and sorted, we consolidated the 430 behaviors (some responses were repetitive or irrelevant to the question asked) to 213 behaviors. We then sent this more refined data to four independent SMEs, who validated the initial behavioral component sorting. Following this step, we then sent this consolidated and sorted set of 214 behaviors to "Super Subject Matter Experts" (SSMEs). SSMEs had to be pilots or flight crew with a flight instructor rating who had at least 3000 hours of pilot time and 700 hours of dual given. The SSMEs scored each of the 213 responses on a scale of 1 to 5, where a "1" designated a behavior as "least likely to cause a mishap" and a "5" designated a behavior as "most likely to cause a mishap."

After the SSMEs scaled the individual behaviors, a factor and item analysis was performed on the 213 behaviors. At the end of the factor and item analysis, 16 behaviors were identified as being the most indicative of likely mishap and not-likely mishap behavior. These 16 behaviors were then used to form a Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale (BARS), which would serve as the basic diagnostic and evaluative tool for pilot performance during the simulator scenarios.

16 behaviors were identified as being the most indicative of likely mishap and not-likely mishap behavior.

Phase II: Simulator Scenario Development

The research used FRASCA T-6A Texan II simulators located at the United States Air Force Academy. Due to the anticipated participant demographic and experience level, the simulator was modified to perform like a high performance single-engine airplane, similar to that of a Cessna 210 or a Bonanza, as opposed to a high-performance military turbine trainer. This was accomplished by limiting

the power output of the simulator, as well as by modifying the simulator instrument panel to look more like a general aviation aircraft. For example, redundant instruments as well as a number of warning annunciators that would not be found in a general aviation aircraft were covered up.

The simulator scenarios were designed using the NTSB accident record as well as mishap analysis gained from the aviation insurance industry.[6] Two Visual Flight Rules (VFR) scenarios were designed. Each scenario required the participant to act as pilot-in-command (PIC) while carrying a passenger (played by members of the research team). Since the accident record shows that "continued VFR flight into IMC" and "fuel exhaustion" mishaps continue to plague the general aviation community, one scenario of each kind was designed for the experiment.

The simulator scenario design was limited by the visuals in the simulator, which provided a graphical range from about 10 miles east, 20 miles west, and about 35 miles north and south of Colorado Springs Municipal Airport (KCOS). The complete runway environments for the Air Force Academy (KAFF) and KCOS, as well as the surrounding areas were available to use for the scenarios. However, due to the limited range of the visual graphics, the scenarios had to be designed to begin during the "enroute" phase of flight.

Two researchers enacted tightly scripted roles in each scenario, playing the roles of Air Traffic Control (ATC) or passenger. In Scenario A one member of the research team played the role of ATC and managed the simulator event inputs, while the other member played the role of a passenger. During Scenario B, the research team switched roles, i.e. the passenger in Scenario A became the Air Traffic Controller for scenario B, and vice versa.

During the simulator scenario development phase, the research team also designed a complete "standard weather briefing" which was provided to each participant to use for pre-flight planning. This briefing package was based on the content of the official services that would be provided to pilots by a Flight Service Station (FSS) during a real flight. In order to make the scenarios realistic, the researchers downloaded actual weather data for a discrete time period during two typical weather environments that could be found in Colorado. The pre-flight briefing package included radar, satellite, and surface analysis reports as well as standard aviation weather data reports, such as Terminal Area Forecasts (TAFs), Meteorological Reports (METARs), Graphical AIRMETs and SIGMETs, Area Forecasts (FA), and Winds Aloft information. The member of the research team who was acting as the air traffic controller adjusted the simulator visual weather environment during the scenario to correlate to the weather information that was provided.

Phase III: Data Collection

The research protocol used a 3 x 2 pre-test/post-test design. Scenario A was a VFR into IMC flight and Scenario B was a fuel leak incident. The three different intervention groups were: 1) Control Group; 2) Federal Aviation Administration Aeronautical Decision-Making Group (FAA ADM); and 3) Professional-Ethics Experimental Group (aka Trustworthy Pilot Group). The number of participants needed to yield the requirements for statistical significance was determined to be 108. This allowed for 36 participants in each intervention group. Furthermore, the scenarios were counterbalanced. For example, 18 participants in the control group flew scenario A first, followed by scenario B; the other 18 participants in the control group flew scenario B first followed by scenario A. This counter-balancing was designed to washout any discrepancies in scenario difficulty. Furthermore, participants were randomly assigned to their scenarios and their intervention groups by a third party. As a result, the experimenters did not know what experimental group the participants were in until after the entire protocol

6 One of the researchers has a non-disclosure agreement with an aviation insurance carrier and was able to use that knowledge in a way to help shape the scenario design, but without violating the non-disclosure agreement.

was completed and could thus score pilot performance without bias.

Participants were recruited from the Colorado Springs and Denver Metro Area. Recruiting posters deployed at the United States Air Force Academy, at Colorado Springs and Denver Metro Area Airport Flight Schools, as well as among various aviation groups. Many flight schools and aviation groups also agreed to distribute copies of recruiting posters to their members via group lists. Additionally, much of the recruiting happened by word of mouth, as early research participants told their fellow pilots about their positive experiences of the research protocol.

Participants were randomly assigned to their scenarios and their intervention groups by a third party.

To qualify as a research participant a pilot had to: 1) Possess at least a student pilot certificate and be qualified to solo an airplane single-engine land (ASEL); 2) have completed at least three takeoffs and landings in the previous 90 days; 3) be at least 17 years of age; 4) not be pregnant and 5) be willing to consent to neurophysiological monitoring.

The research protocol required the participants to come to the Air Force Academy Air Warfare Laboratory on two different days. The first session took 2.5 hours. During this session, a participant signed an informed consent document (ICD), was given a cockpit orientation in the T-6A Texan II and given the opportunity to practice some basic maneuvers in order to gain familiarity with the simulator. After the orientation phase, the participant was asked to fly a "screener" scenario where they were asked to fly a basic VFR flight from KCOS to KPUB (Pueblo) in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). This screener scenario was designed to make sure that the pilot could fly to the FAA practical test standards (FAA 2012)[7] and handle the communication requirements with ATC.

If the participant passed the screener scenario, he was admitted into the formal phase of the research protocol.

7 https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/test_standards/media/faa-s-8081-14b.pdf.

The first part of the research protocol was a pre-flight planning phase, where the pilot was seated alone in a classroom and asked to prepare for the upcoming pre-test scenario using the standard weather briefing materials provided by the researchers. The researchers also provided a "case description," which included the circumstances of the flight time of day, fuel on board, and information about the passenger. Participants were allowed as much time as they needed to prepare for the flight. No false or misleading information was given to the participants at any time. While the amount of time each participant used to do pre-flight planning was not officially recorded, the average amount of prep time taken was approximately 20 minutes. After participants completed their pre-flight planning, they were hooked up to psycho-physiological monitoring equipment.[8].

When the preflight preparation and physiological hookup was complete, participants returned to the simulator room to

8 A BioPac MP 150 Data Acquisition wireless system and its accompanying software, AqKnowledge, was used to collect and record physiological data. Participants had electro dermal activity (EDA) electrodes hooked up to the *thanar* and *hypothanar* regions of the palms of their non-flying hand. This physiological measurement was designed to capture arousal in the sympathetic nervous system. Two electromyography (EMG) electrodes each were placed on the *flexor radii carporalis* and *extensor radii carporalis* muscles of the flying forearm in order to measure stress/grip strength, with a fifth electrode placed on the wrist serving as a ground. Three electrocardiogram (ECG) electrodes were placed on the participant's chest. The ECG electrodes were used to gather basic cardiac information to include heart rate, heart rate variability and vagal tone. The vagal tone measure was used as a proxy for parasympathetic nervous system activity. The ECG wireless transmitter was also attached to a chest harness to measure respiration. Additionally, there was a small camera in the cockpit that recorded facial micro expressions. The micro expression data was also used as a proxy to capture a pilot's mental states during the scenarios. The physiological data has not yet been analyzed and is not related to the non-physiological findings of this research. It is noted here to acknowledge that it was part of a participant's overall experience

begin the pre-test scenario. The researchers performed their assigned roles as ATC or the passenger. Three cameras and one microphone were in use during the simulator flight. One camera with microphone was used to record the participant's facial expression and serve as a voice recorder. A second camera was mounted on top of the simulator to record the simulator visual graphics. A third recording device was used to capture the simulator operator's board. The simulator operator's board contained airspeed, altitude, heading and course track, as well as the controller weather input and system changes. All three cameras and microphone were in simultaneous operation. An iSpy software package was used to simultaneously capture and record the participant's facial and voice data, the simulator visual graphics, and controller board. Video and audio recording of the entire flight was important for future analysis and event reconstruction.

This screener scenario was designed to make sure that the pilot could fly to the FAA practical test standards (FAA 2012)[7] and handle the communication requirements with ATC.

After a participant completed the pre-test scenario, the researcher, who played the role of passenger, immediately conducted a post flight interview, asking what was going through the participant's mind during selected events. The "non-interviewing" member of the research team, i.e. the one who had played the role of ATC during the flight, took notes on the interview and then entered those notes into a database for future analysis. After the post-flight interview was over, both researchers scored the participant's performance on the BARS. Any discrepancies in scoring between the two researchers were resolved between them and one common BARS performance score was given. The participants BARS scores were entered into a database and the paper version of the record was also maintained.

After the pre-test scenario was completed, the participant was given instructions on what to expect for the intervention assignment. The participant's post-test return date was also confirmed at this time. No training or any flight "debriefing" was done with any of the participants.

As mentioned previously, there were three experimental groups, with 36 participants randomly assigned to each group. After the participants completed their pre-test, an independent third party emailed the participants with their intervention group assignment and relevant instructions. If participants were in the control group, they had no intervention assignment and were cleared to return for their post-flight at the previously agreed upon date. If participants were in the FAA ADM group, the link to this online course was sent to them.[9] They were asked to view the course and complete the end of course quiz. After participants completed the quiz, they were asked to forward the course completion certificate to the independent third party for verification. Once the third party received the course completion certificate, the participant was cleared to return for the post-flight test. A similar procedure was used for those in the Professional Ethics Intervention Group (aka the Trustworthy Pilot group). The researchers designed the professional ethics intervention course and its course completion quiz prior to the start of the research protocol and uploaded it onto a secure link, which was sent by a third party to the participants. Like the FAA course, a participant in the Trustworthy Pilot group was asked to view the 30-minute video, take the end of course quiz, and send the quiz to the third party for verification. Once the quiz was returned, the participant was cleared for the post-flight test.

When participants returned for the post-test, they followed the same procedure that was used for the

9 https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/ALC/course_content.aspx?pf=1&preview=true&cID=62

pre-test, except that they did not have to undergo the cockpit orientation and screener exercise again. The post-flight session took about 1.5 hours, though, again, the session length varied depending on the length of time the participant took for preflight planning. While the researchers switched roles for a participant's post-flight, the protocol was otherwise exactly the same, i.e. physiological data was collected, the post-flight interview was conducted, BARS score assigned, and information entered into the database. At the end of the post-test, the participants were informed that they had completed the research protocol and would be invited to a future seminar where the results of the study would be presented. Data collection began in November of 2013 and was completed during the first week of July 2014. Simulator trials ran Monday through Saturday, between 0800 and 2000.

Results

One hundred and sixteen (116) participants entered the study. One hundred and nine (109) participants completed the full protocol. The results of the first 108 participants were used for the data analysis. Two participants were disqualified from the study because they failed to pass the screener; two participants had to withdraw from the study due to scheduling/moving conflicts; and data was lost or incomplete on three additional participants.

Two of the four research hypothesis were supported.

- H1: *Pilot induced mishap rates are negatively correlated to scores in the four components*. Supported with X^2 <.05. (See Table 2 and 3)
- H2: *Simulator performance scores are positively correlated to scores in the four components*. Supported with X^2 <.05. (See Table 2 and 3)
- H3: *M2 Educational program will improve scores on components one, two and three*. Not supported.
- H4: *M2 educational program will improve simulator performance scores*. Not supported.

Discussion

The validation of research hypotheses H1 and H2 demonstrate the relevance of professional ethics and moral psychology in diagnosing pilot mishaps, since the BARS behaviors (components 1-3 of the FCM) were tightly correlated to simulator outcome (See Figure 2 and Figure 3). Hence, while a focus on traditional "skills" and "aeronautical knowledge," which are typically used by the aviation industry to train and evaluate pilots is certainly necessary, our research suggests that focusing on perception, judgment (deliberation), and commitment (self-discipline) may prove to be effective categories for evaluating pilot behavior as well. All of the pilots who experienced unsafe outcomes in the simulator were qualified and current, as were all of those who flew safely. The difference may be illuminated by reference to professional ethics.

All of the pilots who experienced unsafe outcomes in the simulator were qualified and current, as were all of those who flew safely. The difference may be illuminated by reference to professional ethics.

Virtue theory helps us understand that professional performance is not solely the product of technical training or skills-acquisition. Internal psychic states—perhaps most importantly what a person *cares* about—is important too. Having one's values straight, and understanding why, matters in professional ethics. In the case of aviation, caring about safety matters, and it is more than knowing how to be safe. It is acting in accordance with the value of safety that matters. It may be that the experience of caring about

safety, but then experiencing an unsafe outcome, causes introspection and a subsequent reordering of behavior that increases the probability of safe outcomes.

While research hypothesis H3 and H4 were not supported, the research team is not, upon reflection, completely surprised. The initial plan for the M2 professional ethical education intervention model, i.e. Trustworthy Pilot group, was for it to be conducted in small group seminars and one on one expert/non-expert coaching. However, given the fact that the second intervention group (the FAA ADM course) was an online course, it was determined that having the Trustworthy Pilots course in the same format, i.e. an online course, was more scientifically appropriate. The concern was that the personal interaction *per se* for the experimental intervention group would prove to be a confound in the experimental design. Future research will explore the small group seminar approach for teaching professional ethics.

Having one's values straight, and understanding why, matters in professional ethics. In the case of aviation, caring about safety matters

Unexpected Results

In addition to the results of H1-H, the most important research finding of M2 *is that there was a statistically significant improvement across all three intervention groups if the participant failed the pre-test* (See Figure 4). There was not a statistically significant improvement in the post-test for participants who passed the pre-test (See Figure 5). In other words, the experimental protocol itself proved to be a sort of training program. Since there were improvements across all intervention groups, the researchers concluded that the actual experience of *failing* during the pre-test scenario, proved to be the best predictor of success in the post-test (See Figure 6). The researchers believe that a participant's strong sense of identity of being a pilot, as well as knowing that other pilots performed the scenarios successfully, provided the intrinsic motivation necessary to autonomously evaluate their own performance and seek to improve on the post-test. Indeed, a large majority of the pilots who failed their pre-test spontaneously reported to the research team that they vowed to do better on the post-test and that they spent a lot of time "thinking" and "kicking themselves" and "evaluating" their performance on the pre-test.

Conclusion

M2 demonstrated that a professional ethical decision-making model can be used to design a diagnostic tool which correlates to pilot performance. A professional ethical intervention model in a 30-minute online format does not produce improved simulator outcomes or significantly improve pilot performance BARS scores. A professional ethics intervention model may prove successful when integrated into a pilot training program, if it is done in a one-on-one or small group setting. Researchers believe the language of professional ethics may prove especially powerful in helping "failed" pilots reflect upon their experience and thereby improve. Finally, the experience of failure on the pre-test proved to be the single most significant factor in predicting pilot success in the post-test.

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Figure 1



http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/data/Pages/2012%20Aviation%20Accidents%20Summary.aspx

Figure 2: Average Pre-Test BARS Scores, BARS outcome correlation (X2 <.05), N=108



Figure 3: Average Post-Test BARS Scores, BARS outcome correlation (X2 <.05), N=108



Figure 4: Post-Test Results for the Pre-Test "Mishap" Pilots, (n=68)



Figure 5: Post-Test Results for the "Safe" Pre-Test Pilots, (n=40)



Figure 6: Summary Data for Experimental Results

	Post-Test MISHAP	Post-Test SAFE	Chi Squared
68 Pre-Test MISHAPS	27	41	
(Expected Outcomes)	(43)	(25)	.007219 (strongly significant)
40 Pre-Test SAFES	29	11	
(Expected Outcomes)	(25)	(15)	.715001 (no significant correlation)

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A Strategy for Character and Leadership Education

Kevin McCaskey, U.S. Air Force Academy

ABSTRACT

The concept of teaching character and/or leadership is a critical component of human performance and development. Whether in the military, government service, athletic competition, or academics, character and leadership play a pivotal role in producing a quality product. Unfortunately for educators and practitioners, the chief limitation in developing these traits is the inevitable immeasurability of each through normal means. This article establishes a linkage between character and leadership development and the Clausewitzian notion of military genius in order to establish correlation between military genius and character and leadership education. To establish this relationship this article defines the characteristics of military genius, demonstrates how these aspects can be taught and evaluated, and then links these activities to defining moments which allow the one to evaluate character and leadership in practice.

Something is missing from research and discussion regarding character and leadership education—the acceptance that evaluating the efficacy of any given program seeking to develop either attribute is a near impossible task. Determinations of each depend largely on counter-factual scenarios, hypothetical situations, and normative assessments. Unless an evaluator can spend every possible moment with the subject, how can one effectively determine whether or not someone is demonstrating good character? The "right" decision in a given moment could demonstrate character, but could just as easily demonstrate selfish (rational) action. Is character demonstrated when someone is coerced into choosing a certain option, when the choice is between the desired behavior and a punishment? The teacher who witnesses an act of good character in a pupil witnesses the act, which may or may not indicate that the pupil will lead a life of character. Similarly most leadership (especially command style as in hierarchical organizations such as the military) is by definition directional. While one might assert

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that someone has good or bad leadership, how frequently is that determination made by someone wholly unqualified to make the judgment? How can one tell a subordinate that they have demonstrated good leadership? Managerial skills and/or officership can clearly be witnessed from outside or above the leader, but only ones subordinates can accurately tell us if we are, in fact, effective leaders.

The inherent weakness in character and/or leadership education is the near impossibility of actually assessing whether or not the educational or training methods used have produced the desired end state. Observing a system changes the behavior of the system, but if character is doing what is right when no one is looking, acting unselfishly, eschewing self-promotion over unit and team promotion, then we should expect that true character is demonstrated outside observation. Similarly how does one assess leadership when people can be expected to act "leaderly" while under observation? In both cases the educator, manager, coach, etc. is not witnessing character (or leadership) which would be reflected in how the subject behaves in coming decades, but rather how the subject is acting in the moment, on a given day. Neither character nor leadership are an act, but a pattern (Davis, 2003). This is not to claim that those institutions who value each trait should give up, but rather than an alternate means of assessment might be necessary. Rather than attempting to measure specific instances of character or leadership, we should focus instead on developing truly measurable character traits, traits which will be conducive to truly actionable character and leadership under duress. By substituting the Clausewitzian notion of military genius we have a quality that, while largely still normative, possesses attributes more easily and accurately assessed. This article asserts that because the purpose of character and leadership is similar to that of military genius (to make sound decisions under duress), the latter is a useful predictor for actionable character and leadership, is more reliable in those defining moments which demand solid character and leadership, and are therefore a better focus for training and education.

The inherent weakness in character and/or leadership education is the near impossibility of actually assessing whether or not the educational or training methods used have produced the desired end state.

Introduction

Despite the widely variant folkways and mores of a given time period or generation, a clear streak of consistency runs through scholarly writing on character education. The observation that "character-building, from the standpoint of the institutions involved, requires clear recognition of the necessity of working together toward a single end. They are in no sense competitors or rivals but co-operative agencies" could very well have been written by the United States Air Force's Center for Character and Leadership Development, the publisher of this very journal. In fact those words were written by John Cornett in The Journal of Religion nearly a century ago (Cornett, 1931). So too the idea that those in charge of instructing character should "get it," "buy into it," and "live it" (Berkowitz and Biel, 2004). The notion that effective character education actually requires those in positions of authority to demonstrate character is what we would expect of leaders in any field. That effective character and leadership education requires both objective lessons and subjective demonstrations leads Davis to conclude that genuine character education requires allowing the pupils to actually make mistakes, but that few institutions are willing to do so, preferring safety to quality education (Davis, 2003). Davis' assertion that true character and leadership require practice, experience, and failure, with the results often not visible for decades, matches the

premise of this article and also reflects the millennia long historical dialogue on character education. That experience is a more lasting teacher than precept was recognized by Seneca the Young, whom is commonly credited with the notion that "long is the road through precept, short and effective through example." In a like mein, Aristotle's views on habituation argue that habit leads to character, not that character can become a habit. This then leads us back to John Cornett who, in addition to advocating for synergy among otherwise competing interests, further proposed that the trinity of interests in education included purpose, curriculum, and method (Cornett, 1931). Put another way: the purpose represents the desired end state, the curriculum the available means, and the method the ways of using these means towards the desired end. Collectively these ends, ways, and means represent a strategy, and lead one naturally to the realm of the strategist.

Strategy and Military Genius

Strategy is an oft referenced and infrequently understood concept. Military strategy, business strategy, national strategy, sports strategy, there are a host of fields which one might consider strategy important to success. Interestingly many of these same fields are those that we would expect have a natural desire for strong character and leadership amongst members. Unfortunately, what often masquerades an organizational strategy is little more than a concoction of buzzwords and immeasurable goals masquerading as a defined path towards achieving a desired end state. For the purposes of this article, the term "strategy" adheres to Colin Gray's formulation of a specified means utilized in specific ways that lead to a desired end state. Using this ends, ways, and means construct highlights the fact that Cornett himself was proposing a strategy for character education using curriculum according to a purposeful method in order to develop sound character in students. By establishing that a strategic approach to teaching character has a clear historical foundation, all that remains is to correlate the characteristics of military genius and their employment in defining moments.

Strategy is an oft referenced and infrequently understood concept.

Alongside the dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means, the notion of fog and friction as timeless aspects of the nature of war is one of Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz' most famous contributions (Clausewitz, trans. 1976). In war, fog represents that which we cannot or do not know. Fog introduces uncertainty, makes effective planning difficult, and ensures that chaos will always be a factor when hostilities commence. Once hostilities do commence friction perpetuates chaos by ensuring the battlefield is dynamic. With every moment that passes friction creates more change, demands more ingenuity. Fog and friction can be considered to have an inverse relationship. As fog recedes through prolonged conflict (after a decade of waging the war on terror, the U.S. had a much better understanding of the character of the war) friction increases, thus chance dominates throughout. According to Clausewitz, in order to overcome the combined effects of fog and friction the sound commander needed to possess military genius, which included the characteristics of courage (physical and moral), intellect (a combination of determination and coup de oil or inward eye), and strength of character (the components of which now compromise what we call leadership (Clausewitz, trans. 1976). By understanding the relationship between military genius and the nature of war we begin to understand why certain leaders and commanders have success where others do not. Thus, when President Ulysses Grant is described as "Outwardly quiet and unpretentious, inwardly confident, Grant's style of command was practical, flexible, and, above all, decisive" we can confirm that not only was the

general a sound military commander, but that, according to Clausewitz, it was military genius that made him so (Waugh, 2009).

> *"If we then ask what sort of mind is likeliest to display the qualities of military genius, experience and observation will both tell us that it is the inquiring rather than the creative mind, the comprehensive rather than the specialized approach, the calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our brothers and children, and the safety and honor of our country." (Clausewitz, trans. 1976)*

Though Clausewitz was certainly writing to and for a military audience, the traits that comprise military genius are by no means limited to military commanders any more than fog and friction are the exclusive domains of warfare. Any agency, collective, business, team, or other competitive organization that operates in uncertain environments, encounters unexpected obstacles, and has another agency working against their own is, in fact, operating with fog and friction. These same organizations then stand to benefit from the characteristics of character and leadership in their members and can (and should) grow those traits through a purposeful program designed to instill military genius. A reason that military officers and non-commissioned officers are marketable in the civilian world and pursued through programs such as Troops to Teachers, is precisely because of the perceived value of the veteran's character and leadership, each the result of purposeful exposure training aimed at developing military genius. For example, the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) directly develops each of the components of military genius in officer candidates through a wide variety of military, academic, and athletic endeavors. Thus, while the Mission Statement of the Air Force Academy *"to educate, train and inspire men and women to become officers of character motivated to lead the United States Air Force in service to our Nation"* speaks to the need for leadership (officers) and character, the explanation behind this mission statement reads like a modern day appraisal of military genius. "...USAFA forges cadets, through academic, military and athletic training, into resilient (determination), innovative (intellect) airmen who...are able to operate and lead in the most challenging environments (fog and friction)." Sequentially then what the United States Air Force Academy actually does is teach the traits of military genius, with the expectation that those traits can and will lead to leaders of character.

By understanding the relationship between military genius and the nature of war we begin to understand why certain leaders and commanders have success where others do not.

Courage: Physical and Moral

The first consideration in developing military genius is the requirement for moral and physical courage and, while each are critical components, certain organizations will place a premium on one over the other. For example, many professional sports require a high degree of physical courage, which allows athletes to overcome friction (literal and figurative) during competition. From combatives training such as mixed-martial arts and boxing to contact sports such as football or rugby to extreme sports such as cliff diving, athletics often demand physical courage which allows the athletes to deal with the inherent hazards of their business. Despite the obvious importance of physical courage even the casual observer can recognize that certain sports encourage a culture short on moral courage. Human performance enhancing drugs and the art of flopping (feigning having been fouled by opposing team) are rampant in some sports. Conversely, other organizations such as lawyers and judges each require a high amount of moral courage, and less so

physical. Both aspects however are critical components of military genius because they improve the ability of the individual to react quickly in a dynamic environment, to mitigate fear in challenging circumstances, and to overcome unexpected obstacles (friction).

Clearly physical and moral courage are very different character traits, and an individual can possess (be taught) one, both, or neither. Moral courage leads to reliability and a calmer mind, while physical courage is stimulating and leads to boldness (Clausewitz, trans. 1976). By aiming to instill both in future officers the Academy aims to "the highest kind of courage…a compound of both" (Clausewitz, trans. 1976). Physical courage can be manifested in a variety of ways apart from simulated combat or contact sports. Exercises that emphasize physical courage such as jumping from or crossing large heights, white-water rafting, or even self-protection classes can each be employed by businesses, government agencies, etc. The value from such activities simply requires explaining to participants that, by purposefully engaging in tasks which require physical courage the subject can learn to adapt to uncertain environments. So too with moral courage, which can also be simulated right in offices with simple, effective exercises. Managers, coaches, and employers can present their subordinates with ethical dilemmas, often without the subjects knowledge, and allow them to make choices. The best of these won't necessarily have a "right" answer, but force the person to truly face a moral dilemma. Simply empowering members to speak to leadership about apparent inconsistencies, errors, and mistakes can help create a culture where moral courage is perceived as a value-added trait.

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Intellect: Determination and the *Coup d'oeil* (Inward Eye)

Like courage, intellect can be broken down into sub-categories, in this case determination and the *coup d'oeil*. At initial glance, the inclusion of determination as a component of intellect might strike some as misplaced. Would determination not fit better under courage or strength of character? In a reasoning all military officers should internalize, Clausewitz postulated that "determination in a single instance is an expression of courage; if it becomes characteristic, a mental habit" (Clausewitz, trans. 1976). As an intellectual quality determination leads to a reduction in self-doubt and helps overcome hesitation when absolute knowledge of a situation is unavailable. Leaders in diverse organizations will continually be presented with situations in which they lack critical information, but must nonetheless act decisively in order to accomplish organization goals in uncertain environments. The intellectual component of determination makes such decisiveness possible. In simplest terms, intellectual determination is the conscious decision to persevere.

From the singular instance and the habitual (mental habit), determination is a quality that can be purposefully developed in members. Many organizations force new recruits to develop perseverance from the moment they join. The military has basic training, athletic teams have "two-a-days," fraternities have challenges. Some businesses place new hires on temporary contracts in order to determine if the new hire has the ability to succeed in a new environment. For each of the above, the determinant for which new members remain and which do not is less a skill problem than a will problem. Recruits don't fail basic training in the early weeks for lack of skills (the purpose of basic training to teach these skills) but because they

lack the will. For Clausewitz, the decision not to quit is intellectual determination.

While the intellectual component of determination allows perseverence despite conditions, the inward eye is that which allows the commander (leader) to maintain battlefield presence and quickly assess situations in light of their own experience and the evolving battlespace (Clausewitz, trans. 1976). Inward eye should be considered the product of self-reflection and personal development, and can potentially yield comfort with uncertainty, helping to overcome fog and friction. The development of the inward eye is a byproduct of time spent in study, specifically study of oneself.

In order to understand anything one must spend time engaged in the task of analyzing said object. From one's children or a profession, to a material object such as a new set of golf clubs or a new car, the more time that a person spends analyzing and employing something, the more one comes to understand that object. The same should be said of understanding oneself. In order to develop an inward eye, an individual needs significant quantities of time spent in efforts to truly understand who they are. Many people do this through religion, club participation, group projects, etc. Occasionally defining moments such as the loss of a loved one or a major life setback can force periods of strong self-analysis. The characteristic of self-awareness (the ability to understand one's mood, emotions, and their effect on others) is often developed through these same avenues (Goleman, 2000). With proper mentoring, members can be taught to recognize when they lack self-awareness, and when they fail at accurate self-analysis. The inward eye is an attribute that can be encouraged by embracing lessons learned from failures, often with the help of mentors. The greater the trust a member has in a potential mentor, the more influence that person will have over their protégé (Melanson, 2009). Thus the inward eye can also be developed through purposeful, lasting mentorship relationships.

The inward eye is an attribute that can be encouraged by embracing lessons learned from failures, often with the help of mentors.

Strength of Character

For Clausewitz the component strength of character was that which grants the leader the ability "not to be unbalanced by the most powerful emotions" (Clausewitz, trans. 1976). According to Clausewitz, of the variety of men (now women) who could be formed from the development of strength of character, the best was a person who was "imperturbable." (Clausewitz, trans. 1976). The imperturbable leaders were those best able to "summon the titanic strength it takes to clear away the enormous burdens that obstruct activity in war (friction)" (Clausewitz, trans. 1976). Strength of character then does not just allude to a character trait that subordinates desire to see in their leaders, but an existential quality that directly combats the friction of war. If Clausewitz is to be believed, without the strength of character, which develops imperturbable men, commanders would be unable to overcome the burdens, hazards, and difficulties of combat. Though the ideal archetype, these imperturbable men can still be overcome by blind passion if unable to retain their self-control during combat. The hazards of being ruled by emotions are further exacerbated by fog and friction, and for this reason strength of character must be developed in leaders, and future commanders must be taught to rely on their experience and wisdom rather than the passions that inflame the people during war.

Tied to the strength of character aspect of military genius are staunchness and endurance, representing both a physical and mental component, although to Clausewitz the former represented emotional fortitude and the latter intellectual. (Clausewitz, trans. 1976). Staunchness is said to represent the ability to recoil from a single (initial) blow. When

knocked down, can the leader/commander recover? More importantly, how can we know in advance if an individual will have the ability to recover?

Defining Moments - When Character and Leadership are Displayed

If we accept that military genius gives the officer the ability to overcome fog and friction, and that the service academies in general, and the Air Force Academy specifically, have been purposefully designed to teach the Clausewitzian components of military genius, the follow-up question becomes: how does one test military genius? Together, character traits such as courage, intellect, and strength of character should give the officer the ability to act appropriately when confronted with the fog and friction of combat. Rather than hoping such is the case, the Academy graduate would be better served were they able to test for themselves that they had in fact learned and internalized these concepts. Having been taught the traits, how can cadets be placed in situations that allow them to employ these skills before the mission or lives are at stake? Can the Academy create for cadets a defining moment; does the Academy already do so?

One way to help the cadet recognize these defining moments is by understanding the relationship between the individual and the moment, which is often presented by a challenge or decision brought about by circumstances.

According to Joseph Badaracco (1997), defining moments are those that reveal, test, and shape each individual. Often those moments can occur without the individual even recognizing that they took place, and frequently require the strong self-analysis or insight to recognize what was actually learned in that moment. Because a defining moment is as unique as the individual experiencing the moment, purposefully creating individualized moments can be difficult, and the focus therefore should be on helping cadets recognize when these moments occur, or when they will be likely to occur.

One way to help the cadet recognize these defining moments is by understanding the relationship between the individual and the moment, which is often presented by a challenge or decision brought about by circumstances. In his book *Decision Points*, former President George W. Bush (2010) identifies a personal defining moment on the very first page, the moment when he decided that, based on an inability to recall the last day he went without a drink, to give up alcohol altogether. The decision to set an example for his daughters came to define the rest of President Bush's life. For General Chuck Horner, Commander of Central Air Forces during Operation Desert Storm, a defining moment came as a junior officer when his F-100 engine flamed out. In the midst of a near-death experience General Horner had the presence of mind to recollect a table-talk discussion on the ability of the afterburner to reignite engines (Horner, 1999). In that moment, the military genius component of the inward eye saved General Horner and his aircraft, and remained a formative lesson on how close to the edge pilots operate every time they do their mission.

Some defining moments might even force an individual to act against his or her own personal convictions for the greater good. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta gives just such an example when discussing the public release of memos on advanced interrogation (Panetta, 2014). Despite his personal ambivalence towards enhanced interrogations, he nonetheless recommended to President Obama that internal memos discussing the techniques not be released to the public. Though overruled by the President, Secretary Panetta, when confronted with the choice between his personal views and his professional responsibilities,

chose the latter. Similarly, in his own memoir Secretary Robert Gates details the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal from command in Afghanistan, the cautionary tale representing defining moments for both Gates and McChrystal. In Secretary Gates' retelling, he advised McChrystal that the only thing preventing Secretary Gates himself from firing the general was safety of the tens of thousands of men and women he commanded in Afghanistan (Gates, 2014). For McChrystal, the defining moment occurred when tolerating the presence of reporters in an informal capacity, which eventually led to the infamous *Rolling Stone* article and McChrystal's relief of command. These defining moments deserve consideration. It is not as though McChrystal went from a leader of character to one without, but rather that, at a critical point in time, a singular mistake led to a loss of faith in his judgment, with direct ramifications for ongoing combat operations. This lesson is important for any organization developing strength of character. A singular (potentially even a multitude) of mistakes does not mean that one lacks character, any more than a single righteous act demonstrates good character- a pattern of either are necessary to actually determine the quality of someone's character.

This question returns us to the original difficulty presented in the opening paragraph: how to assess traits that are most critical when no one is watching? Leadership under monitoring changes the leadership style.

Executing the Strategy

We have defined the desired end state of our strategic approach to character and leadership education as providing an individual the tools necessary to act as a leader of character. Can we employ military genius to actually reach our desired end state? This question returns us to the original difficulty presented in the opening paragraph: how to assess traits that are most critical when no one is watching? Leadership under monitoring changes the leadership style. Similarly, character assessments made under evaluation do not reflect behavior when no one is observing. Moreover, as Michael Davis (2003) points out, one cannot count that the behavior we teach is the behavior that is learned. Unfortunately, educational methods on both character and leadership can be so contrived as to detract from the purpose. In jurisdictions such as Maryland and Washington, D.C., high school graduation requires students accomplish a certain number of hours of community service, while others permit local school boards to require volunteer time, ostensibly to teach students character. Though people might satisfy such compulsory requirements (in any organization), and do so well, the conduct does not necessarily illustrate internalization of the desired traits. When compulsory (whether through written requirements or though organizational norms / unwritten rules) volunteerism occurs an individual might demonstrate appropriate conduct, but in reality is experiencing a deprivation of liberty, in extremis a lack of character from their own leadership (Davis, 2003). Forced labor masquerading as character training risks teaching cynicism.

What end-state based character or leadership truly desires is the decisive action (or leadership) in a period of conflict, what might be termed a defining moment, and which might not happen until many years later in life. The success of previous education, training, and mentoring is determined by the ability of the student, team member, or employee to function with integrity in crisis, whether actual or manufactured. In the latter case, defining moments can be created and simulated in training environments, but even the former can occur organically through the application of military genius. Many of the experiences that can grow the traits of military genius have the potential to be their own

defining moments. Most notably, with proper mentoring failing at something can increase the inward eye and serve as a catalyst for future growth.

One of the best examples of this purposeful creation of defining moments occurs for students majoring in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership (DFBL). In the DFBL capstone course, cadets engage in field exercises with the Academy Unmanned Aerial Systems Center that place cadets in simulations rife with fog and friction and challenge them to make decisions under duress. With limited understanding of the scenario, DFBL cadets work with other cadets operating a simulated Air Operations Center and with still more cadets flying the RQ-11 Raven unmanned aerial vehicle to make determinations about proportionality, risk management, mission accomplishment, and a host of other ethical dilemmas common to the warfighter, but highly uncommon to the cadet. Given the opportunity to challenge themselves and test their leadership and decision-making capacity, these cadets have responded with vigor, creating increasingly challenging scenarios for each other (Scott and DeAngelis, 2015). By following this example the Academy can aim to create defining moments for all cadets. Writing on wartime leadership Anthony Codevilla noted that "nothing so convinces others that they ought to follow you than your confidence in your own actions" (Codevilla, 2009). Through experiences that create defining moments, cadets become better leaders simply because they learn to trust their own ability.

Cadets become better leaders simply because they learn to trust their own ability.

Allowing subordinates to fail when doing so does not lead to mission or organizational failure can be one of the hardest aspects of leadership. Subordinates will likely need to see this behavior in order to model it. That being said, in too many cases, subordinates in many career fields are not afforded the opportunity to fail, but are coerced into doing the right thing. Especially at institutions such as the service academies, while coercion might lead to solid performance, it can never lead to effectiveness in creating leaders who will be expected to execute missions around the world within months of graduating. Ultimately character and leadership are exceedingly difficult to measure, given the mere observation of a subject alters the behavior of the system. However, by purposefully developing courage, self-reflection, and perseverance in members organizations can be secure in the knowledge that members have at least been given a toolset that can enable sound character and better leadership later in life.

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Three Pillars of Organizational Excellence

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ABSTRACT

There is extensive research linking leadership to organizational effectiveness. In particular transformational leadership has received a great deal of support for it being very effective in producing desirable organizational outcomes across a variety of organizational settings. Recently Hendrix, Born, & Hopkins (2015) found that the character of a leader predicted organizational effectiveness measures above and beyond that of transformational leadership. Job enrichment has also been found to be predictive of organizational effectiveness; however, no research has been found that looks at job enrichment predicting organizational effectiveness in combination with transformational leadership and character. The purpose of this research was to investigate if character and job enrichment add in the prediction of organizational effectiveness above and beyond that of leadership alone. The sample for this research consisted of 279,100 active-duty military and civilian United States Air Force personnel. Data were collected using a survey that included measures of transformational leadership, character, job enrichment, and five organizational outcomes. Results indicated character and job enrichment add to the prediction of desirable organizational outcomes above and beyond that of leadership. Therefore, this research adds support for measuring leaders' character and job enrichment in combination with transformational leadership assessment.

Theoretical models of leadership have evolved greatly in the last century. Previous research has demonstrated that certain leadership behaviors result in successful organizational outcomes (Mann, 1959; Yammarino, Dionne, Schriesheim, & Dansereau, 2008; Horney, Pasmore, & O'Shea, 2010). Current models supplement prior research by examining the predictive nature of innate characteristics of effective leaders and existing job enrichment elements on the overall success of an organization (Kenny & Zaccaro, 1983; Smith, 2013). Mann (1959) originally argued that a person's leadership status evolves across various situations, thereby establishing leadership as a fluid trait that responds to the demands of a situation. However, in 1983 Kenny and Zaccaro published results reporting that 49 to 82% of the variance in leadership resulted from trait distinctions, leading them to surmise that leadership is more constant across situations than previously indicated. In a Harvard Business Review article, Rooke and Torbert outline seven types of leadership identities and their levels of effectiveness. Despite obvious distinctions, it was possible to grow as a more successful leader (according to their criteria) through visualization, planning, and practice (Rooke & Torbert, 2015). While it is important to choose an effective method of leadership, recent studies have sustained the predictive nature of leaders' character traits with respect to organizational success (Hendrix, Born, & Hopkins, 2015; Barlow, Jordan, & Hendrix, 2003; Brown, Trevino, & Harrison, 2005). Walker and Pitts (1998) noted that contemporary moral psychology models have focused more on moral reasoning and have paid little attention to the construct of moral excellence. Moral excellence or moral character is broader conceptually than the construct of moral reasoning and deals with moral values individuals hold (e.g., honesty, integrity, selflessness) and is the focus of this study.

Organizations have benefited from enhanced individual productivity resulting from recent trends to seek out "meaningful" or "fulfilling" work (Smith, 2013). An organization's ability to create an enriching environment stems to the leader's motivational ability (Feintzeig, 2015).

Certain job enrichment characteristics (e.g., skill variety, task identity) produce psychological states that prompt motivation (Salau, Adeniji, & Oyewunmi, 2014). Across multiple industries, organizations become more effective when the overall employee population feels more enriched. Furthermore, job enrichment changes should be tailored to the industry itself which harkens back to the role of a leader (Paul, Robertson & Herzberg, 1969). The leader's job is to establish meaning for employees through a "point of reference" as well as to create an environment that stimulates motivation (Walumbwa et al., 2013). Shiva and Suar (2012) demonstrated that the existence of a transformational leader was not enough to drive successful outcomes, but by enhancing the culture for his employees, a transformational leader indirectly influences organizational effectiveness. By promoting productivity through purpose and culture, job enrichment adds to an organization's effectiveness more than good management skills alone.

Promoting productivity through purpose and culture, job enrichment adds to an organization's effectiveness more than good management skills alone.

While excellent leadership behaviors and tactics certainly lead to impactful results, it depends on the character of the leader to ensure that these actions reflect the motivations of subordinates. The influx of media attention aimed at business scandals makes it clear that executives can excel at furthering personal agendas while failing to create an effective organization overall (Zimmerman, 2015). Cho and Ringquist (2010) found that levels of trustworthiness and managerial leadership strongly and positively correlated with perceived organizational outcomes. Furthermore, job enrichment behaviors (creating a shared organizational vision, identifying clear performance expectations) only enhanced employee culture when those employees trusted their superiors suggesting that character might add to outcomes above leadership alone (Cho & Ringquist, 2010). Additionally, Colbert, Barrick, and Bradley (2014) found that top management teams and CEOs with task-oriented traits (conscientiousness, emotional stability, openness to experience) were more likely to accomplish goals and solve organizational issues. In a 2010 study, Hoffman et al. drew a distinction between the effectiveness of character and leadership skills in a meta-analysis of the qualities and skills relating to leader effectiveness. While not a substantial distinction, they did find that trait-like characteristics (motivation, energy, dominance, integrity, self-confidence, creativity, and charisma) were slightly more related to leader effectiveness than were state-like qualities (interpersonal skills, oral/written communication, administrative skills, problem-solving skills, decision making).

Past literature has shown that leadership, character, and job enrichment all predict organizational effectiveness independently. This study examines whether it is merely a leader's actions that drive results or if character and job enrichment play a role in predicting the success or failure of an organization above and beyond that of leadership alone. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were tested earlier in Hendrix, Born, & Hopkins (2015) and have been replicated in this study.

Research on transformational leadership, character, and job enrichment in predicting organizational effectiveness outcomes leads to the following hypotheses:

- Hypothesis 1: Transformational leadership will be positively related to organizational commitment, job satisfaction, work group performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and negatively related to intent to leave.
- Hypothesis 2: Character will be positively related to organizational commitment, job satisfaction, work group performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and negatively related to intent to leave.

- Hypothesis 3: Job enrichment will be positively related to organizational commitment, job satisfaction, work group performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and negatively related to intent to leave.
- Hypothesis 4: Character and Job enrichment add to the prediction of desirable organizational outcomes above and beyond that of leadership.

Method

Participants

The participants of this research consisted of 279,100 active-duty military and civilian United States Air Force personnel. The personnel composition was approximately: 62% enlisted, 16% officer, and 23% civilian, of these 76% were males and 24% females. Their highest educational level obtained was: (a) 0.2% some high school, (b) 13.7% high school, (c) 30.0% less than two years of college, (d) 4.1% associate's degree, (e) 13.6% less than four years of college, (f) 11.9% bachelor's degree, (g) 3.8% some graduate education but no graduate degree, (h) 11.1% master's degree, (i) 1.1% doctorate degree, (k) 10.5% listed their educational level as other or did not provide their educational level. The sample demographics approximate the Air Force population.

Procedure

Annually the United States Air Force conducts an online organizational climate survey, the Chief of Staff Air Force (CSAF) Climate Survey. This survey was designed to identify strengths and opportunities for improving the organizational climate and organizational effectiveness of Air Force units. The survey included measures of transformational leadership, character, job enrichment, and five organization effectiveness measures. Individuals completed the survey by rating their supervisors on these measures.

Measures

Transformational Leadership. This scale was based on the transformational components of the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ), and included 14 items on a six-point Likert agree-disagree scale with an option for *don't know or not applicable*. Items were designed to measure intellectual stimulation (e.g., communicating high expectations), inspiration (e.g., promotes problem solving), and individualized consideration (e.g., personal attention). Scale items are provided in the Appendix.

Character. The Character Assessment Rating Scale (Hendrix, Barlow, & Luedtke, 2004) was adapted for measuring individuals' character that can also be called moral excellence. Supervisors were rated on 11 dimensions of character using a five-point frequency scale (e.g., 1 = *Never*, 5 = *Always*). Scale items are provided in the Appendix.

Job Enrichment. Hackman, Oldham, Janson, and Purdy (1975) proposed that job enrichment could be better demonstrated using their Job Characteristics Model (JCM). The JCM was based on the concepts of three states: core job dimensions (CJDs), critical psychological states (CPSs), and affective outcomes (AOs). These states were measured using an instrument they called the Job Diagnostic Survey (JDS) that consists of five items: Skill variety (the degree to which a job requires a variety of different skills), Task identity (the degree to which a job requires completion of a whole and identifiable piece of work), Task significance (the degree to which a job has a significant impact on other work or lives), Autonomy (the degree to which a job provides freedom, independence, and discretion in scheduling their work and procedures), Feedback (the degree when carrying out work tasks provides the individual with clear and direct information on their performance effectiveness). These five components were combined in a formula they called the Motivation Potential Score (MPS). The MPS was computed as follows: MPS = ((Skill Variety + Task Identity + Task Significance)/3 X (Autonomy) X (Feedback). The job enrichment scale used in this research was based on the

MPS and included the five items on a six-point Likert agree-disagree scale with an option for *don't know or not applicable*. This measure of job enrichment had a mean of 128.76 with a range of 1 to 216. Scale items are provided in the Appendix.

Outcome Variables. The five outcome variables used to measure the effects of transformational leadership, character, and job enrichment were organizational commitment, job satisfaction, work group performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and intent to leave the organization. Organizational commitment, job satisfaction, work group performance, and organizational citizenship behavior, were assessed using a six-point Likert scale. Intent to leave the organization, utilized a six-point likelihood scale (e.g., 1 = *Highly Unlikely*, 6 = *Highly Likely*). Scale items are provided in the Appendix.

Results

The means, standard deviations, correlations, and coefficient alpha scale reliability indices for transformational leadership, character, job enrichment and each organizational outcome are provided in Table 1. Hypotheses one, two, and three, *transformational leadership (H1), character (H2), and job enrichment (H3) will be positively related to organizational commitment, job satisfaction, work group performance, and organizational citizenship behavior and negatively related to intent to leave,* were tested using correlational analysis. Transformational leadership, character, and job enrichment were found to be significant ($p < .001$) in predicting each of the five outcome variables as hypothesized. Table 1 also shows that while transformational leadership and character were highly correlated (r=.83), job enrichment was not nearly as highly correlated with transformational leadership (.38) or with character (.32).

Transformational leadership, character, and job enrichment were found to be significant ($p < .001$) in predicting each of the five outcome variables as hypothesized.

The fourth hypothesis (H4), *character and job enrichment add to the prediction of desirable organizational outcomes above and beyond that of leadership*, was tested using multiple regression analyses. Table 2 contains raw score and standardized regression coefficients, raw score standard error, and each equation's R^2. The hypothesis was supported with both character and job enrichment adding significantly ($p < .001$) to the variance accounted for by transformational leadership in predicting each outcome variable. However, with the exception of organizational commitment and intent to leave, character added little in predicting the five organizational outcomes above that of leadership and job enrichment.

Discussion

There is always concern of common method variance (CMV) when measures come from a single source. Lindell and Whitney (2001) proposed the extent of common method variance could be estimated by including as a covariate a marker variable that is theoretically unrelated with the variables under investigation. Should there be an observed relationship between the marker variable and those under investigation it could be assumed that it was due to CMV. Hendrix, Born, & Hopkins (2015) investigated the extent CMV influenced the responses in the database used in this research by performing Lindell and Whitney's CMV detection approach. The results indicated little presence of common method variance. The R^2 values of the regression analyses with the covariate included were the same as the regression analyses without the covariate. In addition, the beta weights for transformational leadership and character for the five outcomes were also the same. The beta weights for the covariate showed little CMV effect (commitment .075, satisfaction .066, performance .013, OCB .035, intent to leave -.020).

With the large sample size in this study one would expect low p-values. The importance is not so much on relationships being statistically significant as is the practical implications of these relationships. The results of this research support the hypotheses of leadership, character, and job enrichment directly relating to the five outcome variables. It also supported the hypothesis that *character and job enrichment add to the prediction of desirable organizational outcomes above and beyond that of leadership.* Still, with the exception of organizational commitment and intent to leave, character added little in predicting the five organizational outcomes above that of leadership with job enrichment included in the regression analyses. This shouldn't be unexpected since leadership and character were highly correlated (.83) while job enrichment and leadership (.32) wasn't.

This research does not attempt to establish causation. It only investigates the extent that measures of leadership, character, and job enrichment are predictive of the five desirable outcomes of this study. Future research investigating causal relationships between the leader, organizational outcomes, and the organizational environment would add to our understanding of the interrelationships among these.

There are a number of opportunities for future research. This research was limited to analysis within organizational units. The data for job enrichment showed a wide range of scores (mean = 128.76, SD = 61.09) between these units. The objectives and design of some jobs result in less job enrichment compared to most other job types. Nevertheless, this is an opportunity for future research to identify these jobs and see what aspects might be modified to improve their enrichment. Testing the effects of these modifications on organizational effectiveness measures could be determined using a pretest-posttest design.

Since this research was limited to units there was no investigation of unit interaction with other units, laterally or vertically. Future research might investigate the processes of these interactions and the impact on unit and system performance. For example, it might be required for an analysis report to go from a research unit through another review unit before being presented to the requesting office. It would be a constraint on the system resulting in a less efficient and timely process if the reviewing office slows down the process significantly due to repeated requests of the originating office to modify the results or the way it is presented. Therefore, the requesting office would be a constraint or bottleneck on an overall system process making it less efficient and decreasing the job enrichment (i.e., autonomy component) of the research unit.

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Appendix

Transformational Leadership, Character, Job Enrichment & Organizational Outcome measures

Transformational Leadership

1. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *sets challenging unit goals*.
2. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *provides a clear unit vision*.
3. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *makes us proud to be associated with him/her*.
4. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *is consistent in his/her words and actions*.
5. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *is inspirational (promotes esprit de corps)*.
6. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *motivates us to achieve our goals*.
7. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *is passionate about our mission*.
8. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *challenges us to solve problems on our own*.
9. My unit commander (or commander equivalent*) encourages us to find new ways of doing business.*
10. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *asks us to think through problems before we act*.
11. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *encourages us to find innovative approaches to problems*.
12. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *listens to our ideas*.
13. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *treats us with respect*.
14. My unit commander (or commander equivalent) *is concerned about our personal welfare*.

Character

1. Integrity. Consistently adhering to a moral or ethical code or standard. A person who considers the "right thing" when faced with alternate choices.
2. Organizational Loyalty. Being devoted and committed to one's organization.
3. Employee Loyalty. Being devoted and committed to one's coworkers and subordinates.
4. Selflessness. Genuinely concerned about the welfare of others and willing to sacrifice one's personal interest for others and their organization.
5. Compassion. Concern for the suffering or welfare of others and provides aid or shows mercy for others.
6. Competency. Capable of executing responsibilities assigned in a superior fashion and excels in all task assignments. Is effective and efficient.
7. Respectfulness. Shows esteem for, and consideration and appreciation of other people.
8. Fairness. Treats people in an equitable, impartial, and just manner.
9. Self-Discipline. Can be depended upon to make rational and logical decisions (in the interest of the unit).
10. Spiritual Diversity Appreciation. Values the spiritual diversity among individuals with different backgrounds and cultures and respects all individuals' rights to differ from others in their beliefs.
11. Cooperativeness. Willingness to work or act together with others in accomplishing a task or some common end or purpose.

Job Enrichment

1. My job requires me to use a variety of skills.
2. My job allows me to see the finished products of my work.
3. Doing my job well affects others in some important way.
4. My job is designed so that I know when I have performed well.
5. My job allows me freedom to work with minimum supervision.

Organizational Commitment

1. I am really willing to exert considerable effort on the job for my organization.88
2. The goals and values of my organization are very compatible with my goals and values.

Job Satisfaction

1. In general, I am satisfied with my job.
2. I have a sense of fulfillment at the end of the day.
3. The tasks I perform provide me with a sense of accomplishment.
4. I am a valued member of my unit.
5. I would recommend an assignment in my unit to a friend.
6. Morale is high in my unit.

Work Group Performance

1. The quality of work in my unit is high.
2. The quantity of work in my unit is high.
3. My unit is known as one that gets the job done well.
4. My unit is successfully accomplishing its mission.

Organizational Citizenship Behavior

1. In my unit, people help each other out when they have heavy workloads.
2. In my unit, people make innovative suggestions for improvement.
3. In my unit, people willingly give of their time to help members who have work-related problems.
4. In my unit, people willingly share their expertise with each other.

Intent to Leave

1. If you were released from all of your service obligations and you could separate from the Air Force within the year, what is the likelihood that you would leave the Air Force?

Table 1

Variable Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, & Scale Reliabilities

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Leadership[a]	4.75	1.06	(.98)							
2. Character[b]	4.33	.81	.83	(.97)						
3. Job Enrichment[c]	128.76	61.09	.38	.32	-					
4. Commitment[d]	5.05	.93	.47	.44	.45	(.69)				
5. Satisfaction[e]	4.27	1.23	.53	.46	.60	.62	(.92)			
6. Performance[f]	4.97	.88	.48	.42	.46	.48	.57	(.89)		
7. OCB[g]	4.54	1.03	.46	.41	.46	.48	.61	.58	(.89)	
8. Intent to Leave[h]	3.32	2.04	-.25	-.24	-.27	-.34	-.40	-.23	-.25	-

Note: Coefficient Alpha Reliabilities in Parenthesis

[a]N = 244,544, [b]N= 245,937, [c]N = 206,981 (formula), [d]N = 251,434, [e]N = 261,943, [f]N = 265,062, [g]N = 365,545, 252,653 (single item).

Table 2

Organizational Outcomes, Leadership, Character, and Job Enrichment

	B	SE B	β	R^2
Commitment[a]				.31**
Transformational Leadership	.20	.003	.22	
Character	.18	.003	.15	
Job Enrichment	.01	.001	.32	
Satisfaction[b]				.47**
Transformational Leadership	.34	.003	.29	
Character	.10	.004	.07	
Job Enrichment	.01	.001	.47	
Performance[c]				.31**
Transformational Leadership	.26	.003	.32	
Character	.07	.003	.06	
Job Enrichment	.01	.001	.29	
OCB[d]				.30**
Transformational Leadership	.27	.003	.28	
Character	.11	.004	.08	
Job Enrichment	.01	.001	.30	
Intent to Leave[e]				.09**
Transformational Leadership	-.19	.007	-.10	
Character	-.25	.009	-.10	
Job Enrichment	-.01	.001	-.18	

[a]N = 239,828. [b]N = 245,231. [c]N – 244,544. [d]N = 244,682. [e]N = 240,530.
**p < .001

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Power and Status: The Building Blocks of Effective Leadership

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ABSTRACT

Experimental social science research tests theories about basic elements of social processes. This research offers valuable insights for leader development and indicates that structural power and status are the building blocks of effective leadership. Power, defined as the ability to get what one wants despite resistance, and status, defined as a position in a group based on respect or esteem, both lead to influence. Status overcomes the resentment that is typically produced by the use of power. We identify approaches to gaining status and power and discuss their use by leaders. Sixty years of cumulative research on power and status in groups indicates that developing effective leadership requires the sparing use of power. To be most effective, leaders should rely on status.

Bridging the Gap: Leadership Research and its Application

Several recent statements note the divide between academic research on leadership and leadership practices (Latham, 2007). Human resource managers report being unaware or skeptical of findings from academic research on job performance (Rynes, Colbert, & Brown, 2002). Latham (2007) points out the problematic divide of differing goals and language separating social sciences researchers and consumers of research. Nowhere is the research-practice gap wider than in the dissemination of experimental research on fundamental social processes. In this article we summarize the body of research on the elements of status and structural power, the two most widely studied concepts in group processes, and draw links between those literatures and the practice of leadership. This research provides insights for leader development in work organizations.

At its most basic level, leadership—in the military or anywhere else—is about getting people to do things. If people are doing things they would otherwise do, there is no need for a leader. We thus define *leadership* as changing what people do in order to achieve an objective.

There are many ways to change people's behavior. All of these can be classified as either coercive means, or non-coercive influence. Influence is a willing change of attitudes or behavior to meet those of another. In order to test the social processes in groups we begin by narrowly defining fundamental concepts. This facilitates research efforts to understand the nature of those concepts irrespective of any particular context. Group processes research provides theories and standardized methods to study processes affecting influence. It does this by testing the relationships between these narrowly defining concepts in carful designed studies and experiments. These findings build cumulative knowledge. When studying power, researchers make a distinction between structural power governed by network relations, and the use of power. In a classical research on power French and Raven (1959) develop typologies of "power" based on the experiences of those against who power is used. Many of their bases of power (i.e. expert power or legitimate power) would be classified by group processes researchers as status processes rather than power. This is an important distinction because status processes involve un-coerced changes in attitudes and behaviors and so produce much different reactions than coercive power processes. Status is the honor and prestige individuals hold relative to others in their groups. Status is based on esteem or respect. Status and power both command respect however, status and power used to change others behavior produces markedly different effects on follower's perceptions. It is useful to distinguish the two when examining processes leading to influence. Group processes researchers ask how

these processes operate at their basic level across settings, as well as in conjunction with each other.

This approach to status and power differs from that of researchers attempting to capture the full complexities of concepts in all instantiations (Kelley, 1994). Power is a concept that spans multiple disciplines and countless treatments. Philosopher Bertrand Russell called power the fundamental concept of all social sciences (Russell, 1938). Group processes researchers choose narrow definitions to study concepts in settings removed from complexities that accompany concepts in natural environments. The result of this research then informs further investigation in more complex settings.

We do not suggest that other definitions of power and status are wrong. Rather, by defining them narrowly and precisely, we may carry out research on their basic natures.

In the case of changing what people do, group processes research leads to the conclusion that power and status are basic building blocks of leadership (Lovaglia & Lucas, 2005). There are many ways to get people to do things, but power and status are two major sources behavior change. Both generate influence. We define *power* as the ability to get what one wants even when others resist. *Status* is defined as a position in a group based on esteem or respect. The primary outcome of status is *influence*, a change in the attitudes or behaviors of others without threat of punishment or promise of reward. A politician leads with influence if volunteers hold her in high regard and campaign for her without clear expectations of personal reward. Some of the ways that power translates into influence are through perceptions of increased competence associated with favorable outcomes in resource accumulation (Williams, Troyer, & Lovaglia, 2005), or the ability to reward or punish individuals. According to Ridgeway (1982) status leads to influence through the perception by group members that high status people have the group's interests at heart (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977). Recent group processes research on power and status in networks has also shown that status can alter the power of positions in groups (Thye, 2000).

We do not suggest that other definitions of power and status are wrong. Rather, by defining them narrowly and precisely, we may carry out research on their basic natures. This strategy has produced knowledge growth and insight into how people gain power and status as well as outcomes of their use. Power and status are fundamental ways to change behavior; understanding how to get and how to use them is essential for developing effective leadership.

How to Gain Power

For sociologists, power results from a position in social structure. Although skill, talent, and charisma usually play a role in attaining power, the power itself rests in a structural position. After decades of research on power in networks, social psychologists now identify that power primarily stems from the ability to control resources and exclude others from resources they desire (Lovaglia, 1999). Teachers control grades that matter to students, judges control outcomes for parties in legal cases, and in the military, commanders have tremendous authority over their subordinates. Power in this sense is relational, based on connections between people. People may deny others their expertise or knowledge. However, these individuals risk losing out on future interactions, especially if the actor they deny resources has alternatives. When we think of expertise and knowledge as aspects of status, we can predict that acting in this manner will decrease influence by building resentment.

In each of the examples above power rests in the position, not the person. If a supervisor leaves his job and is replaced by someone new, the replacement has the same positional power. Power stays with the position rather than being attached to the person. It is only an aspect of a position an organization or networks. This is what we mean when we say that power results from a position in a social structure.

People comply with powerful people because they fear the consequences of non compliance or value the rewards available from the power holder. How does one get power? Research on power in networks shows how it can be done. The key is to control resources that others value. Thus, a first step in attaining power is to identify important resources. The next step is to control their distribution. If you can exclude others from desired resources, you will have power. The power of controlling valued resources can be seen in human resources departments that exert control beyond what their positions in corporate hierarchies would indicate. They control resources that are important to people.

Power comes with many advantages, so competition for power within the branches of service is typically intense. Identifying resources and seeking their control is easier said than done. There are, however, effective approaches to gaining power beyond directly going after positions in the military hierarchy that control resources.

One way to sidestep the intense competition for power is to create a new resource that people don't yet know they want (Pfeffer, 1992). Engineers, for example, can design improvements in processes, the nuanced workings of which only they understand. The engineers' knowledge of the improved process represents control of a valuable resource that they can use to gain power. This power gain results from a change in the preferences of actors within the social structure, much as French and Raven might have predicted. However, even given more highly valued resources, the power of a network position is still influenced by social structure. The explanatory power of group processes research has allowed sociologists to untangle power and status in order to understand how they work conjointly, and how status may lead to structural power.

We define power as the ability to get what one wants even when others resist. Status is defined as a position in a group based on esteem or respect.

How to Gain Status

Status is a position in a group based on respect. Research on groups shows that people quickly rank themselves and each other into status hierarchies (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980). Early small groups research found that some people talk more in groups, are evaluated more highly, and have more influence over decisions. Further research found that distinguishing characteristics between actors predicted who would behave in these ways. Being a member of high status group in society results in greater influence within other groups. Research on status in groups demonstrates that status hierarchies emerge from often unconscious expectations people develop for the performances of themselves and others in groups or organizations (Berger & Webster, 2006). Those expected to perform at higher levels have higher status in groups. Note that *expectations* of superior performance, not performance itself, produce higher initial status.

Some characteristics act as status markers in society. Gender is one example. People in many societies tend to expect higher performances from men than from women, even on seemingly gender neutral tasks like leadership (Lucas, 2003). Other status characteristics include education, attractiveness, and race. Where people stand on these characteristics activates expectations producing status hierarchies in groups. Those expected to perform at a higher level are accorded higher positions in the group's status order.

Status hierarchies in groups will sometimes defy expectations based on the status characteristics of group members. If a white male consistently performs at a level lower than other members of the group, his status suffers. However, status hierarchies tend to be resistant to change for two reasons. First, the processes that produce status hierarchies are primarily non-conscious (Webster & Driskell, (1978). Second, status hierarchies once established tend to be self-reinforcing. As a result high-status group members are consistently afforded more positive performance evaluations. Low-status group members receive lower evaluations because expectations for their likely contributions are lower (Lucas, 2003). These forces make status hierarchies stable.

Status hierarchies in groups will sometimes defy expectations based on the status characteristics of group members.

Some status characteristics (such as gender and race) are out of our control; others can be changed. One way to gain status is to change your standing on status characteristics within your control. Education brings status; increasing your education credentials leads to influence beyond job-related benefits of the acquired knowledge (Bunderson, 2003). For example, the career value of an MBA degree over that of a bachelor's degree is enormous relative to the two-year investment required to complete it (Davies & Cline, 2005). Appearance is another important status characteristic. More attractive people are expected to be more competent than less attractive people (Umberson & Hughes, 1987). The burgeoning cosmetic surgery industry likely owes much of its success to the status implications of appearances. Similarly, the military uniform is a form of clothing with a particular symbolism and a long history and tradition that connotes a formal status rather than individuality. The uniform reflects order and discipline, and calls for subordination by displaying a variety of insignia, including badges that indicate rank and emphasize the hierarchical structure of the armed forces. It also calls for respect and symbolizes status in the eyes of comrades, civilians, and the enemy. The more rank a member of the armed forces has alters expectations for his or her performance in groups, ultimately affecting how much influence the wearer can wield (Fisek, Berger, & Norman, (1987).

One method toward gaining status, then, is to move to more valued categories of status characteristics. Other routes lay in self-presentation. Although status hierarchies tend to be stable, they do change. One way to gain status in groups is to perform competently. In the military many groups do not interact for long periods of time for group members to get a good sense of the relative competence levels of its members due to high personnel turnover. Moreover, even in organizational groups that meet over long periods of time, status hierarchies tend to reflect the status characteristics of group members (Cohen & Zhou, 1991). This is because of the self-fulfilling nature of status orders described above. Nevertheless, competence does matter, and performing more competently in groups will enhance your status.

Research has identified another effective strategy for increasing influence in groups (Ridgeway, 1982). People in groups typically assume that high-status group members are more oriented toward group interests than low-status group members. This is one reason why high-status persons tend to be leaders in groups—we assume that leaders have the interests of the group in mind. Research shows that a group-motivation self-presentation strategy increases status (Shackelford, Wood, & Worchel, 1996). You can increase your status in a group by making clear that your actions are carried out with the interests of the group in mind, focused on the group's objectives, and in the interest of group members. These behaviors will increase your influence in the group.

Using Power or Status to Gain the Other

Power and status usually vary together. Many jobs, such as senior military commanders, are high in power and status. Other jobs are high in one but not the other. Police officers have more power than status. High school teachers have more status than power (Rogalin, Soboroff, & Lovaglia, 2007). The strategic use of both power and status can be used to gain the other.

For sociologists, the use of power has two primary outcomes: (1) those with power tend to accumulate valued resources, and (2) those without power resent those who use power (Willer, Lovaglia, & Markovsky, 1997). Because power use creates resentment, and because status is a position based on esteem or respect, it is difficult to use power to gain status. But it can be done. There are at least three ways that power can translate to status, and they result from the fact that those with power accumulate resources.

1. The foundation of status differences are the expectations that people have for the competence of each group member. The resources that come with power result from a position in a structure rather than personal ability. Nevertheless, if we see one person accumulating more resources than others, we tend to assume that that person is more competent than those who don't accumulate as many resources. Thus, one way power translates to status is that people assume those using power are competent because they see the powerful person accumulating valued resources.

2. Another way that power can be used to gain status is to use the resources that come with power to essentially purchase status. Al Capone became the most powerful person in Chicago largely through ruthlessness. Once powerful, however, Capone was generous with the proceeds of his criminal activities, giving to schools and organizing one of Chicago's first soup kitchens. These activities led to Capone not only being the most feared person in Chicago, but also beloved in many Chicago neighborhoods. In the same way, Pablo Escobar, the notorious Columbian drug lord, gained status in his community despite being responsible for the deaths of scores of Columbian citizens. He purchased his status by using proceeds from his drug operation to do things such as build community soccer stadiums. Members of his community rewarded these actions with respect.

You can increase your status in a group by making clear that your actions are carried out with the interests of the group in mind, focused on the group's objectives, and in the interest of group members.

3. A third way that power can translate to status is through strategic image control. Research shows that powerful people are presumed by others to be self-interested and greedy (Lovaglia, Willer, & Troyer, 2003). When powerful people practice strategic humility and philanthropy, they counter negative expectations and enhance their status with others who admire their perceived restraint and compassion Powerful people who exercise restraint are lauded as "having their feet on the ground." Bill Gates, for example, enhances his status by conspicuously applying resources to philanthropic causes. It may not be coincidence, however, that Gates's philanthropic activities increased dramatically at the same time as European anti-trust legislation against Microsoft.

Although power can be used to gain status, it is easier to accumulate power after you have status. Power is a natural outgrowth of status. The principle antecedent of status is expectations for competence. Status leads to power in part because selections to powerful positions are typically made based on perceptions of competence. Powerful leadership positions in organizations are filled with people who were

perceived as most competent by making those hiring decisions. In other words, those who are highest in status (who may or may not truly be most competent) are typically rewarded with powerful positions.

Although power can be used to gain status, it is easier to accumulate power after you have status. Power is a natural outgrowth of status. The principle antecedent of status is expectations for competence.

Status may lead to power because we value resources held by high-status others (Thye, 2000). Those higher in status are held in higher esteem, and people will trade relatively more of their own resources for fewer of a high-status person's resources. Time is a resource we all value, and lower-status people will wait longer (i.e., trade more of their time) for high-status others. In the same way, people will trade money for the autograph of high-status celebrities; giving a resource they likely value a great deal for a resource relatively insignificant to the celebrity. Higher status people can trade on status to accumulate more resources with less effort. Power, then, naturally grows out of status.

Leading with Power and Status

Power use creates resentment. This is true whether people are threatened with punishment for undesirable behavior or promised rewards for desirable behavior. Using both rewards and punishments compel people to do things they wouldn't do if the rewards or punishments weren't in place. Using power to lead is also inefficient. It requires a great deal of energy on the part of the leader to always use rewards and punishments to compel behavior. If leaders only initiate action through the use of power, then followers will stop carrying out leader's desires when incentives are removed.

Leading with status has significant benefits. People do what a high-status leader wants because they hold her in respect. The influence of high-status leaders make people *want* to perform actions they would not otherwise perform. Moreover, influence (the principle outcome of status) can lead followers to carry out positive actions that the leader herself may not have imagined. This is because while power works at changing behavior, status changes behavior through attitudes. High-status leaders change the attitudes of followers who then carry out behaviors that the leader desires or that followers perceive will benefit the leader.

An appealing conclusion that one might draw from this discussion is that effective leaders don't use power. Or as Admiral William Crowe put it when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "You cannot run a unit just by giving orders and having a Uniform Code of Military Justice behind you" (Tsouras, 1992). However, leadership positions usually require leaders to use power—teachers grade students and judges decide legal matters. That leaders sometimes use their power is especially true for military leaders. A military commander may require a subordinate to conduct physical exercises as corrective training to the point of utter exhaustion. In combat, a commander may order a subordinate officer to assault a fortified enemy position in the face of heavy resistance. In either situation, the subordinate often has little choice but to accept his orders as a matter of position.

Research has found that the most effective leaders use power least (Rodriquez-Bailon, Moya, & Yzerbyt, 2000). Effective leaders use their power only when necessary, and actively manage the resentment produced by the use of power. Although leading with power can be easier in the short term, the benefits of leading with status multiply over time. This is because leading with status does not bring with it the resentment produced by the use of power (Willer, Lovaglia, & Markovsky, 1997). While those who use power risk losing it, those who lead with status usually gain more.

An effective approach to leadership is to avoid the use of power when possible and instead lead with status. The result is that status, and in turn power, grows. After George Washington became the commander of the Continental Army, his troops won an important battle in Boston against the British. Washington might have led the troops into Boston as a signal of his newfound power. Instead, Washington had the generals in charge during the battle lead the troops into the city (McCullough, 2005). He quietly arrived in the city the following day. Such an approach required Washington to be confident he would get credit for the accomplishments of the army even if he didn't claim them. This confidence certainly grew out of his status. The strategy also required long-range thinking about his status among the troops. The result of his actions in Boston increased his status among the troops and ultimately his power.

Effective leaders use their power only when necessary, and actively manage the resentment produced by the use of power.

Practical Implications

Effective leadership requires having power and status. It then requires their effective use. Good leaders use power sparingly, and only when necessary. They rely on the benefits of the high status that both accompanies and produces influence.

Research on small groups outlined above indicates a number of ways to gain power and status. Power rests in being able to exclude others from resources they desire, and acquiring power begins with the control of resources that others value. One way to circumvent the intense competition for powerful positions is to create a new resource that people will value. Status can be increased by moving to more valued categories of status characteristics such as education or by performing competently. A particularly effective way to gain status, and in turn to lead, is to present your behaviors as being carried out with the interests of the group in mind. Give credit to others and focus on the benefits to the group.

Thinking in terms of status requires leaders to think beyond power, but status together with power produces effective leadership, increasing the likelihood of access to future leadership positions. Conspicuously taking action for the benefit of the group, exercising power with discretion and restraint, and giving credit to others can be difficult. Such actions may present immediate threats to one's power. As in the case of President Washington, however, being willing to trade power for status enhances both power and status, the foundational building blocks of effective leadership.

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ESSAY

The Code of the Warrior: Ideals of Warrior Cultures Throughout History

Shannon E. French, Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence

ABSTRACT

This issue of JCLI goes to press simultaneously with the U.S. Air Force Academy's 24th annual National Character and Leadership Symposium, focused this year on "Warrior Ethos." The essay which follows was originally delivered in 2004 at the Academy, as the 47th Harmon Memorial Lecture in Military History. The insights Dr. Shannon French shared at that time, illuminating "the values and ideals of warrior cultures throughout history," are still relevant today and appropriate to highlight for JCLI's readers, because the character of warriors is of exquisite importance to the society they serve. Continuing human conflicts inextricably draw civilian and military leaders together into difficult decisions at all levels of warfare and policy-making, and the pressures of advancing technology and changing social mores arguably add to the complexity of the restraints, moral codes and cultures that define warriors and guide their conduct. Dr. French opens with reference to a November 2004 incident in Fallujah, Iraq that was investigated as a war crime, making clear the gravity and complexity of combatant decisions involving the taking of life as a springboard for this brief but powerful synopsis of warrior codes and cultures.

Shannon E. French is the Inamori Professor in Ethics, Director of the Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence, and a tenured Professor of Philosophy with a secondary appointment in the law school at Case Western Reserve University. She is also the General Shelton Distinguished Visiting Chair in Ethics for the U.S. Army CSCF and has been a Senior Associate at CSIS. She received her Ph.D. in philosophy from Brown University. Prior to starting at CWRU in 2008, she taught for eleven years as an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the United States Naval Academy and served as Associate Chair of the Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law. She is the author of many scholarly publications, including *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values, Past and Present,* editor-in-chief for the *International Journal of Ethical Leadership*, and an associate editor for the *Journal of Military Ethics*.

You have all heard the recent news story about a Marine who may have shot an unarmed, wounded Iraqi insurgent. The question being asked is: was this war or murder? The distinction between a warrior and a murderer is not trivial one. For those whose calling is the profession of arms – for you – understanding this distinction is essential.

Murder is an act that is cross-culturally condemned. Whatever their other points of discord, the major religions of the world agree in the determination that murder (variously defined) is wrong. Unfortunately, the fact that we abhor murder produces a disturbing tension for those who are asked to fight wars. When you are trained for war, you are given a mandate by your society to take lives. But you must learn to take only certain lives in certain ways, at certain times, and for certain reasons. Otherwise, you may become indistinguishable from a murderer and suddenly find yourself condemned by the very society you have sacrificed so much to serve.

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Warrior cultures throughout history and from diverse regions around the globe have constructed codes of behavior, based on that culture's image of the ideal warrior. These codes have not always been written down or literally codified into a set of explicit rules. A code can be hidden in the lines of epic poems or implied by the descriptions of mythic heroes. One way or another, it is carefully conveyed to each succeeding generation of warriors. These codes tend to be quite demanding. They are often closely linked to a culture's religious beliefs and can be connected to elaborate (and frequently death defying or excruciatingly painful) rituals and rites of passage, such as the Sun Dance ritual performed by Native Americans of the Plains Tribes or the Corridor of Death that separated disciples from masters among the Chinese warrior monks of Shaolin.

In many cases this code of honor seems to hold the warrior to a higher ethical standard than that required for an ordinary citizen within the general population of the society the warrior serves. But the code is not imposed from the outside. The warriors themselves police strict adherence to these standards, with violators being shamed, ostracized, or even killed by their peers. In the Roman legions, a man who fell asleep while he was supposed to be on watch, allowing an enemy to penetrate the camp, could expect to be stoned to death by the members of his own cohort.

The code of the warrior not only defines how warriors should interact with their own warrior comrades, but also how they should treat other members of their society, their enemies, and the people they conquer. The code restrains the warrior. It sets boundaries on acceptable behavior. It distinguishes honorable acts from shameful acts. Achilles must seek vengeance for the death of his friend Patroclus, yet when his rage drives him to mistreat the corpse of his arch nemesis, he angers the gods. Under the codes of chivalry, a medieval knight has to offer mercy to any knight who yields to him in battle. In feudal Japan, samurai are not permitted to approach their opponents using stealth, but rather are required to declare themselves openly before engaging in combat. Muslim warriors prosecuting an offensive *jihad* cannot employ certain weapons, such as fire, unless and until their enemies use them first.

But why do warriors need a code that ties their hands and limits their options? Why should a warrior culture want to restrict the actions of its members and require them to commit to lofty ideals? Might not such restraints cripple their effectiveness as warriors?

What's wrong with, "All's fair in love and war?" Isn't winning all that matters? Why should any warrior be burdened with concerns about honor and shame?

In fact, there are many reasons to maintain warrior's codes. The most obvious is to protect innocent lives. There has never been a war in which innocents did not die, even with warrior codes in place. When there are no codes at all, innocents – those least able to defend themselves - become easy targets for atrocity. War is hellish enough without at least some attempt to limit its scope. When the concepts of guilt and innocence become too complicated to apply, we rely instead on the distinction between combatants and noncombatants.

Not all rules of war, however, relate to the protection of those not directly involved in the conflict. Some limit how warriors can treat other warriors, such as rules about what weapons or tactics of war may be used, as well as those pertaining to the handling of surrenders, POWs, and enemy wounded and dead. Many arguments in favor of such rules are based on the notion of reciprocity with the enemy. We hope that if we treat our enemy's troops well, our own troops will receive equally good treatment. Or perhaps more often than not, we fear that if we *fail* to treat our enemy's troops well, our troops will surely become the objects of retaliation. Yet this tit-for-tat rationale is disturbingly conditional. If reciprocity is our only motive for urging our warriors to show restraint, it will quickly dissolve whenever we fight enemies who do not share our ideas of what is honorable in war.

The disciplined Romans were caught off-guard by the ferocious shock troops of the Celtic and Germanic tribesmen and responded with unspeakable brutality. The British were horrified when they first faced the hit-and-hide tactics of the colonial American militia and some responded by punishing civilians with torture and death. When white settlers moved west, they confronted native tribes who considered stealth an honorable warrior skill and did not always recognize the combatant/noncombatant distinction, while white settlers did not shrink from using biological weapons or attempting genocide against the native peoples. The Japanese claimed to be appalled by Chinese-derived ninja tactics of espionage and assassination yet exercised no restraint in terrorizing their Asian neighbors. The past offers clear warning of the danger when fighting an enemy with different values of violating one's *own* values.

If reciprocity is our only motive for urging our warriors to show restraint, it will quickly dissolve whenever we fight enemies who do not share our ideas of what is honorable in war.

When both sides in a conflict abandon all restraint, another casualty is the hope for peace. When atrocities escalate and conflicts devolve into personal hatreds, cycles of violence can span generations. If each side's violations are answered by reprisals, bringing both sides to the table to discuss terms to end the conflict becomes more and more difficult.

Even warring parties who do not care about the prospect of peace may yet be concerned enough about international opinion to exercise some restraint in their conduct of war. This potentially restraining principle is once again conditional. Not all belligerents will care about international opinion, and some will think that they can hide their actions from scrutiny. And even those nations that do concern themselves with their international images may not effectively translate that concern into appropriate leadership and discipline of the soldiers who represent them.

Within democratic nations, domestic opinion can also be a factor in encouraging warriors to exercise restraint. If public support of a conflict is required in order to sustain funding for it and if that public support depends on the perception that the war is being conducted in an honorable manner, then domestic opinion may encourage strict observation of conduct of war rules. On the other hand, concern about domestic opinion may do no more than inspire cover-ups of any actions by members of the military that might be condemned by the general public.

All of the reasons for restraint I have mentioned thus far are in a sense external to our warriors themselves. The most compelling reason for warriors to accept restraint may be the internal moral damage they risk if they fail to do so and the serious psychological damage they may suffer. The nature of the warrior's calling places him or her in peculiar moral peril. The power to kill with impunity and possibly even to dominate entire foreign cultures could certainly corrupt character and promote hubris. Warriors need the restraint of a warrior's code to keep them from losing their humanity and their ability to enjoy a life worth living outside the realm of combat.

When both sides in a conflict abandon all restraint, another casualty is the hope for peace.

In the introduction to his valuable analysis of Vietnam veterans suffering from post- traumatic stress disorder, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*, psychiatrist Jonathan Shay stresses the importance of "understanding... the specific nature of catastrophic war experiences that not only cause lifelong disabling psychiatric symptoms but can *ruin* good character."[1] Shay has conducted countless personal interviews and therapy sessions with American combat veterans. His work has led him to the conclusion that the most severe cases of post-traumatic stress are the result of wartime experiences that are not simply violent, but which involve what Shay terms the "betrayal of 'what's right.'"[2]

Veterans who believe that they were directly or indirectly party to immoral or dishonorable behavior (perpetrated by themselves, their comrades, or their commanders) have the hardest time reclaiming their lives after the war is over. Such men may be tortured by persistent nightmares, may have trouble discerning a safe environment from a threatening one, may not be able to trust their friends, neighbors, family members, or government, and many have problems with alcohol, drugs, child or spousal abuse, depression, and suicidal tendencies. As Shay sorrowfully concludes, "The painful paradox is that fighting for one's country can render one unfit to be its citizen."[3]

Warriors need a way to distinguish what they must do out of a sense of duty from what a serial killer does for the sheer sadistic pleasure of it. Their actions, like those of the serial killer, set them apart from the rest of society. Warriors, however, are not sociopaths. They respect the values of the society in which they were raised and which they are prepared to die to protect. It is therefore imperative for them to conduct themselves in such a way that they will be honored and esteemed by their communities, not reviled and rejected by them. They want to be seen as proud defenders and representatives of what is best about their culture: as heroes, not "baby-killers."

In a sense, the nature of the warrior's profession puts him or her at a higher risk for moral corruption than most other occupations because it involves exerting power in matters of life and death. Warriors exercise the power to take or save lives, order others to take or save lives, and lead or send others to their deaths. If they take this awesome responsibility too lightly – if they lose sight of the moral significance of their actions – they risk losing their humanity and their ability to flourish in human society.

In his powerful work, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, Lt. Col. Dave Grossman illuminates the process by which those in war and those training for war attempt to achieve emotional distance from their enemies. The practice of dehumanizing the enemy through the use of abusive or euphemistic language is a common and effective tool for increasing aggression and breaking down inhibitions against killing. Yet this process can be taken too far. If there is excessive dehumanization of the enemy–if warriors genuinely come to believe, deep down, that their enemies are somehow less than human–the result is often lingering psychological trauma.

Like Shay, Grossman has interviewed many U.S. veterans of the Vietnam War. Grossman found that some of the men

he interviewed had never truly achieved emotional distance from their former foes. Interestingly, these men seemed to be better off for having held on to their respect for the humanity of their enemies. They expressed admiration for Vietnamese culture. Some had even married Vietnamese women. Most significantly, they appeared to be leading happy and productive post-war lives. In contrast, those who persisted in viewing the Vietnamese as "less than animals" were unable to leave the war behind them.

Dr. Shay describes an intimate connection between the psychological health of the veteran and the respect he feels for those he fought. Shay stresses how important it is to the warrior to have the conviction that he participated in an *honorable* endeavor. Dr. Shay writes:

> *"Restoring honor to the enemy is an essential step in recovery from combat PTSD. While other things are obviously needed as well, the veteran's self-respect never fully recovers so long as he is unable to see the enemy as worthy. In the words of one of our patients, a war against subhuman vermin "has no honor."* [4]

He notes that this true either in victory or defeat.

Shay finds echoes of these ideas in the words of World War II veteran J. Glenn Gray from Gray's modern classic on the experience of war, *The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle*. Gray brings home the agony of the warrior who has become incapable of honoring his enemies and thus is unable to find redemption himself. Gray writes:

> *"The ugliness of a war against an enemy conceived to be subhuman can hardly be exaggerated. There is an unredeemed quality to battle experienced under these conditions, which blunts all senses and perceptions. Traditional appeals of war are corroded by the demands of a war of extermination, where conventional rules no longer apply. For all its inhumanity, war is a profoundly human institution.... This image of the enemy as beast lessens even the satisfaction in destruction, for there is no proper regard for the worth of the object destroyed.... The joys of comradeship, keenness of perception, and sensual delights [are] lessened.... No aesthetic reconciliation with one's fate as a warrior [is] likely because no moral [reconciliation is] possible."* [5]

By setting standards of behavior for themselves, accepting certain restraints, and even "honoring their enemies," warriors can create a lifeline that will allow them to pull themselves out of the hell of war and reintegrate themselves into their society, should they survive to see peace restored. A warrior's code may cover everything from the treatment of prisoners of war to oath keeping to table etiquette, but its primary purpose is to grant nobility to the warriors' profession. This allows warriors to retain both their self-respect and the respect of those they guard.

Nor is it just "boots on the ground" front-line and special forces troops who need the protection of a warrior's code. Every warrior sent into combat risks moral damage. Men and women who fight from a distance – who drop bombs or shoot missiles from planes or ships or submarines – are also in danger of losing their humanity. What threatens them is the very ease by which they can take lives. As technology separates individuals from the results of their actions, it cheats them of the chance to absorb and reckon with the enormity of what they have done. Killing fellow human beings, even for the noblest cause, should never feel like nothing more than a game played using the latest advances in virtual reality.

Nor is it just "boots on the ground" front-line and special forces troops who need the protection of a warrior's code. Every warrior sent into combat risks moral damage.

In his book *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*, international journalist and scholar Michael

Ignatieff airs his concerns about the morality of asymmetric conflicts in which one side is able to inflict large numbers of casualties from afar without putting its own forces at much risk (for example, by relying primarily on long-range precision weapons and high- altitude air assaults). In such a mismatched fight, it may be easy for those fighting on the superior side to fail to appreciate the true costs of the war, since they are not forced to witness the death and destruction first-hand. Distance warriors may not feel the moral weight of what they do. Ignatieff warns modern warriors against the "moral danger" they face if they allow themselves to become too detached from the reality of war. He writes:

> Virtual reality is seductive. ...We see war as a surgical scalpel and not a bloodstained sword. In so doing we mis-describe ourselves as we mis-describe the instruments of death. We need to stay away from such fables of self-righteous invulnerability. Only then can we get our hands dirty. Only then can we do what is right.[6]

Warriors who dehumanize their enemies by equating them with blips on a computer screen may find the sense that they are part of an honorable undertaking far too fragile to sustain. Just as societies have an obligation to treat their warriors as ends in themselves, it is important for warriors to show a similar kind of respect for the inherent worth and dignity of their opponents. Even long-distance warriors can achieve this by acknowledging that some of the "targets" they destroy are in fact human beings, not just empty statistics. The further war evolves away from armies of declared and uniformed combatants lining up across an open field, the more need for strict codes of discrimination and proportionality.

The morality of benefiting from technological advances that make it possible to kill at a greater distance has made proponents of ethical warfare nervous for centuries. Pope Urban II in 1097 outlawed the use of one of the earliest instruments of death-at-a-distance, the crossbow. In 1139 Pope Innocent II went even further, threatening anyone who used the crossbow with excommunication and condemning the weapon as, "hateful to God and unfit to be used among Christians."

It is precisely this suspicion of technology-enhanced distance warfare – the idea that it is somehow less honorable or brave than the up-close-and-personal combat of the traditional battlefield – that may have led some modern warriors to go to even greater lengths to identify themselves with a demanding warrior's code. From the first use of aerial combat, fighter pilots have self-consciously compared themselves not to foot soldiers with crossbows but to knights on horseback. They have adopted the ideals, and even the language, of chivalry.

The further war evolves away from armies of declared and uniformed combatants lining up across an open field, the more need for strict codes of discrimination and proportionality.

One of these knights of the air was Sir Hugh C.T. Dowding, a fighter pilot for the Royal Air Force in World War I and strategist for the Battle of Britain in World War II. Dowding was passionately committed to maintaining the nobility of his vocation. An incident from the First World War illustrates this plainly. Dowding's squadron brought down a German aircraft. He was then appalled to see the pilot and crewman shot while climbing out of their wrecked plane by ground troops. In an attempt to redeem what he saw as soiled British honor, Dowding gathered up the personal effects of the two dead Germans and dropped them behind enemy lines along with a note saying exactly where their bodies were buried.[7]

There was no law or international convention that required Major Dowding to go to such lengths. It was his own warrior's code that prompted him to act. He clearly

believed that there must be things that honorable warriors simply do not do, regardless of the provocation.

Similar sentiments were behind a story I heard from an older gentleman who approached me after I spoke about the warrior's code to a Kiwanis Club meeting in Reisterstown, Maryland. This man, whom I will call "Dan," told me that he had been a fighter pilot in World War II in the Pacific Theater. Near the end of the war, he was commanding a squadron over Tokyo. They flew a mission near a crowded train station, where hundreds of people were desperately pushing to climb aboard trains that could take them away from the besieged city. Acting against direct orders, one member of the squadron broke formation, flew down and strafed some of the helpless Japanese civilians.

When they returned from this mission, no one in the squadron would speak to the pilot who had murdered the noncombatants. Tears filled Dan's eyes as he told me the conclusion of this sixty-year-old story: "We were all so ashamed of what he had done. He had shamed the entire squadron. He was killed in an engagement two days later. And, God help us, we were *glad*."

Today, as throughout history, the warriors' code is the shield that guards their humanity.

Warriors who retain the capacity to feel shame have not yet lost their hold on their humanity. In Homer's *Iliad*, we know that the great Achilles has crossed the line and surrendered his humanity to war when he abuses the body of his noble opponent, Prince Hector of Troy. The god Apollo describes Achilles, the former warrior, turned killer:

His twisted mind is set on what he wants,
As vage as a lion bristling with pride,
Attacking men's flocks to make himself a feast.
Achilles has lost all pity and has no shame left.
Shame sometimes hurts men, but it helps them, too.
... But this man? After he kills Hector,
He ties him behind his chariot
And drags him around his dear friend's tomb.
Does this make him a better or nobler man?
He should fear our wrath, good as he may be,
For he defiles the dumb earth in his rage.[8]

When Achilles desecrates the body of Hector by dragging it behind his chariot, it is clear that Achilles has been damaged by war. Something has died inside him. He can no longer honor his enemy, so he no longer has honor himself. As Apollo says, he has lost all sense of shame. The truth of Apollo's accusation highlights the wisdom of one of the edicts found in the *Bushido* code of the Japanese samurai: "A sense of shame will uphold justice."[9]

Legend has it that when a Spartan mother sent her son off to war she would say to him, "Come back with your shield or on it." If a warrior came back without his shield, it meant that he had laid it down in order to break ranks and run from battle. He was supposed to use his shield to protect the man next to him in formation, so to abandon his shield was not only to be a coward but also to break faith with his comrades. To come back on his shield was to be carried back mortally wounded or dead. Thus the adage meant that the young warrior should fight bravely, maintain his martial discipline, and return with his honor intact: "Death before dishonor."

The warriors' mothers who spoke this line were not heartless monsters–far from it. It was spoken from great love. They wanted their children to return with their sense of self- respect still with them, feeling justifiably proud of how they had performed under pressure, not tortured and destroyed by guilt and shame. To come back with their shields was to come back still feeling like warriors, not like cowards or murderers.

Today, as throughout history, the warriors' code is the shield that guards their humanity. Modern warriors must balance the physical risks of combat against the moral risks. And they may face enemies who will try to use their values

and their commitment to a code against them. Is it worse to come home on your shield or to come home without it? It is a question you must answer for yourself. But I will leave you with the words of Seneca, a Roman Stoic:

> *[I will never let concern for my] flesh drive me to fear, never to a role that is unworthy of a good man. ...I will not allow any wound to penetrate through the body to the real me. My body is that part of me that can be injured; but within this fragile dwelling-place lives a soul that is free.*[10]

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Call for Papers

The Next 70 Years:

Innovation: Character Development for Future Leaders—of the Air Force and Beyond

In the closing days of World War II, America's airpower pioneers—like Generals Henry "Hap" Arnold and Carl A. Spaatz—knew that our nation's future security and prosperity were directly tied to the establishment of a dedicated Air Force to gain and attain mastery of the "third dimension of warfare." Their vision came to pass on 18 September 1947 with the National Security Act that formally established a Department of the Air Force. In the 70 years since, our Air Force's men and women have devised, built, and led the employment of global power, reach and vigilance. They have fought increasingly complex and lengthy wars with unprecedented precision and power; pioneered, stewarded, and conducted much of humanity's expansion into space; crisscrossed the globe to provide humanitarian missions; and have been at the tip of the spear in defining and employing the 21st century cyber domain.

What is past, however successful, is merely prelude. What comes next for our Air Force as battlespaces, technologies, capabilities, societies and adversaries evolve or emerge? As Academy Distinguished Graduate Ervin Rokke has said, "how do we reconcile the three variables of a rapidly changing profession of arms, a new generation of leaders, and a set of important and enduring values?" Put differently, how do we prepare young people to lead with character in a complex, dynamic environment?

As JCLI's home institution prepares to observe the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the U.S. Air Force, **we solicit manuscripts that explore how principles, methods, and ideas for development of character and leadership should be sustained, adapted, or replaced to effectively respond to the evolution of future social, political, technological and military demands.** This call for papers specifically seeks both exposition of how particular character or leadership development approaches have stood the test of time and can continue to serve as effective preparation for future challenges. Of equal interest are those works of scholarship and essays advocating innovative means of developing values-based leadership for tomorrow's leaders and settings. Subthemes of particular interest are the development of *commitment* as a component of enhancing character and leadership; character development in the presence of evolving environmental factors such as social media, future-casting, work-force evolution or operationally-based technology changes; and the definition and impact of *defining moments* on leaders' character.

This focus area does *not* restrict scholars' freedom to submit manuscripts for consideration on other topics of interest; rather, it seeks to enable the upcoming issue of JCLI to provide useful energy to intellectual preparation for the U.S. Air Force's next seventy years, while contributing to a broader discussion on the development and manifestation of sound character and good, ethical leadership in the rapidly-changing, diverse and incredibly interconnected future that lies ahead.

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The Journal of Character and Leadership Integration intentionally juxtaposes scholarly and applied understanding of the integration of character and leadership. Its purpose is to illuminate character and leadership development as interdependent areas of study whose integrated understanding is directly relevant to the profession of arms. Consequently, JCLI applies the highest standards to guide publication of scholarly work–to include blind-peer review by recognized experts across the character and leadership development spectrum–while also welcoming thoughtful, practical and well-articulated perspectives relevant to that same continuum.

Manuscripts should normally align with one or more of the following categories: Educational Methods & Techniques, Theory Development, Individual Development, Organizational Development and Culture, Empirical Research, Student Perspectives, or Senior Leader Perspectives. Manuscripts outside these categories will be considered if relevant to the broad purposes of the Journal. Submissions are welcome from military and non-military contributors alike. Articles may be submitted to JCLI in two categories: **scholarly contributions** intended for double-blind peer review, and **applied leadership and integration articles/essays** which provide a complementary, practical perspective on JCLI-relevant scholarly topics.

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